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Introduction
On March 7, 1997,... Theodore Johnson violently attacked his
ex-girlfriend Vanessa Parker as she walked home from the
supermarket with her three daughters. [He] approached Parker
and struck her in the back of the head, knocking her against a
fence. The baby carriage Parker was wheeling, carrying their child,
was also knocked over. Parker's two older children, 7 and 12 years
old, immediately began to cry. [Johnson] yelled and cursed at
Parker about previously putting him in jail (Parker already had an
order of protection against defendant in connection with a prior
harassment incident). He grabbed her by the back of the neck,
dragged her to her apartment entrance, ordered her to unlock the
apartment and knocked her head against the door.
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Parker's 12-year-old daughter picked up the baby carriage and the
children followed them inside. Once inside, [Johnson] pushed
Parker up the steps into the apartment, again causing her to fall.
He continued his cursing, telling her that he would "leave [her] in
the house for dead" and then she would "see how [her] children
would like being motherless." After entering the apartment, the
children went directly to their bedroom. [Johnson] followed Parker
into the living room, and continued to beat her with his hands, feet
and a metal pipe. Defendant also threw cups, plates and glasses at
the walls and at Parker. He continued his verbal abuse, cursing and
yelling at Parker for calling the police about past incidents of abuse.
Trapped in their room, the children could hear the glass breaking,
Parker's screams and defendant's yelling. [Johnson's] reign of
terror lasted for over 10 hours. Parker was finally able to sneak out
of the apartment and call the police. Only after [his] arrest did the
children emerge from the bedroom, where they were exposed to
broken glass and debris strewn around the living room. Later,
when [Johnson] was in jail awaiting trial, he threatened to beat
Parker if she did not drop the charges against him.
1
In the past two decades, researchers have amassed an impressive
body of empirical data demonstrating the negative impact of exposure
to domestic violence upon children's psychological development and
1. People v. Johnson, 740 N.E.2d 1075, 1075-76 (N.Y. 2000).
2. The term "domestic violence," as used in this Article, refers to violence between
adult intimate partners. The broader term "family violence" refers more generally to the
range of types of intrafamily violence, including domestic violence, child maltreatment,
and elder abuse. Lucy Salcido Carter et al., Domestic Violence and Children: Analysis
and Recommendations, 9 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
CHILDREN 4, 15 n.1 (1999), available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/dvc/index.htm.
Because most victims of serious domestic violence are female and most perpetrators
male, I use gendered language in this Article. Importantly, however, the analyses and
conclusions in this Article apply as well to circumstances in which gender roles are
reversed, and to situations involving same-sex intimate partners. In addition, appropriate
services of the type discussed herein should be available for all victims of severe domestic
violence, irrespective of gender or sexual orientation.
Substantial evidence exists for the conclusion that females are disproportionately
represented among domestic violence victims. For example, the U.S. Department of
Justice reports that women are victims in 85% of incidents of violence between intimates
partners. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON
CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS 1 (1998),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vi.pdf. [hereinafter VIOLENCE BY
INTIMATES] (reporting data for the years 1992 through 1996). Survey data collected by
the National Institute of Justice and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("NIJ-
CDC") indicate that women are three times more likely than men to report having been
assaulted physically or sexually by an intimate partner. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY
THOENNES, PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 6-7
(Nov. 1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/172837.pdf.
A minority of researchers, however, relies on other self-report survey data to
conclude that women engage in more physical aggression toward intimate partners than
do men, see, e.g., John Archer, Sex Differences in Aggression Between Heterosexual
[Vol. 53
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Partners: A Meta-Analytic Review, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 651 (2000), or that husbands and
wives display fairly similar levels of violence towards the other, see Murray A. Straus &
Richard J. Gelles, How Violent are American Families? Estimates from the National
Family Violence Resurvey and Other Studies, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN
FAMILIES 95 (Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles eds., 1990). Yet, Murray Straus and
others who report some of these data caution against extrapolating from these data to
reach certain conclusions. For example, research reveals that men tend to "under-report"
their own violent behavior. See, e.g., Jan E. Stets & Murray A. Straus, Gender Differences
in Reporting Marital Violence and Its Medical and Psychological Consequences, in
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 151, 156 (Murray A. Straus & Richard J.
Gelles eds., 1990) (indicating that "data on violence by men obtained from men needs to
be treated with skepticism"); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 32 (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996)
[hereinafter NRC]. Furthermore, research consistently reveals that women far outnumber
men as victims of serious intimate violence. See, e.g., NRC, supra at 163 ("survey findings
and health and crime data ... indicate ... that women are more frequently and more
seriously injured by intimates than are men"); Stets & Straus, supra at 163 (pointing out
that women tend to sustain more physical injury, require more medical attention, and lose
more time from work because of domestic violence than do men). In the NIJ-CDC report,
Tjaden and Thoennes point out that:
differences between women's and men's rates of physical assault by an intimate
partner become greater as the seriousness of the assault increases. For example,
women were two to three times more likely than men to report that an intimate
partner threw something that could hurt or pushed, grabbed or shoved them.
However, they were 7 to 14 times more likely to report that an intimate partner
beat them up, choked or tried to drown them, threatened them with a gun, or
actually used a gun on them.
TJADEN & THOENNES, supra at 7. In addition, women are much more likely than are men
to be killed by intimate partners. VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES, supra at 6. See also infra
note 33. In 1995, Richard Gelles, one of the researchers whose work has been used to
challenge the notion that domestic violence disproportionately endangers women, drafted
an article dispelling this and other myths about domestic violence. Richard J. Gelles,
Domestic Violence Factoids, available at http:/lwwv.mincava.umn.edulpaperslfactoid.htm
(Sept. 3, 2001). One of the myths Professor Gelles disputes is the assertion that "women
are as violent as are men, and women initiate violence as often as do men." Id. He
clarifies:
This factoid cites research by Murray Straus, Suzanne Steinmetz, and Richard
Gelles, as well as a host of other self-report surveys. Those using this factoid
tend to conveniently leave out the fact that Straus and his colleagues' surveys as
well as data collected from the National Crime Victimization Survey (Bureau of
Justice Statistics) consistently find that no matter what the rate of violence or
who initiates the violence, women are 7 to 10 times more likely to be injured in
acts of intimate violence than are men.
Id. See also Richard A. Berk et al., Mutual Combat and Other Family Violence Myths, in
THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 197 (David
Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983).
For further discussion of the controversies surrounding gender roles in domestic
violence, see Jeffrey Fagan & Angela Browne, Violence Between Spouses and Intimates:
Physical Aggression Between Women and Men in Intimate Relationships, in 3
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 115, 167-71 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. &
Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994); Archer, supra, and Jacquelyn W. White et al., Intimate Partner
Aggression-What Have we Learned? Comment on Archer (2000), 126 PSYCHOL. BULL.
November 2001]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
functioning.3 Exposed children may develop a range of social,
emotional, and academic problems, including aggressive conduct,
anxiety symptoms, emotional withdrawal, and serious difficulties in
school.' Research also suggests that these children are more likely
than are children from nonviolent homes to develop emotional and
adjustment problems as adults, including repetition of the patterns of
violence they observed as children The data clearly demonstrate
that growing up in violent homes is detrimental to children, even
when children are not direct victims of physical or sexual abuse.
Researchers have observed, in fact, that samples of children exposed
to domestic violence display symptoms and difficulties quite similar to
children who have been direct victims of physical abuse.6 In addition,
there are children who are exposed to domestic violence and are
690 (2000).
3. For summaries of the empirical research on the effects of domestic violence on
children, see B.B. Robbie Rossman, Longer Term Effects of Children's Exposure to
Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF CHILDREN: THE FUTURE
OF RESEARCH, INTERVENTION, AND SOCIAL POLICY 35 (Sandra A. Graham-Bermann &
Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2001) [hereinafter DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF
CHILDREN]; B.B. ROBBIE ROSSMAN ET AL., CHILDREN AND INTERPARENTAL
VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF ExPOSURE 11-64 (2000) [hereinafter INTERPARENTAL
VIOLENCE]; Jeffrey L. Edleson, Children's Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence, 14 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 839 (1999) [hereinafter Edleson, Children's Witnessing];
Gayla Margolin, Effects of Domestic Violence on Children, in VIOLENCE AGAINST
CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 57 (Penelope K. Trickett & Cynthia J.
Schellenbach eds., 1998) [hereinafter VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY];
Janis Wolak & David Finkelhor, Children Exposed to Partner Violence, in PARTNER
VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF 20 YEARS OF RESEARCH 73 (Jana L.
Jasinksi & Linda M. Williams eds., 1998); Alan J. Tompkins et al., The Plight of Children
Who Witness Woman Battering: Psychological Knowledge and Policy Implications, 18
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 143 (1992); PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF
BATTERED WOMEN (1990). See also infra notes 372-407 and accompanying text.
4. INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 11-32; Margolin, supra note 3, at 62-
77; Edleson, Children's Witnessing, supra note 3, at 846-61; JAFFE ET AL., supra note 3, at
32-73.
5. See Edleson, Children's Witnessing, supra note 3, at 860-61; Fagan & Browne,
supra note 2, at 194-95, 211-12; Margolin, supra note 3, at 63-64; Cosandra McNeal & Paul
R. Amato, Parents' Marital Violence: Long-Term Consequences for Children, 19 J. FAM.
ISSUES 123 (1998). See also Gerald T. Hotaling et al., Intrafamily Violence and Crime and
Violence Outside the Family, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 431
(Murray A. Straus & Richard A. Gelles eds., 1990). Despite the repeated observation that
children exposed to violence are more likely to engage in such acts as adolescents and
adults, some investigators urge caution because the empirical studies rely substantially on
retrospective self-reports and may be characterized by a range of other methodological
limitations. See, e.g., OLA W. BARNETT ET AL., FAMILY VIOLENCE ACROSS THE
LIFESPAN: AN INTRODUCTION 14 (1997); Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Violence Beget
Violence? A Critical Examination of the Literature, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Peter Jaffe et al., Similarities in Behavioral and Social Maladjustment
Among Child Victims and Witnesses to Family Violence, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
142 (1986).
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victims of direct physical or sexual abuse.7 Not surprisingly, these
"multiply-victimized" children reveal levels of psychological and
behavioral disturbance that are even more severe than those
displayed by children who have experienced only one form of
victimization.'
Whereas the 1960s and 1970s brought with them widespread
professional and public concern about children who are physically
abused,9 and the 1980s and 1990s brought similar attention to the
plight of children who are sexually abused," we are now witnessing
increasing concern about children exposed to domestic violence.
For example, in the past several years, major professional
organizations, such as the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges," the American Bar Association, 3 the American
7. Research reveals that in approximately 45% to 70% of the families in which
domestic violence or child abuse is discovered, the other type of abuse exists as well. See,
e.g., Margolin, supra note 3, at 60-61. See also Jeffrey L. Edleson, The Overlap Between
Child Maltreatment and Woman Battering, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134 (1999)
[hereinafter Edleson, The Overlap]. Early research reports suggest that the co-occurrence
of domestic violence and physical child abuse presents a particularly salient risk factor for
subsequent child homicide perpetrated by the domestic violence offender. Id. at 143-44.
S. INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 17; Edleson, Children's Witnessing,
supra note 3, at 861-62; Margolin, supra note 3, at 60; Kimberly L. Shipman et al., Co-
Occurrence of Spousal Violence and Child Abuse: Conceptual Implications, 4 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 93, 99-100 (1999). See generally, MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION OF
CHILDREN: CONCEPTUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL, RESEARCH AND TREATMENT ISSUES
(B.B. Robbie Rossman et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION].
9. See, e.g., SETH C. KALICHMAN, MANDATED REPORTING OF SUSPECTED CHILD
ABUSE: ETHICS, LAW, & POLICY 12-17 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the historical events
leading to public and professional attention to child abuse in the United States).
10. See, e.g., Penelope K. Trickett & Frank W. Putnam, Developmental Consequences
of Child Sexual Abuse, in VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY, supra note 3,
at 39, 39-40 (indicating that public and professional attention to the prevalence of sexual
abuse increased dramatically during the 1980s and 1990s).
11. The increasing concern about children exposed to domestic violence may reflect
the broader concern about psychological or emotional maltreatment. Some researchers
and practitioners have suggested that exposure to domestic violence is a form of
psychological or emotional maltreatment. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOL. AsS'N, VIOLENCE
AND THE FAMILY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 50 (1996). See also
INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 5-6. The scientific and policy issues relating
to concepts of psychological maltreatment are reviewed below, as well as the theoretical
relationships between concepts of psychological maltreatment and children's exposure to
domestic violence. See infra notes 293-347 and accompanying text.
12. NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, EFFECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD MALTREATMENT CASES:
GUIDELINES FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE (1999) [hereinafter THE GREEN BOOK]. This
document, referred to by those in the field as "The Green Book" because of the color of
its cover, has become the guidepost for agencies and professionals who seek to promote
the well-being of children exposed to domestic violence through effective agency and
community intervention. The Recommendations were authored for the National Council
PROTECTING CHILDRENNovember 2001]
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Psychological Association,14 and the American Medical Association, 5
as well as government agencies,16 have sponsored conferences,
convened task forces, commissioned reports, or published
recommendations addressing the policy issues related to protecting
and assisting children exposed to domestic violence.
The obvious question confronting researchers, practitioners, and
policymakers is how society can best prevent children's exposure to
domestic violence and assist those children already exposed.
Fortunately, in many locations, social scientists, medical and mental
health professionals, social service and law enforcement personnel,
domestic violence workers, educators, and others have begun to
formulate training and practice guidelines and policies so that the
various systems that encounter these children can respond in an
appropriate and useful manner.7 There is a growing consensus about
by two of the most influential pioneers in the field, Susan Schechter and Jeffrey Edleson,
with significant contributions by many highly-respected experts representing the judiciary,
child welfare, domestic violence workers, and policymakers.
In addition, after intense competition from around the country, six communities have
been chosen by the U.S. Department of Justice and Department of Health and Human
Services to receive federal funding for local implementation and evaluation of the Green
Book principles. See Dep't of Justice & Dep't of Health & Human Servs., A
Demonstration Initiative to Address Domestic Violence and Child Maltreatment
(Program description on file with the Hastings Law Journal, received 5/7101). The
communities selected are: Santa Clara County, California; San Francisco, California; Lane
County, Oregon; El Paso County, Colorado; St. Louis County, Missouri; and Grafton
County, New Hampshire.
13. Howard A. Davidson, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Children: A Report to
the President of the American Bar Association, 1994 A.B.A. Ctr. on Children and the Law.
14. AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N, supra note 11.
15. AM. MED. ASS'N, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: HEALTH
AND JUSTICE (1994).
16. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SAFE FROM THE START: TAKING ACTION ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO
VIOLENCE (2000), available from National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 800-851-
3420 or at http://ncjrs.org/htmllojjdp/summary-safefromstart/index.html [hereinafter
OJJDP]. This publication is a product of a National Summit held on June 22, 1999:
"Attorney General Janet Reno and Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna E.
Shalala, with the leadership of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, brought together
150 practitioners and policymakers" to address how to prevent and reduce "the negative
impact of children's exposure to violence." See id. In addition, the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention has launched its "Safe Start Initiative," to implement
the policies embodied in the report in nine sites around the country. See News Release,
Office of Justice Programs, Deputy Attorney General Announces New Effort to Help
Children Exposed to Domestic Violence (Feb. 29, 2000), available at
http:lojjdp.ncjrs.orglaboutpress/ojpOO0229.html. After a competitive review of 208
applications, OJJDP selected the following locales as recipients to share over $6 million
over 5 years to address the needs of children exposed to domestic violence: San
Francisco, CA; Bridgeport, CT; Pinellas County, FL; Chicago, IL; Washington County,
ME; Baltimore, MD; Rochester, NY; Chatham County, NC; and Spokane, WA.
17. See, e.g., THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12; Davidson, The Impact of Domestic
[Vol. 53
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the need for coordinated, community-based approaches to the
problem of children's exposure to domestic violence, grounded in the
collaboration of the various service systems that encounter these
children and their families.'8 Less clear, however, is how lawmakers
should respond, and what types of policy initiatives will promote
these children's well-being.
There have been a variety of responses by state legislatures.
Certain statutory trends are lauded by a broad range of
constituencies, whereas others engender substantial controversy. For
example, almost all states have adopted statutory language directing
family court judges to consider parental perpetration of domestic
violence as a factor in custody decisionmaking, and several states
have enacted a statutory presumption against a child's placement with
a perpetrator of domestic violence. 9 In the past few years, several
states have passed laws alloving or mandating sentencing "upgrades"
for domestic violence offenses perpetrated "in the presence of a
child, 20 and other states are considering such legislation presently.2'
Although the passage and implementation of these custody and
criminal statutes has not been completely free from controversy,' the
most vociferous debate has been reserved for proposals to expand the
juvenile court's dependency jurisdiction to include children exposed
to domestic violence.3 Although several states have passed statutes
that strive to promote child protective services and juvenile court
involvement in domestic violence cases, the success of these statutes
in achieving their asserted goals is mixed, at best. One statute was
repealed and another one revised within a year of enactment, because
of unintended negative effects. 4 Other statutes languish, unused, in
the code books, as if they did not even exist, while at least one state's
Violence on Children, supra note 13; NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT
JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE: EMERGING PROGRAMS FOR BATrERED MOTHERS AND
THEIR CHILDREN (1998) [hereinafter EMERGING PROGRAMS]; NAT'L COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, THE FIRST NATIONAL SUMMIT: EXPLORING
EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & CHILD MALTREATMENT (Sept.
2000) [hereinafter FIRST NATIONAL SUMMIT]; OJJDP, supra note 16.
18. Thus, for example, these approaches envision that hospital emergency room staff,
child protection and domestic violence workers, school personnel, police, and others
would work together in identifying and responding to children exposed to domestic
violence. See THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 16-26; Carter et al., supra note 2, at 7-
10.
19. See infra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 37-47, 61-66 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 98-151 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 454-77 and accompanying text discussing events relating to passage
and repeal of statutes in Minnesota and Florida.
25. See infra notes 439-53 and accompanying text.
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statutory reform seems off to a promising start.26 In this Article, I
seek to understand these diverse findings and to identify the
components of successful and effective statutory reform in this area.
The focus of this Article is an examination of statutes that
characterize children's exposure to domestic violence as a form of
child abuse or neglect for the purpose of triggering child protective
investigations and services, and if deemed necessary, juvenile court
proceedings.2 I evaluate the soundness of this child protection
strategy from theoretical and practical standpoints, and make
recommendations as to the types of policy initiatives that are most
likely to achieve their stated goals while minimizing unintended
negative consequences.
First, in order to clarify how the statutes that are the focus of this
Article fit into the landscape of state policies seeking to protect
children from such exposure, I discuss the various categories of
pertinent statutes. I then focus on statutes that expand the reach of
the juvenile court and child protective services by characterizing
children's exposure to domestic violence as a form of child abuse or
neglect. In addition, I address the policy arguments that have been
advanced in support of and against inclusion of such exposure as an
independent ground for juvenile court jurisdiction.
In Part II, I examine the history and development of our
country's present-day legal responses to child maltreatment. This
Part underscores that identification of child maltreatment as a social
problem requiring legal intervention results from complex
interactions of social, economic, and political forces. It traces
traditions of care and control of our country's "dependent" and
"victimized" children from precolonial to modem times, examining
some of those forces that have influenced varied legal responses at
particular points in our nation's history.
In Part III, I address whether children's exposure to domestic
violence should be considered a form of child maltreatment. The first
section of this Part focuses particular attention on the philosophy,
jurisdictional bases, and interventions of the juvenile court in child
maltreatment cases, and explores emerging concepts of psychological
maltreatment and their use to authorize juvenile court dependency
jurisdiction. The second Section of Part III describes what is meant
by "exposure" to domestic violence, summarizes empirical research as
to the effects of such exposure on children, and examines whether
inclusion of these cases is consistent, theoretically and practically,
26. See infra notes 478-522 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 69-71 and 254-66 and accompanying text for discussions of the




with the juvenile court's traditional roles and actual functioning. In
so doing, I discuss the case law of two states, New York and
California, which have interpreted existing child maltreatment
statutes to incorporate domestic violence exposure cases. In this Part,
I conclude that the scientific data are strong enough to justify a
legislative finding that certain exposures of children to domestic
violence create a substantial likelihood of psychological and physical
harm to children, and thus should be brought within the juvenile
court's dependency jurisdiction.
In Part IV, I evaluate how child maltreatment statutes addressing
children's exposure to domestic violence are working in those
jurisdictions that have adopted them. I identify factors that
contribute to their success, or lack thereof. In addition, I examine
what is happening in states that have not enacted new statutes
formally defining childhood exposure to domestic violence as child
maltreatment. Some states, such as Massachusetts, have actively
sought to create change "from the inside out." That is, they have
reformed internal child protective services' policies and procedures in
dealing with cases of childhood exposure to domestic violence. In
other states, such as New York, the courts have interpreted existing
statutes to encompass childhood exposure to domestic violence. Yet,
no system-wide initiatives have introduced state-of-the-art policies,
procedures, or programs into the handling of cases involving domestic
violence.
Finally, in Part V, I present a blueprint for legal reform. I
conclude that a statute explicitly bringing children exposed to
domestic violence within the dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile
court offers the promise of interrupting the violence that places these
children's psychological well-being at risk. I emphasize, however,
that in order to improve these children's lives, legislation must be
narrowly-drawn and must set forth a clear philosophy of intervention,
consistent with the guidelines set forth by the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, American Bar Association, and
others, as described within this Article.' In addition, the state must
build its capacity to respond to these cases, through development of a
variety of training, screening, and intervention initiatives. In order to
maximize success, the state must insure that all of its statutes,
including criminal and child custody statutes, work together in
responding to domestic violence. Furthermore, coordination among
different courts and agencies is necessary to an effective state
response.
States that expand the juvenile court's jurisdiction to encompass
cases of childhood exposure to domestic violence must calculate the
28. See infra notes 566-92 and accompanying text.
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funding necessary for effective implementation and program
evaluation, and must appropriate such funds. Systematic program
evaluation will allow legislators to determine whether their
enactments are having the intended effects. Despite the challenges
inherent in conducting research of this type, states must strive to
examine the impact of their policies, for only when armed with such
information can we begin to understand whether children who are
exposed to domestic violence are indeed "better off" as a result of the
state's intervention in their families.
I. Recent Statutory Approaches to Protecting Children from
Exposure to Domestic Violence
In the past several years, a number of states have passed statutes
with the explicit purpose of protecting children exposed to domestic
violence. These statutes vary, however, in language and scope, and
with respect to the mechanisms they employ to achieve their stated
and apparent purposes.
A. Types of Statutes
There are three primary categories of statutes, each type
targeting different facets of the family's interactions with the legal
system, addressing somewhat different legal issues, and making
available different types of state intervention. One group of laws
addresses statutory criteria for the determination of child custody in
private disputes between parents, usually in the context of divorce. A
second category includes criminal laws that create penalty "upgrades"
for certain domestic violence crimes when committed "in the
presence of a child." Third, states have passed laws that construe
childhood exposure to domestic violence as a type of child
maltreatment.
(1) Child Custody Disputes between Private Parties
As policymakers have become more knowledgeable about the
risks to children of exposure to domestic violence, they have
attempted to provide guidance to family court judges charged with
determining children's best interests for the purpose of private
custody contests between parents. 9  Some statutes require or
29. Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991); Family Violence
Project of the Nat'l Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges, Family Violence in Child
Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197 (1995);
Marjory D. Fields, The Impact of Spouse Abuse on Children and Its Relevance in Custody
and Visitation Decisions in New York State, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 221 (1994);
Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do for
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encourage judges to consider, when making custody decisions, the
existence of domestic violence in the family or the impact of the
domestic violence on the child? Other statutes require the court to
consider evidence of domestic violence and require a written
justification if a child is placed in the custody of a parent who has
perpetrated domestic violence."' Still other statutes, consistent with a
model code developed by the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges,"z explicitly create a rebuttable presumption
against custodial placement with a perpetrator of domestic violence.3
Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W.VA. L. REV. 237 (1999); Lynne R. Kurtz,
Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the Creation of a Rebuttable
Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60 ALB. L. REV.
1345, 1350 n.38 (1997) (reporting that forty-four states and District of Columbia have
statutes or case law requiring or recommending that evidence of domestic violence be
considered in child custody cases); Nancy K.D. Lemon, Custody and Visitation Trends in
the United States in Domestic Violence Cases, in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: CURRENT ISSUES IN RESEARCH, INTERVENTION, PREVENTION, AND
POLICY DEVELOPMENT 329 (Robert A. Geffner et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter CHILDREN
EXPOSED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE]; Amy B. Levin, Child Witnesses of Domestic Violence:
How Should Judges Apply the Best Interests of the Child Standard in Custody and
Visitation Cases Involving Domestic Violence? 47 UCLA L. REV. 813 (2000).
30. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (A)(7) (Michie 1999) (stating in pertinent part
that "The court shall consider all relevant factors which may include: .... Domestic
violence as defined in section 39-6303, Idaho Code, whether or not in the presence of the
child."). See also, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602(a)(6) (West 2001).
31. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13. § 706A (1999) (requiring the court, after
considering "[a]ny evidence of a past or present act of domestic violence, whether or not
committed in the presence of the child" to "make specific written findings in support of
the decision" if it awards a domestic violence perpetrator sole or joint custody).
32. See MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 401 (Nat'l Council of
Juvenile & Family Court Judges 1994) ("In every proceeding where there is at issue a
dispute as to the custody of the child, a determination by the court that domestic or family
violence has occurred raises a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child
and not in the best interests of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or
joint physical custody with the perpetrator of family violence.").
33. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (West Supp. 2001). This statute, passed in
1999, states: "Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has
perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking custody of the child...
within the previous five years, there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or
joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic
violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child." Id The presumption may be
rebutted by various types of evidence relating to the perpetrator's rehabilitation or other
factors. Id
Arguably, codifying a presumption against a child's sole or joint custody with a
domestic violence perpetrator has several benefits for the child. The most obvious benefit
is protecting the child from contact with a violent parent. Research findings reveal that
exposure to domestic violence is detrimental to the child's psychological well-being, see
supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text, and that it may engender similar conduct in the
child's own future relationships. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. In addition,
given the co-occurrence of domestic violence and direct physical abuse, a child placed in
the custody of a domestic violence perpetrator may be at risk for direct victimization. See
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Some states incorporate a presumption against joint custody where
there is evidence of domestic violence, in recognition of the problems
inherent in requiring a domestic violence victim to have ongoing
contact with her batterer for the purpose of sharing childrearing
decisionmaking and caregiving. 4 A recent survey indicates that forty-
four states and the District Columbia have included language in their
child custody statutes relating to domestic violence,' and that thirteen
have adopted a rebuttable presumption against joint or sole custody
with the domestic violence perpetrator. 6
Initially, there was relatively little controversy about the benefits
to children and domestic violence victims of statutes such as these,
and very little question about the appropriateness of the state's role
in enacting such statutes.37 In custody disputes between private
parties, 5 the state has already been "invited" into the dissolving
supra note 7 and accompanying text. Joint custody orders present particular dangers to
children and adult domestic violence victims, in that they require frequent and continuing
contact between the adult victim and perpetrator, increasing the risk of future violence.
See Levin, supra note 29, at 838. Furthermore, the likelihood of violence between the
perpetrator and victim increases substantially when a victim leaves the batterer, as is the
case when she seeks a marital separation or divorce. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L REV. 1, 64-65
(1991). This phenomenon of escalating violence, which is often lethal, has been referred
to by Professor Martha Mahoney as "separation assault," id., and has been documented by
many researchers. See, e.g., Angela Browne et al., Homicide Between Intimate Partners: A
20-Year Review, in HOMICIDE: A SOURCEBOOK OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 149, 159-60 (M.
Dwayne Smith & Margaret A. Zahn eds., 1999); Carolyn Rebecca Block & Antigone
Christakos, Intimate Partner Homicide in Chicago Over 29 Years, 41 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 496, 506 (1995); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk
and Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 3 (Spring 1993). See also Glenda Kaufman
Kantor & Jana L. Jasinski, Dynamics and Risk Factors in Partner Violence, in PARTNER
VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF 20 YEARS OF RESEARCH 1, 33 (Jana L.
Jasinski & Linda M. Williams eds., 1998). Finally, incorporating a rebuttable presumption
against a child's custody with a batterer may make it easier for a domestic violence victim
to leave the batterer. Commentators note that some domestic violence perpetrators
persuade their victims to stay by threatening to wage and win a successful child custody
fight. See Goodmark, supra note 29, at 253. Creating a statutory presumption against a
child's custody with a domestic violence perpetrator may reduce the potential impact such
threats have on the victim's decisions about staying with, or leaving, the perpetrator.
34. See Levin, supra note 29, at 829.
35. See Kurtz, supra note 29, at 1348.
36. See Goodmark, supra note 29, at 255.
37. Even the United States Congress unanimously passed a resolution supporting state
statutory presumptions against children's custody with domestic violence perpetrators.
See Lemon, supra note 29, at 330-31.
38. It is important to distinguish custody disputes between private parties, such as
divorcing parents, from custody disputes between the state and parents. In the former
case, divorcing parents or other private parties with claims to custody of a child cannot
resolve their disagreements regarding such custody. Here, the state's involvement in the
case takes the form of private dispute settlement. In the latter case, the state's concern
about the welfare of the child triggers intervention. As such, the state pits itself against
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family by litigants unable to resolve their private dispute.
Traditionally, the family court judge determines each child's best
interests with guidance from statutorily-enumerated factors. 9 Adding
to that list a factor that we now know is detrimental to children's best
interests has not generated opposition. Creation of a statutory
presumption against custody with a batterer is, of course, a more
dramatic change in the law. It shifts the burden of proof in a custody
case, requiring a domestic violence perpetrator to overcome the
presumption,0 and limiting the family court judge's discretion in
making custody determinations."
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts issued the first
appellate court analysis of the constitutionality of statutory rebuttable
presumptions against a child's custody with a domestic violence
perpetrator.2 The Massachusetts legislature was deliberating about a
proposal to create such a presumption, and requested that its state
supreme court formally address whether "the resulting shifting of the
burden of proof... violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article
10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."43 The Court
responded, "No," concluding that the "risk of error is greatly
outweighed by the children's interest in being free from abuse and
neglect, and the State's interest in promoting the welfare of its
children."'  Given the recency of state laws creating statutory
presumptions against batterers' custody of their children, it is too
early to assess whether other jurisdictions will follow suit, although
there seems to be increasing acceptance of such an approach.45
the parent(s) or other legal custodians as it seeks to vindicate the child's interests in safety
and well-being. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in
the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975).
39. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West Supp. 2001); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT § 402 (West 1970 & Supp. 1998). See generally, Linda Whobrey Rohman
et al., The Best Interests of the Child in Custody Disputes, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 59 (Lois A.
Weithorn ed., 1984).
40. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West Supp. 2001).
41. Some might argue that limiting the discretion of family court judges in child
custody adjudications is a positive development because there is so much unguided
discretion in these cases. For a discussion of the problems of indeterminacy in child
custody adjudication, see Mnookin, supra note 38.
42. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 691 N.E.2d 911, 916-17 (Mass. 1998).
43. Id. at 913.
44. Id. at 917.
45. But see Deborah Ahrens, Not in Front of the Children: Prohibition on Child
Custody as Civil Branding for Criminal Activity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 737 (2000) (arguing
that use of presumptions against custody with an alleged domestic violence perpetrator in
civil cases serves to stigmatize the parent for acts more appropriately dealt with in criminal
contexts, and does not successfully protect children from harm).
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As these statutes are implemented, however, jurisdictions may
encounter unexpected problems. For example, one year after the
effective date of California's pertinent statute, family courts are
struggling with questions such as what types of evidence constitute a
finding of domestic violence for the purpose of that statute, and
whether findings of domestic violence in other courts and proceedings
should have a res judicata effect in applying the presumption. Given
the constitutional implications of custodial decisions, states must
hammer out these challenging issues so that any such presumptions
can be applied with consistency and fairness, providing safeguards of
parental rights, while retaining the primary focus on the best interests
of the child.
(2) Criminal Sentencing
A rapidly-growing number of states have enacted statutes
authorizing or mandating enhanced criminal penalties or sentencing
"upgrades" for domestic violence perpetrators if their act is
committed "in the presence of a child."' And, at the time of this
writing, additional states are considering such statutory changes.49
46. In a workshop at a conference sponsored by the California Judicial Council's
Center for Families, Children & the Courts, panelists discussed some of the challenges
encountered in the first year during which California's statutory presumption was in effect.
Implementing Family Code Section 3044: One Year Later, Workshop at the Conference
on Family Violence and the Courts: A Coordinated Response, Los Angeles, CA., May 17-
18, 2001 (discussing implementation of CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (2000)). Panelists raised
several difficulties, such as: what types of evidence can constitute a finding of domestic
violence under Section 3044; whether or not the issuance of a civil protective order against
an alleged batterer can trigger the presumption; and whether judges in California will be
reluctant to issue civil protective orders if these orders have res judicata effect on Section
3044 determinations. For a general discussion regarding the construction of state custody
statute provisions addressing domestic violence, see Jack M. Dalgleish, Jr., Construction
and Effect of Statutes Mandating Consideration of, or Creating Presumptions Regarding,
Domestic Violence in Awarding Custody of Children, 51 A.L.R. 5th 241 (1997).
47. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (asserting that the rights to
"raise one's children have been deemed 'essential'...."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents.. ").
48. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(18)(C) (Michie 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-702(C)(17) (West 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.76 (West 2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.0024(1)(b) (West 2001); HAw. REV. STAT. §706-606.4(1)(c) (2000); IDAHO
CODE § 18-918 (7)(b) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 644 (West
Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.160(3)(c) (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.390(2)(h)(ii) (2001).
49. See, e.g., 1999-2000 R.I. Pub. Laws H.B. 5883 (creating criminal offense with
mandatory prison sentences ranging from ten days to ten years, depending upon various
factors, for misdemeanor domestic violence offenses committed in a child's presence);
2001 S.C. Acts H.B. 3056 (creating the offense of criminal domestic violence in the
presence of a minor and specifying penalties including certain mandatory minimum
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California's statute, added to its Penal Code in 1997, characterizes a
child's exposure to an incident of domestic violence as an aggravating
circumstance in sentencing." Idaho's statute explicitly "doubles" the
penalties for domestic violence crimes that occur in the presence of a
child. 1 Oregon's law establishes a new category of criminal offense of
"domestic violence in the presence of a minor," for which specified
penalties are available.'
Statutes that authorize or enhance criminal penalties for
defendants convicted of domestic violence crimes in the presence of
minors are an increasingly common response to evidence of the
negative effects of children's exposure to domestic violence. Those
commentators who support this trend point to several potential
benefits to defining children as direct victims of domestic violence
based on their exposure to it: (1) children may have increased access
to various sources of crime victim compensation funds and programs
to address the health and mental health needs that result from the
domestic violence incidents;- 3 (2) law enforcement officials will be
more likely to focus on the presence of children at the scene of
domestic violence incidents, again increasing the possibilities that
these children's psychological, medical, and other needs may be
addressed; (3) such focus may increase referrals to child protective
services for screening;55 (4) if children are identified as direct victims
of domestic violence crimes, civil protective orders can be issued on
their behalf;56 (5) prosecutions of offenders may have a greater
sentences).
50. Specifically, California Penal Code § 1170.76 indicates that if an assault or
attempted assault "contemporaneously occurred in the presence of, or was witnessed by"
a minor, where the defendant is or has been a household member or relative of the minor
or victim, and the victim is the minor's natural, adoptive, step- or foster parent, the
minor's presence is "considered a circumstance in aggravation of the crime in imposing" a
sentence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.76 (West Supp. 2001).
51. IDAHO CODE § 18-918(7)(b) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2000).
52. OR. REv. STAT. § 163.160 (1999). In defining "Assault in the fourth degree,"
Oregon's code specifies that a "Class A misdemeanor" assault becomes a "Class C felony"
assault if any of several conditions are met. One of the conditions is: "The assault is
committed in the immediate presence of, or is witnessed by, the person's or the victim's
child or stepchild or a minor child residing within the household of the person or victim."
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.160(3)(c) (1999).
53. DEBRA WHITCOMB, CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CHALLENGES FOR
PROSECUTORS, NAT. INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE REPORT vi, 78-86 (2000).
54. Brian K. Holmgren, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: The Interconnection
42-44, (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
55. Id.; WHITCOMB, supra note 53, at vi. This potential consequence is a "double-
edged sword," in that the nature and consequences of child protective services'
involvement in domestic violence cases is highly controversial, as the remainder of this
Article underscores.
56. WHITCOMB, supra note 53, at vi.
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likelihood of going forward, even if the adult victim chooses not to
testify;57 (6) the state is empowered to act more decisively in bringing
the penalties of the criminal justice system to bear against domestic
violence perpetrators who endanger children, including imposing
longer sentences;" (7) this type of statute has the potential for certain
important symbolic and practical effects, making public statements
about society's intolerance of domestic violence and the attendant
harms to children;59 (8) these statutes shift the traditional focus from
the purported liability of the adult domestic violence victim for failure
to protect her child to the liability of the domestic violence
perpetrator, holding him accountable for his acts."
Several objections to these statutes have been lodged, as well.
Some in the field have expressed concerns that these statutes will
increase the criminal justice system's use of children as witnesses.6'
The process of testifying against a family member, or even against a
stranger in an abuse-related case, can be very traumatic for a child.'
An initial investigation of the implementation of these criminal
statutes reveals that these statutes have not substantially increased
the use of children as witnesses in criminal proceedings.63 Others
have expressed concern that expanding a batterer's criminal liability
may have the indirect and unintended effect of expanding the adult
victim's liability as well, through doctrines that hold her criminal
liable for failure to protect her child.6' To date, there is no evidence
of this latter consequence.65 Finally, some may be concerned that
57. Holmgren, supra note 54, at 42-44; Audrey E. Stone & Rebecca J. Fialk,
Criminalizing the Exposure of Children to Family Violence: Breaking the Cycle of Abuse,
20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 205,213 (1997).
58. See Stone & Fialk, supra note 57, at 222-24.
59. Stone & Fialk, supra note 57, at 210-11. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying
text for further discussion of the notions of the expressive or symbolic functions of public
policies.
60. Stone & Fialk, supra note 57, at 210-12.
61. Jeffrey L. Edleson, Bridging Research, Policy, and Practice, Remarks at the
Institute of Medicine/National Research Council Workshop on Children and Domestic
Abuse, Washington D.C. (April 10, 2000) (transcript at 241), transcript available from
National Academy of Sciences [hereinafter Edleson, Bridging Research]; see WHITCOMB,
supra note 54, at 79-80.
62. See WHITCOMB, supra note 54, at 79-80; Goodmark, supra note 29, at 291-94.
63. In a study funded by the National Institute of Justice examining the
implementation of recently enacted criminal statutes addressing children's exposure to
domestic violence, the investigators concluded that: "prosecutors in the jurisdictions
studied rarely ask children to testify in domestic violence cases against their mothers'
wishes." WHITCOMB, supra note 53, at 79.
64. See WHITCOMB, supra note 53, at vii.
65. Id. at 80-82. Based on her field research examining the implementation of these
statutes in five jurisdictions (Dallas County, Texas; Houston County, Georgia; Multnomah
County, Oregon; Salt Lake County, Utah; and San Diego County, California), Whitcomb
reports that women were not charged with these offenses unless they were the primary
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these statutes send us down a slippery slope by expanding the
categories of persons who can be construed as direct victims of violent
crimes to any of those who merely witness an offense. Although all
expansions of criminal liability must be carefully considered, it seems
unlikely that these statutes will start a trend that will extend beyond
the instant context. Parents and other legally recognized caregivers
owe their charges a special duty of care, and thus bear a higher level
of responsibility for violence that they perpetrate in the child's
presence and against that child's parent or caregiver.'
(3) State Intervention in Child Abuse or Neglect
Finally, a few states have sought to protect children exposed to
domestic violence through use of child maltreatment statutes. The
child maltreatment statutes in question fall into several categories:
(1) reporting statutes; (2) statutes that guide or dictate the processing
of maltreatment cases; (3) statutes that invoke the state's criminal
jurisdiction over child maltreatment cases; and (4) statutes that
invoke the state's civil or dependency jurisdiction over maltreatment
cases.
Definitions of what constitutes child abuse or neglect can be
found in any or all of the above statutes. Reporting statutes set forth
the types of parental conduct or harms to children that must be
reported to authorities by specified mandated reporters. 7 Statutes
governing the processing of cases often articulate the ways in which
state personnel and others are expected to respond to cases, and may
indicate what categories of responses are mandatory versus
aggressor. Id. She found that reports alleging that adult domestic violence victims had
failed to protect their children from the perpetrator's behavior did not increase, nor did
maternal loss of custody, solely on the basis of the children's exposure to domestic
violence. Id.
66. See Stone & Fialk, supra note 57, at 213. The expansion of criminal liability in
domestic violence cases to the parties' witnessing children may bear some conceptual
relationship to tort liability for the claims of emotional distress by witnessing bystanders.
Yet, in this latter instance, state law has typically limited the relevant causes of action to
close family members. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en banc). It is
unlikely that these new criminal statutes signal a trend in broadening criminal liability to
new classes of witnessing victims. Although states vary with respect to the precise
relationships they consider to fall within the category of close family members, states
generally do not expand liability outside of this category. Compare Dunphy v. Gregor,
642 A.2d 372 (NJ. 1994) (permitting an accident victim's unmarried cohabitant, who was
also his fiancde, to bring a cause of action, analogizing her relationship to the victim to that
of a spouse) with Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (refusing to extend
California's doctrine to permit an unmarried cohabitant, whose relationship with accident
victim was "akin to a marital relationship," to bring a cause of action for emotional
distress).
67. See infra notes 72-79, 102-03 and accompanying text.
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discretionary.6 In addition, definitions of child maltreatment also
exist in statutes outlining the jurisdiction of the criminal justice
system and juvenile justice system with respect to suspected abuse or
neglect. All of these statutes interrelate, however.
For example, definitions of maltreatment in the reporting
statutes determine the types of cases that will be referred to the
juvenile justice system, the criminal justice system, or both. Statutes
delineating procedures and the roles of state actors further determine
which cases are dismissed, handled informally, or remain in the
system for formal adjudication. Furthermore, criminal justice and
juvenile court jurisdiction in child maltreatment cases overlap. Each
system has the authority to intervene in most child abuse and neglect
cases, sharing with the other system a concern for the protection of
the child from current and future harm.69 Yet, these systems'
mandates and procedures diverge from that point on. State penal
codes empower law enforcement and court personnel to investigate
cases, to prosecute alleged offenders, and to sentence those found
guilty of violating these laws. Punishment may seek to achieve any or
all of the traditional criminal justice system goals: deterrence,
retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. By contrast, civil child
maltreatment statutes trigger child protective services investigation
and intervention, and the potential involvement of juvenile court.
The primary goals of such intervention are remediation of parental or
family problems identified as causing the maltreatment, preservation
of the family unit when possible, and planning for the long-term
safety and stability of the child.' There are provisions and
procedures in most states that require or permit workers in each
system to cross-refer and share in certain types of information.'
Typically, the explicit and implicit directives in statutes, the internal
policies of the various governmental agencies involved, the facts of
individual cases, and the discretion of state employees determine
whether particular cases are processed and pursued in one system or
the other, or both. Because of the interrelationships between
criminal justice and juvenile justice handling of child maltreatment
68. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Donald J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-
Making, 24 AM. CRIM. LAW REV. 315,315-24 (1986) [hereinafter Child Abuse] (discussing
trends in civil versus criminal handling of child maltreatment cases); CLIFFORD K.
DORNE, CHILD MALTREATMENT: A PRIMER IN HISTORY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
RESEARCH 1-4 (2d ed. 1997). See also notes 254-66 infra and accompanying text.
70. Despite the obvious differences between the goals of the two systems, criminal
justice system interventions in maltreatment cases sometimes attempt rehabilitation, and
juvenile justice system interventions in maltreatment cases can appear punitive (e.g., use
of contempt sanctions to enforce parental cooperation with the court's requirements). See
infra notes 254-66 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(h) (West Supp. 2001).
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cases, statutory changes focusing on either criminal or civil child
maltreatment jurisdiction are likely to have direct or indirect
implications for the caseload, and perhaps even processing, of cases in
the other system.
In the past several years, states have enacted statutes that
address reporting, processing, and jurisdiction of cases in which
children are exposed to domestic violence.
(a) Reporting statutes
It is well-known that family violence tends to be treated as a
"family secret."' Children are unlikely to initiate reports about the
family's domestic violence problems to people outside of the family,
because of their dependence upon, trust of, and often also fear of,
abusive adult caregivers.' With the guidance of the federal
government, all states have enacted child abuse reporting statutes in
order to assist authorities in identifying those families in which
children were maltreated?' These statutes require that persons in
particular professions, such as those who work closely with children,
those who are in a position to evaluate children physically or
emotionally, and those who may obtain information about the
existence of child abuse or neglect in a family,75 report their suspicions
about child maltreatment to the designated authorities. 6  Because
72. See Einat Peled, "Secondary" Victims No More: Refocusing Intervention with
Children, in FUTURE INTERVENTIONS WITH BATTERED WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES
125, 128-31 (Jeffrey L. Edleson & Zvi C. Eisikovits eds., 1996). Dr. Peled notes that:
Many children of battered women cannot be identified by service providers
because they live in a secret. The emotional, physical, and sexual violence
children witness may be kept as a secret by abuser, or victim, or both. Parents
may try to hide the violence from the outside world, from their families, from
their children, and, sometimes, from themselves.
Id. at 128-29.
73. Id.; Betsy McAlister Groves, Mental Health Services for Children who Witness
Domestic Violence, 9 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
CHILDREN 122, 124 (1999), available at http://wwwv.futureofchildren.org/dvc/index.htm.
74. See, e.g., KALICHMAN, supra note 9, at 12-18.
75. For example, in California, the following persons, as well as statutorily enumerated
others, are mandated to report "reasonable suspicion" of abuse or neglect that they have
obtained in the course of one's professional duties or employment: teachers,
administrators and aides in instructional settings, day care center employees, summer
camp or youth recreation program personnel, health practitioners (physicians,
psychologists, dentists, nurses, optometrists, paramedics, counselors, coroners), employees
of child protective agencies, child visitation monitors, commercial film and photographic
print processors. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 2000).
76. Typically statutes designate police or child protective services as the authorities
who receive these reports, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.9 (West 2001) ("Reports of
suspected child abuse or neglect shall be made by mandated reporters to any police
department or sheriff's department.... or the county welfare department."), and may
make provisions for cross-referrals between these two agencies. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
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family violence is such a "private" occurrence, the advent of
mandated reporting laws allows society to pierce through the barriers
that hide these children's experiences from public view. Arguably,
one advantage of including children exposed to domestic violence
within the ambit of reporting and juvenile court jurisdictional statutes
is the possibility that the millions of such children who are not known
to law enforcement and helping professionals will be identified, so
that the system can begin to assist them. In 1999, Minnesota passed a
statute incorporating childhood exposure to domestic violence into
the definition of neglect in the state's child maltreatment reporting
law.7 In so doing, it mandated that statutorily-designated persons
report suspicions of such phenomena to child protective services or
the police. Thus, depending upon the case and the policies of
protective services and law enforcement agencies, these cases might
be investigated by one or other system, or both, and ultimately could
be processed in either criminal or dependency court, or both. This
statute was repealed in April of 2000.8 The circumstances
surrounding the repeal will be discussed below.79
(b) Statutes regulating the processing of child maltreatment cases
In 1999, Florida passed a statute in response to several highly-
publicized child abuse cases resulting in the death of several
children.8' The new statute addressed the way in which child
maltreatment cases involving domestic violence were processed,
CODE §11166(h)-(i) (West 2001).
77. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(c)(8) (1999) (repealed 2000):
Neglect means.., that the parent or other person responsible for the care of the
child: (i) engages in violent behavior that demonstrates a disregard for the well-
being of the child as indicated by action that could reasonably result in serious
physical, mental, or threatened injury, or emotional damage to the child; (ii)
engages in repeated domestic assault [as defined in specified criminal provisions];
(iii) intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm against a family or
household member... that is within sight or sound of the child; or (iv) subjects
the child to ongoing domestic violence by the abuser in the home environment
that is likely to have a detrimental effect on the well-being of the child.
78. 2000 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 401, § 1(West).
79. See infra notes 454-71 and accompanying text.
80. 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 99-193 (West) (effective July 1, 1999 and codified at FL.
STAT. § 39.301(8)(b)), repealed and revised June 5, 2000 pursuant to 2000 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 2000-217 (West).
81. Although several cases triggered the legal changes, the most celebrated case was
that of Kayla McKeon, the child whose name has been used in referring to the new statute.
Lenny Savino, Kayla Law Tough Act to Follow: Investigators Say More Child Abuse
Complaints and Tough New Requirements Have Made their Jobs Almost Impossible,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3571172. Six-year-old Kayla
McKeon was killed by her father, "[d]espite four warning calls to the state's child abuse
hotline alleging abuse." Id.
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removing discretion from various state personnel regarding whether
to file a dependency petition.' The statute mandated such a filing in
certain "high-risk" cases, such as cases involving domestic violence.'
State officials had not been prepared for the overflow of cases that
would follow, and the statute was amended in 2000,4 after compliance
with it nearly paralyzed the state's ability to respond to any
maltreatment cases.85
(c) Criminal child abuse statutes
In 1999 and 1997, respectively, Georgia and Utah passed
statutes that characterized perpetration of acts of domestic violence
by one household member on another within the presence of a child as
a form of criminal child abuse. Both statutes provide for a range of
criminal penalties, depending upon various circumstances, including
whether the offense is the first or subsequent violation of that type.
82. 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 99-193 (West) (repealed and revised 2000). The relevant
portion of the 1999 statute read:
If it is determined that the child is in need of the protection and supervision of
the court, the department shall file a petition for dependency. A petition for
dependency shall be filed in all cases classified by the department as high-risk
cases, including, but not limited to, cases involving parents or legal custodians of a
young age, the use of illegal drugs, or domestic violence."
Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id
84. The new section listed domestic violence as one of several "[f]actors that the
department may consider in determining whether a case is high-risk." FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.301(8)(b) (West 2001) (emphasis added).
85. See Savino, supra note 81.
86. Georgia Code section 16-5-70, reads in pertinent part:
(c) Any person commits the offense of cruelty to children in the second degree
when: (1) Such person, who is the primary aggressor, intentionally allows a child
under the age of 18 to witness the commission of a forcible felony, battery, or
family violence battery; or (2) Such person, who is the primary aggressor, having
knowledge that a child under the age of 18 is present and sees or hears the act,
commits a forcible felony, battery, or family violence.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-70(c) (1999).
87. Utah indicates that a person is guilty of criminal child abuse if he:
(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide... against a cohabitant in
the presence of a child or (b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a
cohabitant or uses a dangerous weapon.., or other means of force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury against a cohabitant, in the presence of a
child; or (c) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of [the above
subsections] commits an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child
[under certain other specified circumstances].
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109.1(2) (2000).
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(d) Dependency court jurisdictional statutes
Although it has only been in the past several years that
American states have begun to incorporate childhood exposure to
domestic violence into statutory definitions of child abuse and
neglect, six of ten Canadian provinces have had such laws for many
years.! In the years spanning from 1978 through 1990, these
provinces passed statutes that place certain cases in which children
are exposed to domestic violence within the reach of the juvenile
court. More information about Canada's use of these statutes is
provided below."
In the United States, however, interest in such legislation is far
more recent. In 1998, Alaska incorporated children's exposure to
domestic violence into its statute governing the grounds for the
juvenile court's dependency jurisdiction.9" As part of a fairIX
extensive reworking of the statute's definition of "mental injury,"
the legislature authorized the juvenile court to proceed with any of
the interventions and dispositions available to it in cases where
children are exposed to domestic violence. This statute permits
juvenile court jurisdiction in cases where parental perpetration of
domestic violence creates a "substantial risk" of emotional harm to
88. The six provinces are: Alberta, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia
Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. See infra note 439 and accompanying text.
89. For example, Alberta's Child Welfare Act states that:
a child is emotionally injured (i) if there is substantial and observable impairment
of the child's mental or emotional functioning that is evidenced by a mental or
behavioural disorder, including anxiety, depression, withdrawal, aggression or
delayed development, and (ii) there are reasonable and probable grounds to
believe that the emotional injury is the result of... (C) exposure to domestic
violence or severe domestic disharmony ....
Child Welfare Act, R.S.A., ch. C-8.1, § (3)(a) (1984) (Alberta, Can.)
90. See infra notes 439-53 and accompanying text.
91. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (Michie 2000):
[T]he court may find a child to be a child in need of aid if it finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the child has been subjected to... (8)
conduct by or conditions created by the parent, guardian, or custodian have...
(B) placed the child at substantial risk of mental injury as a result of... (ii)
exposure to conduct by a household member, as defined in [pertinent Alaska
domestic violence statutes] against another household member, that is a crime
under [Alaska statutes criminalizing murder, assault, and sexual assault], an
attempt to commit an offense [listing same statutes above]; or (iii) repeated
exposure to conduct by a household member, as defined in [pertinent Alaska
domestic violence statutes], against another household member that is a crime
under [Alaska statutes criminalizing offenses that have not necessarily already
caused physical injury, such as reckless endangerment, and stalking].
Id.
92. See infra notes 340-47 and accompanying text for additional information about
Alaska's new "mental injury" statute.
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children in the family.93 In 1998, Florida amended its juvenile court
jurisdictional statute to include within the definition of "harm"
circumstances "when any person... engages in violent behavior that
demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could
reasonably result in serious injury to the child."94 Two other states,
ConnecticuC and Kentucky,96 have authorized their juvenile courts to
93. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(8)(B) (Michie 2000).
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(30)(i) (West 2001). The statutory definition of abuse
includes "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual
injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional
health to be significantly impaired...." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(2) (West 2001).
"Harm" is defined further in Subsection 30 of Section 39.01, with the domestic violence
provision listed as one of over a dozen specified categories of potentially harmful conduct.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(30) (West 2001). Florida appellate courts have decided two
cases interpreting Subsection 30 in which they have limited the juvenile court's jurisdiction
on this ground to cases where the "the child sees or is aware of the violence occurring."
See D.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 615, 617-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000); D.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 769 So. 2d 424,427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
See also, K.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 784 So. 2d 594, 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (implicitly considering the relevance of Section 39.01(3)(i) in stating "There was no
evidence of physical violence other than the father pushing the mother onto the bed,
which occurred over a year prior and was not witnessed by the child," and citing to D.H.,
769 So. 2d at 427).
95. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-106b (West 2001):
(a) The state of Connecticut finds that family violence can result in abuse and
neglect of the children living in the household where such violence occurs and
that the prevention of child abuse and neglect depends on coordination of
domestic violence and child protective services. (b) The Commissioner of
Children and Families may consider the existence and the impact of family
violence in any child abuse investigation and may assist family members in
obtaining protection from family violence.
tL There exists only one published case applying Connecticut's statute, and it is not clear
from that case whether the statute creates a separate jurisdictional basis for juvenile court
intervention. See In re Crystle W., 2000 WL 726842, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 15,
2000). In this case, the court noted that the children were exposed to domestic violence
and states: "Our General Assembly has stated the nearly obvious point that 'family
violence can result in abuse and neglect of the children living in the household where such
violence occurs."' Id. at '4. It then stated additional grounds for the finding of neglect,
such as the mother's failure to take her child to a pediatrician after sexual abuse was
discovered. Id.
96. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.023 (1) (Michie 2000):
Evidence of the following circumstances if relevant shall be considered by the
court in all proceedings conducted pursuant to [the state code chapter
authorizing state intervention in cases of dependency, neglect, and abuse] in
which the court is required to render decisions in the best interest of the child:
... (d) A finding of domestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720,
whether or not committed in the presence of the child.
KRS 403.720(1) defines domestic violence as "physical injury, serious physical injury,
sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical
injury, sexual abuse, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried
couple." KY. REV. STAT. § 403.720(1) (Michie 1999). Kentucky has no published cases
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"consider evidence" of the children's exposure to domestic violence
in the various stages of the proceedings. In 1998, the Utah legislature
considered legislation that would have included "commission of
domestic violence in the presence of a child" in all civil definitions of
child abuse, but these provisions were stricken from the bill at some
point before the final language was enacted.97
B. Rationales for Defining Childhood Exposure to Domestic Violence as
Child Maltreatment
There is substantial disagreement in the field as to whether such
exposure should be treated as a form of child maltreatment for the
purposes of triggering child protective services and the dependency
court involvement. 9 In order to set the stage for the analysis of
current statutes in Part III, I briefly summarize the policy arguments
asserted in favor of such expansions of juvenile court jurisdiction, as
well as the counter-arguments lodged against the expansions. The
potential benefits of expanding juvenile court jurisdiction to
incorporate children's exposure to domestic violence include: an
enhanced ability to identify children exposed to domestic violence;
greater opportunities to protect children exposed to domestic
violence from continued exposure through child protective
intervention; promotion of consistency in handling of domestic
violence cases among the various agencies involved; and, the
opportunity to "send a message" (to domestic violence perpetrators,
their victims, their children, and the community) that domestic
violence is harmful to children and that our society will not tolerate
its continuance. By contrast, opponents of statutory expansion of
child protection's reach in cases involving domestic violence fear that
such expansion will deter battered women from seeking services from
professionals (e.g., workers at domestic violence shelters) who will
interpreting the statute as yet.
97. Compare the version of House Bill 239 passed by the Utah House, H.B. 239, 52nd
Utah Leg., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 20, 1998), with the version enacted, H.B. 239, 52nd Utah Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mar. 21, 1998).
98. For discussions of this controversy, see, for example, JAFFE ET AL., supra note 3, at
103; Janet E. Findlater & Susan Kelly, Child Protective Services and Domestic Violence, 9
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILDREN 84, 84-88 (1999),
available at http://www.futureofchildren.orgldvc/index.htm; Peled, supra note 72, at 134-36;
Susan Schechter, The Battered Women's Movement in the United States: New Directions
for Institutional Reform, in FUTURE INTERVENTIONS WITH BATTERED WOMEN AND
THEIR FAMILIES 53, 62-63 (Jeffrey L. Edleson & Zvi C. Eisikovits eds., 1996). For an
articulate statement of a position against such expansion of child maltreatment statutes,
see Jeffrey L. Edleson, Should Childhood Exposure to Adult Domestic Violence be
Defined as Child Maltreatment Under the Law?, temporarily available at
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/link/shouldch.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2001) [hereinafter
Edleson, Is Exposure Maltreatment?].
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become mandated reporters of child maltreatment under state
reporting statutes. In addition, opponents claim that child protective
involvement in cases of childhood exposure to domestic violence
typically has not served the best interests of children or their abused
caregivers. Opponents argue that such intervention traditionally has
been ineffective, discriminatory, and destructive, endangering the
safety of adult victims and their children, blaming battered women for
their children's exposure, and reflexively removing children from
their abused parent's custody. Finally, opponents argue that not all
children exposed to domestic violence are harmed by their exposure,
and thus intrusive government intervention and its negative
concomitants will be extended to many families where such
intervention is unnecessary. These various issues are discussed below.
(1) Bringing Children Exposed to Domestic Violence to the Attention of
Authorities
One clear purpose of these new statutes is to increase the
likelihood that cases involving children's exposure to domestic
violence come to the attention of authorities. By characterizing
children's exposure to domestic violence as child maltreatment, those
individuals legally mandated to report child maltreatment become
obligated to report cases of domestic violence in families with
children. Because family violence typically occurs "behind closed
doors," authorities often are unable to assist children who have been
harmed or are at risk of harm, unless other adults intercede to bring
children's circumstances to light."° This problem is magnified with
respect to children exposed to domestic violence because, even if
authorities or service providers learn that one adult in the family is
violent toward another adult, the harms experienced by the children
may not receive attention if they are not physical. For this reason,
writers refer to children who are exposed to domestic violence as
"invisible," "hidden," or "silent" victims. 1
l
99. See Tompkins et al., supra note 3, at 179-80 (arguing that explicit inclusion of
children exposed to domestic violence into child maltreatment statutes would make it
more likely that such exposure "would be reported-and useful interventions
provided....").
100. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. "Until the secret of violence is
broken by a family member or others who are aware of it and decide to report or
intervene, it may not be possible to individually help children in [families characterized by
domestic violence]." See Peled, supra note 72, at 129. Dr. Peled and others who address
the secretive nature of domestic violence also warn, however, that expanding protective
services access to domestic violence cases will not necessarily serve children's best
interests unless the child protective services response to families incorporates additional
knowledge and sensitivity to the special needs of domestic violence victims and their
children. IL at 134-36.
101. See, e.g., JOY D. OSOFSKY, Children who Witness Domestic Violence: The Invisible
November 2001] PROTECTING CHILDREN
As one might suspect, broadening the scope of mandated
reporting in child abuse and neglect cases is a controversial
proposition. Throughout the past three to four decades during which
reporting statutes have been in effect,"° professionals such as
physicians, psychotherapists, and counselors have struggled with how
to balance these legal obligations against their ethical and legal duties
to protect the privacy and confidentiality of their patients and
clients.13 Expansion of maltreatment statutes to include children
exposed to domestic violence may create reporting obligations for at
least three additional groups of professionals who typically come into
contact with domestic violence cases. First, law enforcement
personnel answering domestic violence calls would be on notice to
obtain information about the presence of children in the family, and
to refer the cases to child protective services. Second, emergency
room physicians and other medical professionals treating abused
women would be required to report cases when there is a child in the
family. Third, domestic violence workers at shelters and
nonresidential counseling centers might also incur obligations" to
report the cases of all of their clients with children.
In all of these situations, it is possible that the knowledge that her
contact with one of the above professionals will be reported to child
protective services will deter or discourage mothers from calling the
police, seeking medical treatment for her injuries, or using domestic
violence services." Given that abused women often are fairly
Victims, 9(3) SOCIAL POLICY REPORT: SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 3 (1995); Groves, supra note 73, at 124.
102. See, e.g., Kalichman, supra note 9, at 12-17.
103. See, e.g., id. at 30-33, 43-63. See also Murray Levine, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Analysis of Mandated Reporting of Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 711 (1993) (providing an insightful analysis of how reporting
obligations affect psychotherapists' relationships with their clients, and identifying many
potential consequences that are applicable to other categories of mandated reporters as
well).
104. Whether these workers would actually be required to report might hinge on
several factors. Some states require certain categories of professionals to report (e.g.,
physicians, psychologists, social workers, nurses, and so forth). If domestic violence
workers are professionals who do not fit into any designated profession, or if they are
"volunteers," they may not be obligated to report. Other states, however, deal with the
situation somewhat differently, by specifying that professionals working in certain settings
are obligated to report. Domestic violence workers could be included or excluded from
that list. In addition, at least one state has enacted a statutory exception to domestic
violence workers' duties to report suspicions of child maltreatment under specific
circumstances. See, e.g., discussion of Alaska's statutory exception, infra note 494 and
accompanying text. See generally Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and
Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273,294-97 (1995).
105. JAFFE ET AL, supra note 3, at 103; Peled, supra note 72, at 135 (noting that
domestic violence victims may choose not to disclose their abuse because they are
concerned this will lead to their losing custody of their children). In addition, battered
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isolated from others in the community, commentators have expressed
concern that expanded reporting obligations may have a chilling
effect on these women's willingness to seek out any kind of help, a
result that will be to the detriment of the children involved."'
Of course, reporting requirements will only have such a chilling
effect if reports to child protective services are viewed negatively by
battered mothers. Unfortunately, at present, the history and
"reputation" of child protective services involvement in domestic
violence cases is anything but positive. 7  Domestic violence
advocates often characterize child protective services as
misunderstanding the dynamics of domestic violence, and assert that
child protective services typically: blames mothers who are domestic
violence victims for their own victimization; blames these women for
any negative ramifications of their abuse for their children; removes
children from their mothers' custody when doing so is not necessary
for the child's protection; fails to hold the abuser accountable for his
conduct; and fails to provide any services that contribute to the short-
or long-term well-being of the child or the nonabusive parent."
There is evidence that many child protective systems have operated in
this manner, as well as for the ineffectiveness of the traditional child
protection interventions for adult domestic violence victims and their
children. 9 More productive than mandating inclusion of cases of
childhood exposure to domestic violence into the protective services
women may fear, legitimately, that disclosure of the abuse may threaten their safety or the
safety of their children if the abuser learns that they have discussed the abuse with a
professional, or-if they have left the abuser-if the disclosure leads to the abuser's
discovery of their location. See also Zorza, supra note 104.
106. Peled, supra note 72, at 135.
107. See, e.g., The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers with
"Failure to Protect". Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 854-56 (2000)
[hereinafter Failure to Protect Working Group] (citing the policies of child protective
services to remove children from domestic violence victims on the basis of "neglect", i.e.,
"failure to protect" the children from exposure to the domestic violence, without
providing appropriate services to the victims or children); Findlater & Kelly, supra note
98, at 87 (indicating that protective service workers "have often misunderstood [the
dynamics of domestic violence] and held battered mothers responsible for ending it");
Schechter, supra note 98, at 62 (noting that there is a fear that the "family preservation"
philosophy of child protective services will "push women to stay with abusive partners as a
way of preserving the family").
108. See, e.g., Sandra K. Beeman & Jeffrey L. Edleson, Collaborating on Family Safety:
Challenges for Children's and Women's Advocates, in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, supra note 29, at 345, 348-51; Failure to Protect Working Group, supra note
107, at 854-56; Findlater & Kelly, supra note 98, at 87; Schechter, supra note 98, at 62;
Peled, supra note 72, at 134-36.
109. See, e.g., Carole Echlin & Larry Marshall, Child Protection Services for Children of
Battered Women: Practice and Controversy, in ENDING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE:
COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN 170,173-78 (Einat Peled
et al. eds., 1995).
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caseload, opponents argue, would be providing greater access for
domestic violence victims and their children to a range of important
voluntary services. °  Encouraging victims to seek such services,
provided confidentially, is likely to be more effective than requiring
community personnel to refer the case to state child protection
authorities, opponents assert.'
Commentators have also expressed concern that increasing the
flow of referrals to child protective services will paralyze the already
over-burdened and underfunded child protective services system by
flooding it with cases."' The are countless horror stories about
caseworkers with so many children under their watch that they can
not responsibly monitor even the most serious and dangerous
situations."1 It has been argued that adding all children in families
with domestic violence to the caseload would paralyze a system that
110. For an articulate statement of this position, see Edleson, Is Exposure
Maltreatment?, supra note 98, manuscript at 18-19. For a description of the types of
voluntary services available from community-based domestic violence agencies, see Amy
J. Saathoff & Elizabeth Ann Stoffel, Community-Based Domestic Violence Services, 9 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILDREN 97 (1999), available at
http://www.futureofchildren.org/dvc/index.htm.
111. See, e.g., Pamela Whitney & Lorna Davis, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence in
Massachusetts: Can Practice Be Integrated in a Public Child Welfare Setting? 4 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 158, 163-64 (1999). In characterizing the concerns expressed by shelter
workers, one group of authors has noted that: "Shelters also worry that general
knowledge of a close working relationship between themselves and child protective
services may discourage battered women in the community from even seeking safety for
fear their children may be taken from them." JAFFE ET AL., supra note 3, at 103.
112. See Echlin & Marshall, supra note 109, at 179-80; Edleson, Is Exposure
Maltreatment?, supra note 98, manuscript at 18-19.
113. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(adjudicating claim that child protective services failed to protect two-year-old Joshua
DeShaney from his father's violence when protective services did not intervene effectively
after receiving multiple reports of the abuse that ultimately left Joshua permanently brain
damaged). The newspapers are filled with stories about children who continued to
experience severe or lethal abuse at the hands of their parents even after their abuse was
known to child protective services. See e.g., Savino, supra note 81 (describing the case of
six-year-old Kayla McKeon, who was killed by her father, "[d]espite four warning calls to
the state's child abuse hotline alleging abuse"); Opinion: Help for Hurt Children, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Dec. 22, 1994 (describing cases of severe abuse or neglect resulting in
children's deaths, in which child protective services was alerted, but failed to act).
In 1991, the National Commission on Children stated: "If the nation had deliberately
designed a system that would frustrate the professionals who staff it, anger the public who
finance it, and abandon the children who depend on it, it could not have done a better job
than the present child welfare system." Mary B. Lamer et al., Protecting Children from
Abuse and Neglect: Analysis and Recommendations, 8 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN:
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 4, 5 (1998) (citing the Nat'l
Comm'n on Children, Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Children and
Families 293 (1991)), available at http:llwww.futureofchildren.orglinformation2826/
information show.htm?docjid=75334 (last visited Sept. 28, 2001).
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already limps along. Some have projected that doing so would double
or triple child protective services' current caseloads.' Failure to
anticipate this result led to the repeal of Minnesota's statute.. and the
revision of Florida's statute. 6
A final argument against including children exposed to domestic
violence within state definitions of maltreatment is that a sizable
proportion of children exposed to domestic violence do not appear to
be harmed, and thus do not require state protection through intrusive
intervention into the family." Clearly, not all children exposed to
domestic violence are harmed in a manner justifying intrusive
governmental intervention. In fact, as the summary of data on the
effects of domestic violence on children below reveals, there is
substantial heterogeneity in the effects on children of such
exposure."' Yet, the absence of prospective longitudinal studies
examining effects of domestic violence exposure on children over
time leaves us with many unanswered questions about the long-term
consequences of such exposure."9 There is a growing body of
empirical knowledge which, I propose, together with the combined
wisdom gleaned from the experience of domestic violence and child
protection workers, that can help policymakers target those children
whose exposure places them at risk of substantial harm.' Thus, while
strongly rejecting the concept of sweeping all children exposed to
domestic violence within the reach of the dependency system (or
characterizing childhood exposure to domestic violence as per se
maltreatment), I support a cautious inclusion of exposed children who
are already manifesting psychological symptomatology, as well as
those who appear to be at substantial risk for suffering serious
emotional harm in the immediate future. It is always challenging to
predict which children are indeed at risk of future harm and which are
not."' Yet, this determination is not substantially different from the
114. See, e.g., Whitney & Davis, supra note 111, at 164-65; Laudan Y. Aron & Krista K.
Olson, Efforts by Child Welfare Agencies to Address Domestic Violence: The Experiences
of Five Communities, Ch. VI. (1997), at http://wwv.urban.orglvelfare/aron3.htm.
115. See Edleson, Is Exposure Maltreatment?, supra note 98, manuscript at 18-19. See
infra notes 454-71 and accompanying text.
116. News agencies reported a 300 percent rise in child-abuse caseloads in the year
following the passage of the Kayla McKeon Child Protection Act in Florida. See John
Kennedy, Schools, Taxpayers Gain in Bush Budget: Democrats were Quick to Assail
Business-Friendly Language in the State's First-ever E-Budget, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan.
20, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3573475. See also supra notes 82-85, and accompanying
text.
117. See Edleson, Is Exposure Maltreatment?, supra note 98, manuscript at 21-22.
118. See infra notes 375-407 and accompanying text.
119. See infra note 377 and accompanying text.
120. See infra note 436 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 438,566-77 and accompanying text.
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predictions made with respect to other potential harms falling under
the jurisdiction of the dependency system. It is essential, however,
that if expanding child protection's jurisdiction to include domestic
violence exposure cases, we heed the criticisms discussed immediately
below regarding the ineffective, and sometimes destructive, ways in
which services have been provided to families in such cases.
(2) Making Available the Resources and Interventions of the Child
Protection System
Another important legislative goal in bringing children exposed
to domestic violence within the reach of the dependency system is
that doing so will make the resources and interventions of the system
available to these children and their families. The system's
interventions seek to insure children's immediate safety, provide
remedial services to the parents in the hope of preserving the family
system, provide support services to help children cope with the abuse
they have suffered, and plan for permanency. In the past several
years, however, authors have articulated a range of concerns about
the appropriateness and efficacy of the intervention strategies used by
protective services in domestic violence cases."
There is little disagreement on the part of knowledgeable
persons that children exposed to domestic violence are at risk
physically and psychologically."z  And, increasingly, there is
agreement among experts as to the principles of intervention that are
most likely to promote children's safety and well-being in domestic
violence situations. Yet, despite increasing unanimity among those
who serve on policy-making boards and committees, and those who
publish articles, "traditional" patterns of intervention persist in most
jurisdictions."2 Protection system authorities often remove children
122. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
123. There remain, however, many unanswered questions, such as what proportion of
exposed children are likely to have negative outcomes. For a discussion of this issue, see
infra notes 372-407 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 50-72; OJJDP, supra note 16;
SUSAN SCHECHTER & ANNE L. GANLEY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A NATIONAL
CURRICULUM FOR CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES (Janet Carter et al. eds., 1996),
available from Family Violence Prevention Fund, 383 Rhode Island Street, Suite 304, San
Francisco, California 94103 (415) 252-8900 [hereinafter A NATIONAL CURRICULUM];
Janet Carter & Susan Schechter, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Creating
Community Partnerships for Safe Families-Suggested Components of an Effective Child
Welfare Response to Domestic Violence, FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND (1997),
available at http:l/www.mincava.umn.edullink/fvpfl.htm (last modified Jan. 10, 2001);
Susan Schechter & Jeffrey L. Edleson, In the Best Interest of Women and Children: A Call
for Collaboration Between Child Welfare and Domestic Violence Constituencies (1994),
available at http:l/www.mincava.umn.edu/papers/wingsp.htm (last modified Jan. 28, 2000).
125. See Echlin & Marshall, supra note 109; Failure to Protect Working Group, supra
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from the custody of both the abusive and nonabusive parent, citing
the nonabusive parent's "failure to protect" the child from either
direct abuse by her batterer, or from exposure to the domestic
violence. 6 The reflexive use of such policies as a primary approach
to families affected by domestic violence has been strongly rejected
by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges,127 the
American Bar Association's Center for Children and the Law," the
U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention ("OJJDP"),29 as well as scores of scholars
and practitioners.30
For many decades, child protection policies have aimed, at least
in theory, to "preserve" (or at least "reunite" children with their)
families in abuse and neglect cases."' This aim reflects not only a
respect for parental rights to rear their own children,'32 but also a
note 107. A recent survey of state child protective services administrators revealed that
half of the respondent agencies did not have a written policy for their agency's responses
to domestic violence. Findlater & Kelly, supra note 98, at 89 (citing an unpublished report
of a survey conducted in 1998 by M. Montminy-Danna). For a discussion of a federal
lawsuit claiming that New York City agencies' policies and practices of removing children
from their battered mothers without proper investigation, findings, or due process are
unconstitutional, see infra notes 555-560 and accompanying text.
126. Over two dozen articles have been published in recent years, criticizing the
tendencies of protective services workers and prosecutors to frame civil and criminal child
abuse cases in this manner. See, e.g., V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State
Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
229 (1996); Lesley E. Daigle, Empowering Women to Protect: Improving Intervention with
Victims of Domestic Violence in Cases of Child Abuse and Neglect: A Study of Travis
County, Texas, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 287 (1998); Failure to Protect Working Group,
supra note 107; Jeanne A. Fugate, Who's Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure-to-
Protect Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 27-- (2000); Randy H. Magen, In the Best Interests of
Battered Women: Reconceptualizing Allegations of Failure to Protect, 4 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 127 (1999); Melissa A. Treppicione, At the Crossroads of Law and
Social Science: Is Charging a Battered Mother with Failure to Protect Her Child an
Acceptable Solution When Her Child Witnesses Domestic Violence?, 69 FORDHAM. L.
REV. 1487 (2001).
127. Recommendation 22 in the Green Book specifically states that "Child protection
services should avoid strategies that blame a nonabusive parent for the violence
committed by others." THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 66.
128. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 13, at 17 ("Child PROTECTIVE service agency
personnel [and others] are urged to exercise care so that their interventions do not become
unintentional bludgeons used against children and their battered parents.").
129. OJJDP, supra note 16 ("Principle 4: Make mothers safe to keep children safe").
130. See e.g., supra note 98 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of "family preservation" and "family reunification" theories in
child welfare, see generally HOWARD ALTSTEIN & RUTH G. McRoy, DOES FAMILY
PRESERVATION SERVE A CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS: CONTROVERSIES IN PUBLIC
POLICY (2000); Jacquelyn McCroskey & William Meezan, Family-Centered Services:
Approaches and Effectiveness, 8 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN
FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 54 (1998), available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/pcnL.
132. See infra note 267 and accompanying text, discussing constitutional protection for
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general appreciation that, from the perspective of a child, parents are
not fungible commodities. In most instances, there is a bond between
parents and children that is not easily replaced." In addition,
empirical research suggests that a strong positive relationship with a
nonabusive caregiver can promote the psychological well-being of
children exposed to violence, increasing their ability to cope
effectively.3' Thus, most policy-making groups that have recently
tackled these issues assert that it is the obligation of the child
protection system to assist the nonabusive parent in creating safety for
the child if she is unable to protect her child from exposure to domestic
violence, or from direct abuse by the offending parent.'35 Some of the
the parent-child relationship.
133. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 9-
28 (1973) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEST INTERESTS] (discussing the notion of the
"psychological parent" and the importance to children's well-being to maintaining that
relationship without external interference).
134. Joy D. Osofsky, The Impact of Violence on Children, 9 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILDREN 33, 38-39 (1999), available at
http://www.futureofchildren.orgldvc/index.htm.
135. See, e.g., THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 62-67. "Child protection workers
should develop service plans and referrals that focus on the safety, stability, and well-being
of all victims of family violence and that hold domestic violence perpetrators
accountable." Principle X, id. at 62; OJJDP, supra note 16, at 28-34. The OJJDP report
states:
Historically, women who are victims of domestic violence often have been held
responsible for batterers' violence against them and their children. They have
been blamed for being abused, for exposing their children to abuse, for not
leaving the perpetrator, or for not stopping his violence.
A battered woman cannot change or stop a perpetrator's violence by herself; if
she does not have adequate support, resources, and protection, leaving him may
simply make it worse for her children. In many instances, making mothers
safe.., does make children safer and offers them their best hope for stability.
Therefore, child welfare administrators and juvenile court personnel should seek
to keep children affected by maltreatment and domestic violence in the care of
their nonoffending parent whenever possible.
OJJDP, supra note 16, at 30-31.
There are many obstacles battered mothers face in trying to create safety for
themselves and their children, such as an increased risk of physical harm from the abuser
when attempting or following separation, and concern that the criminal justice system will
not protect them; poverty and homelessness; fear that their abuser may succeed in
abducting or otherwise harming the children; difficult legal contests for child custody with
the batterer and/or child protective services. For discussions of some of the obstacles
confronting women trying to leave their batterers, see, for example, Carole Echlin & Bina
Osthoff, Child Protection Workers and Battered Women's Advocates Working Together to
End Violence Against Women and Children, in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, supra note 29, at 207, 212-15; Failure to Protect Working Group, supra note
107, at 858-62; Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.ka., Why Abuse Victims Stay,
COLO. LAW, Oct. 1999, at 19. For a discussion of the phenomenon of "separation
assault," see Mahoney, supra note 33; see also supra note 31. For discussions of the
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interventions suggested include use of community services, such as
those provided by domestic violence organizations and shelters, to
help domestic violence victims and children to reach safety; use of
civil protective orders, issued by the juvenile court, to remove the
batterer from the home; and use of the criminal justice system to
intervene decisively with domestic violence offenders.'36
As noted above, the philosophical differences and history of
mistrust that characterize the relationships between child protective
services and community-based domestic violence programs have been
the subject of much commentary.' 3 Whereas child protective services
is criticized for misunderstanding the dynamics of domestic violence
and taking a punitive role in working with domestic violence victims,
domestic violence workers are charged with failing to act in the best
interests of victims' children by refusing to report cases of child abuse
and neglect to authorities."S And, indeed, to the extent that either
accusation is grounded in truth, there is cause for concern. Legal
intervention in domestic violence cases may unintentionally increase
the dangers faced by victims, if implemented in the absence of a
working understanding, for example, of how batterers manipulate the
legal system to control their victims. 39 In addition, however, there are
relationships among domestic violence, women's poverty, welfare receipt, and
homelessness, see, for example, Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and
Homelessness, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 237 (1994); Jody Raphael & Richard M. Tolman, Trapped
by Poverty, Trapped by Abuse: New Evidence Documenting the Relationship Between
Welfare and Domestic Violence (report from the Project for Research on Welfare, Work,
and Domestic Violence (1997)), at http://www.ssw.ucmich.edu/trapped/pubs.html.
There has been much written in recent years to help explain why not all battered
women manage to leave their abusers. Some commentators find it perplexing that so
many observers ask "Why do women stay?" rather than "Why do abusers continue to
abuse their partners and their children?" See, e.g., Echlin & Osthoff, supra at 212-13.
Others have suggested that the expectation that the victim of battering leave the family
home is the ultimate concession to the batterer and his control over the family members'
lives. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1888 (1996) (citing Natalie Loder Clark,
Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 263,281-282 (1987)) [hereinafter Hanna, No Right to Choose].
136. See THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 54-55; AM. BAR ASs'N, supra note 13, at
3-4; OJJDP, supra note 16, at 35-40; Carter et al., supra note 2, at 11-14. See Saathoff &
Stoffel, supra note 110, at 99-104 for a discussion of the types of services provided by
domestic violence organizations.
137. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
138. Schechter, supra note 98, at 62 (describing the mutual mistrust that has sometimes
characterized the perceptions of child protection and domestic violence workers vis-a-vis
each other).
139. As noted below, where "the word is out" that child protection agencies typically
remove children from the custody of battered women once the family becomes known to
the agency, batterers are empowered to "threaten" their victims' that such removal will
likely follow the victims reports of the abuse to authorities. See infra note 553 and
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circumstances when the interventions offered by domestic violence
agencies may not succeed in protecting a child from imminent harm.'4
accompanying text.
140. For example, given the high co-occurrence of domestic violence and physical child
maltreatment, many children who are exposed to domestic violence also are direct victims
of physical abuse or neglect. See supra note 7. Depending upon the duration and extent
of the abuse suffered by the adult victim, she may be paralyzed by fear, substance abuse,
or other factors, and may not be able to protect the child from the violence. This
appeared to have been the case for Hedda Nussbaum, a battered woman who, together
with her common law husband, Joel Steinberg, raised a little girl named Lisa who was
unrelated to either of them. See Primetime Live: A Journey to Tragedy: Hedda
Nussbaum Tells Her Disturbing Story (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 2, 1997), available
at 1997 WL 15362260. Ms. Nussbaum was subjected to ongoing physical torture and
psychological manipulations by Mr. Steinberg, rendering her virtually incapable of taking
action to protect herself or Lisa. Id. Ultimately, Lisa died at the age of six, at Joel
Steinberg's hands. Id. In some instances, temporary state custody of a child may be the
only way to provide immediate safety for the child, while child protective services and
domestic violence agencies seek to help the adult victim recover from the debilitating
effects of the abuse. See Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence:
Legal Connections and Controversies, 29 FAM. L.Q. 357, 360-69 (1995). For arguments
regarding specific circumstances when the state should intervene with removal of the child
from the battered parent's custody, see Thomas D. Lyon, Are Battered Women Bad
Mothers? Rethinking the Termination of Abused Women's Rights for Failure to Protect, in
NEGLECTED CHILDREN: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 237, 258 (Howard
Dubowitz ed., 1999).
And, in some instances, mothers may be perpetrators of their children's
maltreatment. Researchers have disagreed as to precisely how much and what types of
the child maltreatment result from maternal abuse or neglect of their children. See
Candace Kruttschnitt, Gender and Interpersonal Violence, in 3 UNDERSTANDING AND
PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 293,310-11 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr., & Jeffrey
A. Roth eds., 1994). Some investigators report that mothers perpetrate more physical
aggression than do fathers, generally, as well as in families characterized by domestic
violence. See, e.g., RICHARD J. GELLES, THE VIOLENT HOME 55 (1987); Murray A.
Straus, Ordinary Violence, Child Abuse, and Wife Beating: What Do they Have in
Common?, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS AND
ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 403, 407-09 (Murray A. Straus & Richard J.
Gelles eds., 1995). Others critique the research methods used to support this assertion,
and conclude that men perpetrate the overwhelming proportion of physical child
maltreatment occurring in families characterized by domestic violence. See, e.g., Lee H.
Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 158 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds. 1988); Edleson,
The Overlap, supra note 7, at 143; Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children
at Risk- A Feminist Perspective on Child Abuse, 18 INT'L. J. HEALTH SERVS. 97 (1988)
(discussing, and critiquing, protective services' judgments of child maltreatment by
mothers). Recent research suggests that although some battered mothers "do engage in
aggressive behavior toward their children," they do not do so to a greater extent than
mothers in matched control groups. George W. Holden et al., Parenting Behaviors and
Beliefs of Battered Women, in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE: THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND APPLIED ISSUES 289, 326 (George W. Holden et al. eds., 1998)
[hereinafter CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE]. See also Cris M. Sullivan, et
al., Beyond Searching for Deficits: Evidence that Physically and Emotionally Abused
Women Are Nurturing Parents, 2 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 51 (2000) (presenting data
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Without question, a partnership between the two organizations,
grounded in mutual respect and shared knowledge, is most likely to
serve the interests of children and their battered mothers. And
indeed, there is a growing consensus that both agencies have much to
offer domestic violence victims and their children, and that effective
services for this population will require interagency cooperation and
collaboration.141 Thus, whether or not a jurisdiction uses a statutory
approach to respond to children's exposure to domestic violence, a
careful examination of the policies and procedures used in domestic
violence cases, with reference to recently-promulgated guidelines for
effective intervention,'42 is likely to benefit children and their battered
parents.
(3) Promoting Consistency in Interagency Handling of Domestic Violence
Cases Involving Children
Inclusion of certain children exposed to domestic violence within
the definition of maltreated children, if accompanied by language that
sets forth a specific agency approach to these cases, may promote
more consistent child protection responses to domestic violence cases.
In most jurisdictions, there is no clear mandate regarding how to
countering the proposition that battered mothers, as a group, may be less emotionally
available to, and more likely to use punitive discipline with, their children). And,
consistent with the research cited above, supra note 2, on gender differences in
perpetration of intimate partner violence, research strongly indicates that "the most
dangerous and potentially injurious acts [of child maltreatment] are performed more by
men than by women," Kruttschnitt supra, at 311, and that men are overwhelmingly
responsible for child abuse homicides, Edleson, The Overlap, supra note 7, at 143-44.
Although the frequency and severity of direct child abuse perpetrated by battered
women against their children may be less than previously presumed, battered women may
put their children at risk in some limited subset of cases, by engaging in potentially
harmful conduct, or failing to provide adequate care. See Judith Martin, Maternal and
Paternal Abuse of Children: Theoretical and Research Perspectives, in THE DARK SIDE OF
FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 293 (David Finkelhor et al. eds.,
1983); Holden et al., supra. In such cases, state intervention, including removal from
maternal custody, may be necessary to protect a child from imminent harm. See Lyon,
supra. Clearly, however, the types of services and interventions offered to a domestic
violence victim must reflect an understanding of her victimization, must address a key
source of the problem (i.e., the violence by the domestic violence perpetrator), and must
help her remediate any conditions (e.g., substance dependency) that affect her parenting.
For discussions of some of the challenges to feminists in addressing child abuse and
neglect by mothers, see Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for
Feminist Theory, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 75 (1993); Carolyn Kott Washburne, A Feminist
Analysis of Child Abuse and Neglect, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT
FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 289 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983).
141. See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see infra notes 144-45 and
accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 12-13, 16 and accompanying text.
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respond to domestic violence cases.143 In addition, the lines of
communication across agencies are not always open, nor are there
clear guidelines for cross-reporting and making referrals. Thus, an
effective statute must guide child protection workers, judges, and
other agencies in a coordinated and consistent approach to these
cases.
Some jurisdictions have achieved more uniform and coordinated
handling of these cases through implementation of internal protocols
guiding assessment and intervention, in the absence of statutory
inclusion of children exposed to domestic violence into the definition
of maltreated children.'" In fact, jurisdictions have attained
interdepartmental and interagency collaboration and cooperation
through a variety of initiatives.' Thus, it is clear that inclusion of
children exposed to domestic violence within the statutory definition
of maltreated children is not a necessary precondition to realization
of these goals.
And, without question, statutory enactments alone, without
explication of practice guidelines and decision rules, could do more
harm than good.'46 Statutes placing childhood exposure to domestic
violence within the definition of child maltreatment must not only
target the subpopulation within the larger group for which state
intervention is necessary, but must articulate a philosophy of
intervention, consistent with our state of knowledge as to what
constitutes effective intervention. And, the statutes must also provide
concrete guidance to workers, through training, assessment
instruments, and other tools, to promote the appropriate handling of
these cases.
(4) "Sending a Message" to Domestic Violence Perpetrators and Others
Many assert that enactment of a statute defining childhood
exposure to domestic violence as a form of child maltreatment will
educate the public, professionals, batterers, victims, and children
143. Echlin & Marshall, supra note 109, at 175.
144. Janet E. Findlater & Susan Kelly, Refraining Child Safety in Michigan: Building
Collaboration Among Domestic Violence, Family Preservation, and Child Protection
Services, 4 CHILD MALTREATMENT 167 (1999); Whitney & Davis, supra note 111
(describing the successful integration of domestic violence and child protective services
expertise in the Massachusetts Department of Social Services). See also Aron & Olson,
supra note 114, at Ch. I-VI (for a description of such programs in Michigan, San Diego
County, Oregon, and Hawaii, as well as Massachusetts).
145. For descriptive summaries of many such creative approaches to service delivery,
see generally EMERGING PROGRAMS, supra note 17; FIRST NATIONAL SUMMIT, supra
note 17.




affected by domestic violence.'47 Such statutes "send a message" to
those in the community that domestic violence is harmful to children
and that exposing children to domestic violence falls below socially-
accepted standards of parenting. As such, these statutes would
invoke the "symbolic" or "expressive" function of law,"* and may
147. See, e.g., JAFFE ET AL., supra note 3, at 104. Dr. Peter Jaffe and his colleagues
assert,
Recognizing the fact that children who are exposed to violence may be in need of
protection also sends a clear message to the community about the life conditions
of battered women and their children. It changes wife abuse from being a private
family matter between consenting adults to a dangerous situation that may have
serious physical and emotional consequences for battered women and their
children.
Id. In her analysis of policies mandating domestic violence victims' participation in
prosecution of their batterers, Professor Cheryl Hanna underscores a more fundamental
point that is applicable here as well. Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra note 135, at 1865
(1996). Articulating the position of advocates of aggressive criminal prosecution of
domestic violence perpetrators, she states:
They... argue that because domestic violence is a public crime, [aggressive state
intervention] ... communicates and follows through on the message that the
state will not tolerate violence of any sort. These arguments are rooted in the
feminist principle that, when the state refuses to intervene under the rationale
that domestic violence is a private family matter, the state not only condones,
but, in fact, promotes such violence.
Id. (emphasis added).
148. Professor Carol Weisbrod discusses the perspective that law has the potential to
influence our attitudes and behavior:
Professor Glendon's argument, in part, is that law has both strong educational
functions and significant expressive components. Law is a play, a story, a
message, a thing that is shaped by culture and in turn shapes the culture. To the
extent law shapes culture we should use it to send messages ....
Recognition of law as expressive, as a source of symbols and values, has been
common in America for some time.
Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv., 991,
991-93 (1989) (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
LAW (1987)). In her essay, Professor Weisbrod points out some of the complicating
factors in the notion of law as an expressive or symbolic medium. For example, "law" is
often a complex and disparate mass of often contradictory messages and it is not always
clear what "messages" the public "receives." Id. at 995-1004.
Professor Robert Scott provides a useful summary of current theories about law's
expressive functions:
In recent years, the social norms literature has shown that law can also have
indirect effects on incentives. Thus, for example, a legal ban on smoking in
public places or a "pooper-scooper" law can motivate citizens not to smoke in
certain areas or to clean up after their dogs even when the state has no resources
invested in direct (or first order) enforcement. By empowering neighbors and
other citizens to use public ridicule as an enforcement technique, these laws can
influence behavior by imposing informal (or second order) sanctions, such as
shaming. Similarly, these laws can have self-sanctioning (or third order) effects
to the extent that citizens internalize the legal rule and are deterred by the
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result in the changing of public attitudes toward the phenomenon of
domestic violence and of children's exposure thereto. Some argue
that some perpetrators of domestic violence might be motivated to
change their conduct if they realized their children were being hurt. 49
And, public condemnation of domestic violence may help exposed
children challenge their beliefs about the place of violence in intimate
relationships."' It may also help women who are victims to appreciate
that society and its institutions condemn their abusers' actions, and
are available to support them and their children as they attempt to
extricate themselves from these relationships.
Opponents of these statutes do not challenge the power and
potential benefits of statutory enactments in sending this type of
social message. Rather, they would argue that there are other
mechanisms to communicate such messages, and that the potential
negative consequences of such statutes outweigh these potential
benefits. In recent years, many professionals and community workers
have developed a range of public education programs and prevention
programs for youth."5 Regardless of the position one takes on the
types of statutory enactments discussed here, proliferation of such
prospect of guilt. These latter effects require that legal rules be mediated
through social phenomena-social norms and human emotions-that are highly
complex and only imperfectly understood. In the case of a shaming sanction, the
law must rely on existing normative structures to influence in predictable ways
the "expression" or social meaning of the disfavored (or favored) action. In the
case of self-sanctions, the law must rely on the even more complex phenomenon
of internalization of normative behavior.
Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1603, 1603-04 (2000). For thoughtful examinations of various theories of the
expressive or symbolic functions of law, and for criticisms of these theories see, for
example, Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence,
83 VA. L. REv. 249 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996). See generally Symposium, The Legal Construction of Social
Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577 (2000).
149. Jeffrey L. Edleson, Men Who Batter as Parents, in EMERGING PROGRAMS, supra
note 17, at 150. See also David J. Mathews, Parenting Groups for Men Who Batter, in
ENDING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO CHILDREN OF
BATTERED WOMEN 106, 116-17 (E. Peled et al. eds., 1995) (indicating that many
perpetrators of domestic violence "deny" the effects of their conduct on their children).
150. Cf. Stone & Fialk, supra note 57, at 210. Assertions that "[c]riminal sanctions send
a message to [children exposed to domestic violence] that the violence they observe in
their homes is a criminal act that brings negative consequences to the perpetrator and
should not serve as a model for their future relationships," id., pertain as well to statutes
that characterize exposure as child maltreatment. In both cases, society is labeling the
abusive conduct as unacceptable.
151. David A. Wolfe & Peter G. Jaffe, Emerging Strategies in the Prevention of
Domestic Violence, 9 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
CHILDREN 133 (1999), available at http:llwww.futureofchildren.org/dvc/index.htm.
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educational programs may be an important weapon to combat
domestic violence and the phenomenon of children's repetition, as
adults, of patterns of violence they learned in their families of origin.
I. The History and Current Status of "Child Protection" in the
United States
Any analysis of statutes that seek to alter or reinforce the
mandate of state child protection agencies and the juvenile court must
be grounded in an understanding of the nature and philosophical
justifications of our country's traditions of state intervention in
families to protect children from alleged child maltreatment. Thus, in
this Part, I provide an historical overview of the American social and
legal response to child maltreatment, followed by Part III, which
focuses specifically on modem American legal responses, and in
particular, the roles of the juvenile court and child protective services
in promoting children's safety and well-being.
A. Child Maltreatment as a Social Problem
Public concern about and coordinated social responses to the
plights of maltreated children reflect relatively "modem" perspectives
about children, families, and family-state relationships. Settlers,
colonists, and early Americans did not recognize child maltreatment
as a problem requiring public attention. Mechanisms, typically
informal, existed to deal with orphaned, abandoned, and other
dependent children. Corporal punishment was routine as the
recommended practice for promoting children's obedience and moral
development. The prerogatives of parents, guardians, and other
adults to use discretion in the discipline and training of children
within their charge were rarely questioned.
Slowly, attitudes changed, as did a range of social and economic
realities of American life. New conceptions of childhood developed
throughout the nineteenth century, culminating in images of young
people as vulnerable beings whose future well-being could be highly
influenced by their childhood experiences and the environments in
which they grow up. Immigration, industrialization, and urbanization
throughout the century resulted in conditions that caught the
attention of social reformers, whose parens patriae concern for the
welfare of children perceived to be at risk was commingled with a
desire to control the upbringing of children from less desirable
segments of the nation's population. Challenges to the previously
impenetrable privacy of the family increasingly were tolerated,
particularly if the parents in question appeared unsuited to the task of
raising our country's future citizens. Although developments specific
to child protection did not evolve through the nineteenth and
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twentieth centuries in a linear fashion, the reforms generally tracked
broader societal themes and movements that related to de jure and de
facto child and family policy in America. By the second half of the
twentieth century, child protection had become an important
component of state and federal social agendas, ultimately resulting in
the complex network of criminal and civil policies and agencies that
now regulate various aspects of family relationships.
The identification of a phenomenon as a social problem arousing
public condemnation and triggering formal legal intervention results
from complex interactions of social, economic, and political forces,
some of which may be related only incidentally to the focal issue.
As such, the goals and effects of the child protection movement at
various points in history must be examined with this perspective in
mind, and with attention to the contexts in which various legal
responses developed. Many writers cite the 1874 case of Mary Ellen
Wilson153 as the watershed event that announced the emergence of
child protection as a legitimate focus for public attention.'" Others
focus on the "discovery" of child abuse that followed the 1962
publication of physician Henry Kempe's landmark study of the
medical records of hundreds of "battered children." '55 Yet, although
these events reflected initial changes in our society's readiness to
scrutinize and intervene in the ways in which some families raised
their children, they did not necessarily correlate with shifts in the
prevalence of child maltreatment. 56
Children across America had been subjected to horrific
maltreatment'57 at the hands of their parents, guardians, teachers,
152. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 1-6 (1988) [hereinafter GORDON, HEROES] (arguing that
it is public concern about, and visibility of, family violence that has changed over time in
this country, rather than the incidence of family violence); D. Kelly Weisberg, The
"Discovery" of Sexual Abuse: Experts' Role in Legal Policy Formulation, 18 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1984) (analyzing the evolution of public concern about, and legal responses
to, sexual abuse of children in the United States). On the construction of social problems
more generally, see THEODORE R. SARBIN & JOHN I. KITSUSE, CONSTRUCTING THE
SOCIAL (1994); MALCOLM SPECTOR & JOHN I. KITSUSE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL
PROBLEMS (Rev. 2001); Joseph W. Schneider, Social Problems Theory, 11 ANN. REV.
SOC. 209 (1985).
153. See infra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
154. DORNE, supra note 69, at 22-23; VINCENT J. FONTANA & DOUGLAS J.
BESHAROV, THE MALTREATED CHILD: THE MALTREATMENT SYNDROME IN
CHILDREN; A MEDICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL GUIDE 4 (5th ed. 1996); ELIZABETH
PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY
VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 69-73 (1987).
155. See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
17 (1962). See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
156. GORDON, HEROES, supra note 152, at 2.
157. The term maltreatment, as used here, refers to conduct that falls within the four
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masters, IS employers, and others,'59 since the early days of the
colonies and territories.' In fact, there is widespread consensus that
maltreatment of children, as judged by modem standards, has always
primary categories recognized today: physical abuse, neglect (and its extreme form,
abandonment), sexual abuse, and emotional or psychological maltreatment. As noted
below, determinations of what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable treatment of
children are socially-, culturally-, and historically-relative. See infra notes 158-253, 273-77
and accompanying text. Therefore, the application here of modem categories and
terminology imposes a somewhat artificial lens on events that occurred in prior eras.
Despite this fact, I will evaluate these historical phenomena according to modem
standards, since such standards provide the most accessible and useful yardstick by which
to judge adult practices toward children.
158. Use of the term "master" refers to two distinct sets of relationships between adults
and children. First, the enslavement of generations of African-Americans subjected
millions of children to socially- and legally-sanctioned maltreatment on a daily basis.
MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 39-46 (1994); STEVEN MINTZ &
SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS 67-68 (1988); Brian D. Gallagher, A Brief
Legal History of Institutionalized Child Abuse, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1,14-19 (1997).
Enslaved children were not spared from the brutalities and indignities forced upon their
parents. Beatings, sexual abuse, coerced labor under severe conditions of physical
hardship, malnutrition, unsanitary living quarters, and dehumanizing and degrading
psychological treatment were among the hallmarks of a slave child's existence. MINTZ &
KELLOGG, supra at 67-77. And, slave children were often separated permanently, and
without warning, from their parents, if doing so seemed financially advantageous to the
"owners." Id. at 70; MASON, supra at 43-46; Gallagher, supra at 17-18. The institutional
nature of slavery in America places the maltreatment of these children in a class by itself
in American history, and it is not possible here to do justice to the suffering of children
raised in bondage.
The second context in which the term "master" applies involves circumstances in
which children became the indentured servants or apprentices of adults who, in turn,
provided them with food and lodging, and ideally, with training in a trade. MICHAEL
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 259-68 (1985); MASON, supra at 30-39. In these situations, the "masters"
assumed an in loco parentis relationship toward the child and, like parents, could
command obedience, and use various methods of "correction," with minors, as would a
child's own parents. GROSSBERG, supra at 259-68. Depending upon the nature and
circumstances of the servitude, masters might have greater or lesser autonomy in how they
treated their wards, and the extent to which they were required to provide children with
vocational training. MASON, supra at 30-39.
159. Children, together with slaves and servants, were sometimes initial research
subjects in medical experiments. Susan E. Lederer & Michael A. Grodin, Historical
Overview: Pediatric Experimentation, in CHILDREN AS RESEARCH SUBJECTS: SCIENCE,
ETHICS & LAW 3, 4-5 (Michael A. Grodin & Leonard H. Glantz eds., 1994). Medical
researchers reportedly tested vaccinations on their own children, but more commonly,
sought subject pools of children for medical research from orphanages, poorhouses, and
other institutional settings. Id. at 4-9.
160. See, e.g., DORNE, supra note 69, at 16; PLECK, supra note 154, at 44-48; Paul A.
Gilje, Infant Abandonment in Early Nineteenth Century New York City: Three Cases, in
GROWING UP IN AMERICA: CHILDREN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 109 (N. Ray Hiner
& Joseph M. Hawes eds., 1985).
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been a feature of human societies. 6' Most attempts at historical
reconstruction focus on Western nations and the civilizations that
preceded them. There is less information about maltreatment of
children in non-Western societies,'62 although there is strong evidence
of cultural variations in the prevalence of behaviors that would be
perceived to constitute child maltreatment by modern Western
criteria.'63
Scholars disagree, however, as to the nature and prevalence of
various forms of child maltreatment in particular segments of
161. See OLA W. BARNETT et al., FAMILY VIOLENCE ACROSS THE LIFESPAN: AN
INTRODUCTION 6 (1997); DORNE, supra note 69, at 15-18; FONTANA & BESHAROV,
supra note 154, at 3 (citing myths, legends, literature, and historical accounts of infanticide,
murder, human sacrifice, mutilation, abandonment); Samuel X. Radbill, Children In a
World of Violence: A History of Child Abuse, in THE BATTERED CHILD 3 (Ray E. Helfer
& Ruth S. Kempe eds., 4th eds., 1987) (reviewing a range of abusive practices throughout
history, including lethal abuse, child labor, sexual abuse, abandonment, and neglect).
162. The lack of such information may be due, in part, to the orientation on the part of
anthropologists to study "normative" rather than culturally-deviant practices in the society
of interest. Jill E. Korbin, Child Abuse and Neglect: The Cultural Context, in THE
BATTERED CHILD 23,23-24 (Ray E. Helfer & Ruth S. Kempe eds., 4th ed. 1987).
163. Id. at 25-35. Of course, cross-cultural comparisons are complicated by the obvious
role that cultural values and practices play in the definition of what constitutes
unacceptable conduct of adults vis-A-vis children. Id.
This said, however, anthropologist Jill Korbin, indicates that virtually all societies
have social norms and standards regarding what types of adult conduct toward children
are harmful. The Cultural Context of Child Abuse and Neglect, 4 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 3, 4-5 (1980). Despite the inherent complexities of evaluating conduct in other
cultures as abusive or neglectful to children, international standards have been
promulgated, articulating certain basic, and arguably universal, values in adult treatment
of children. See, for example, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1989, which speaks to the
rights of children to be free from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, as well as torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Children's Rights in
America: U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child Compared with United States Law, in
AM. BAR ASS'N CENTER ON CHILDREN & THE LAW xi-xxxiii (Cohen & Davidson eds.,
1990).
There is also evidence that particular forms of abuse, as judged by modern Western
standards, prevailed in particular times and places, clearly influenced by a range of social
and economic forces. Child labor practices in nineteenth and early twentieth century
America can be characterized in this way. See, e.g., Caroline G. Trinkley, Child Labor in
America: An Historical Analysis, 13 IN PUB. INTEREST 59, 69-71 (1993). Likewise, social
and economic factors clearly played a role in the rise in infanticide of female children in
the People's Republic of China in response to the "one child per family" population
control policy. See Caught Between Tradition and the State: Violations of the Human
Rights of Chinese Women, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 285, 295 (1996) (stating that
approximately five percent of China's female babies are "missing," due to infanticide,
selective abortion, neglect, and abandonment, in response to China's population control
policies). See generally Xiaorong Li, License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State
Responsibility, and Legal Failures in China's Family-Planning Program, 8 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 145 (1996).
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Western society throughout the past millennium.1" Whereas some
posit a linear evolution in the treatment of children, increasingly
approaching modem humane ideals during this period, others dispute
this characterization.165 The diverse perspectives converge, however,
in supporting the conclusion that maltreatment of children, as defined
by current mores, is not a new phenomenon, and that it certainly
preceded popular attention to child maltreatment as a social problem.
By the end of the twentieth century, four general categories of child
maltreatment had been identified: physical child abuse, physical child
neglect, sexual abuse, and psychological maltreatment. In examining
the "history" of child maltreatment policy in the United States, we
can trace social awareness about each of these categories, which
attracted public attention at different points in time. Furthermore, an
historical review reveals the seeds of modern legal approaches to
child maltreatment, which now incorporate both criminal and civil
responses.
B. The Development of Early Child Welfare and Child Protection Policies
(1) Care and Control of "Dependent" Children
Prior to the American Revolution, communities responded
informally to dependent persons, such as children who had been
orphaned or abandoned, as well as the poor, the infirm, or the
"insane." 16 Parental death was common in the new world, and
orphaned children typically joined extended families that contained a
164. DORNE, supra note 69, at 15-18 (for a summary and analysis of divergent
viewpoints).
165. Compare, e.g., Lloyd deMause, The Evolution of Childhood, in THE HISTORY OF
CHILDHOOD 1 (Lloyd deMause ed., 1974) (characterizing the "history of childhood [as] a
nightmare from which have only recently begun to awake. The further back in history one
goes, the lower the level of child care, and the more likely children are to be killed,
abandoned, beaten, terrorized, and sexually abused."), with PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES
OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 47, 261-68 (Robert Baldick trans.,
1962) (positing that between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, discipline of
children became increasingly humiliating, degrading, and corporal, and that such patterns
of adult treatment of children persisted into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in
some Western societies). Providing further contrast, Linda Pollock challenges the
analyses and conclusions of deMause, Aries, and others, as "dramatic generalizations"
[sic] grounded in part on sloppy research and inaccurate factual data. LINDA A.
POLLOCK, FORGOTTEN CHILDREN: PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS FROM 1500-1900 263,
268 (1983). Her investigations lead her to conclude that "the majority of children were not
subjected to brutality [and] that cruelty to children was not as widespread as has been
claimed" during the four centuries covered by her research. "A large section of the
population-probably most parents-were not 'battering' their children." Id. at 268.
166. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 187 (1973); DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC 31 (rev. 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM].
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complex mixture of half- and step-siblings, cousins, and wards, often
headed by older siblings, aunts, uncles, or other relatives serving in
parental roles.67 Dependent children who had no extended families
were cared for by neighbors or became the responsibility of the
community-at-large, typically as indentured servants.
r6s
Not until the nineteenth century did institutions for dependent and
"deviant" individuals develop in the United States. Ultimately
almshouses, orphanages, and houses of refuge became the more
common response to those whose families had died, abandoned them,
or seemed unable to care for them.169  Orphan asylums, the
predecessors of modem child welfare institutions, had flexible
admission policies, and did not limit their residents to children without
parents.' Children could be removed from parents seen as providing
inadequate supervision, moral training, or financial support to
safeguard against the likelihood that they would otherwise become
"pests to society" or future "tenants of... prisons."'' The first "house
of refuge" was established in 1824 in New York to serve juvenile
delinquents and other wayward, disobedient, neglected, and dependent
children and, in the next decades, other such houses were founded in
many major cities."
Appalled by the growing institutionalization of America's
dependent children, Charles Loring Brace, a New York City minister,
took a different approach." He created the Children's Aid Society,
which sought to save "homeless, ragged, hungry children prowling the
streets of New York City" by sending them to live with Christian
families in the rural Midwest.'74 Reportedly, over 150,000 such children
were sent by train to live and work on family farms. 5  In the late
nineteenth century, rural states also developed programs for
167. Ross W. Beales, Jr., The Child in Seventeenth-Century America, in AMERICAN
CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL HANDBOOK 15, 20 (Joseph M.
Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds. 1985).
168. DISCOvERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 166, at 31, 36; MASON, supra note 158, at
31-36.
169. DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 166, at 79-154, 180-236. See also, Patricia
A. Schene, Past, Present, and Future Roles of Child Protective Services, 8 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 23,25 (1998), available
at http://www.futureofchildren.org/pcn/.
170. The predominant philosophy was to avoid "penalizing an unfortunate child for the
fact of his parents' survival." DISCOvERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 166, at 207.
171. Id. at 210.
172. Id. at 76-77,209; DORNE, supra note 69, at 19.
173. Priscilla Ferguson Clement, The City and the Child, 1860-1885, in AMERICAN
CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL HANDBOOK 235, 257, 259-62
(Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985).
174. Schene, supra note 169, at 25.
175. Id.
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reimbursing farm families for caring for state wards.'76 These models
were precursors to modern concepts of foster care.
The nineteenth century witnessed the development of
increasingly aggressive policies of intervention in the lives of children
viewed as needing rescue from their otherwise unfortunate lots in life.
This phenomenon was an important component of the Progressive
Movement, which had its greatest influence toward the end of the
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century."7 Middle- and
upper-class Americans were alarmed at the plight of inner-city, lower-
class, and immigrant children, and a breed of Progressive reformers
or "child savers" gained growing influence and legitimacy in social
policy formation. Professor Michael Grossberg characterizes social
reforms of this era as propelled by a kind of "moral panic"-that is,
fear "that urbanization, industrial capitalism, and massive
immigration were undermining the nation's homes and thus, the
republic itself."'7  Historian Ronald Cohen notes that "[a]dults
worried about children-everyone's children, not just their own-for
their own sake and also out of fear for the country's future.
1 79
Whereas some observers emphasize the humanitarian underpinnings
of the Progressive ideology, others argue that the primary motive for
this focus on children was the desire for social control over growing
population subgroups viewed as dependent, different, or deviant."
These efforts culminated in the creation of the juvenile justice
system, which authorized state involvement in children's lives as a
"superparent" that substituted itself in the rearing of those children
176. Id.
177. Historians have generally referred to the period of time between 1885 through
1915 as the Progressive Era. During these years, "reformers" expressed pervasive
concerns about social and economic conditions in the United States, and particularly those
that affected children, and sought comprehensive social and legal change. For a
thoughtful and balanced historical analysis of this era, see Ronald D. Cohen, Child-Saving
and Progressivism, 1885-1915, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND
HISTORICAL HANDBOOK 273 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985). See also
Hamilton Cravens, Child Saving in Modern America, 1870-1990s, in CHILDREN AT RISK
IN AMERICA: HISTORY, CONCEPTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-31 (Roberta Wollons ed.,
1993).
178. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American
Family Law, 1890-1990,28 IND. L. REV. 273,275 (1995).
179. COHEN, supra note 177, at 274.
180. It is not possible here to disentangle the various impulses underlying twentieth
century social movements and legal reforms affecting children and families, although it is
likely that some mix of motives influenced these shifts. Id. at 273-81; GORDON, HEROES,
supra note 152, at 27-30; Schene, supra note 169, at 25. Critics of the social, cultural, and
economic biases of the modem child welfare system contend that the system still operates
as a mechanism of social control by certain classes and segments of society over others.
See, e.g., LELA B. COSTIN ET AL., THE POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE IN AMERICA 3-11
(1996) [hereinafter POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE].
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whose parents were viewed as harmful or inadequate."' These
reforms incorporated a "treatment" philosophy, emphasizing the needs
of the child, rather than on the act that triggered the court's authority.'1
Significantly, the three populations under juvenile court jurisdiction-
delinquents, status offenders,"8 and the dependent/neglected-could,
and often did, receive similar dispositions. Children from within any of
these categories could be sent to a foster home, an institution for the
dependent or neglected, or an institution for juvenile delinquents."f
2. Protecting "Endangered" Children from "Cruelty"
In April 1874, a jury convicted Mary Connolly of assault and
battery against Mary Ellen Wilson, a ten-year-old child who had been
placed in her care by the Department of Charities eight years prior."
Mrs. Connolly had assaulted Mary Ellen with a pair of scissors on one
instance, had repeatedly beat her with a rawhide whip and a cane, and
caused numerous bruises and scars on Mary Ellen's face and body."'6
The abuse against Mary Ellen served as a rallying point for a nascent
social movement against cruelty to children, initiating the use of the
criminal justice system as a weapon in the movement's
armamentarium, and stimulating the founding of the first society
against cruelty to children. The case was ground-breaking for several
reasons.
181. LaMar T. Empey, Introduction: The Social Construction of Childhood and
Juvenile Justice, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1-34 (LaMar T.
Empey ed., 1979). Most writers cite 1899 as the date of the juvenile justice system's
creation, since in this year, the Juvenile Court Act in Illinois became effective, marking
the first formal appearance of the juvenile court model in a state statute. See ANTHONY
M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 9-10 (2d ed., 1977);
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 215 (1980) [hereinafter CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE]; Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104,107 (1909).
182. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 181, at 107; CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE, supra
note 181, at 215.
183. Status offenders are minors brought to the attention of juvenile court for acts of
truancy, disobedience to their parents, running away from home, and other forms of
'incorrigible' troublesome behavior.
184. PAUL LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE 107, 113-
14 (1982). For example, in 1923, 50% of the minors in secure detention facilities in this
country were labeled "dependent." The author of a 1923 census noted: "The dividing line
between dependency and delinquency is often so vague that in practice both types of
children may be found in the care of organizations intended primarily for the care of a
single class." Id. at 114.
185. PLECK, supra note 154, at 69-73. For a collection of New York Times articles and
other press accounts of the case and related events, see 2 ROBERT H. BREMNER ET AL.,
CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 185-93 (1971). For a
critical examination of the "legend" of Mary Ellen Wilson, see POLITICS OF CHILD
ABUSE, supra note 180, at 51-75.
186. BREMNER, supra note 185, at 185-89.
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Corporal punishment was then a fixture in American society, in
families, in institutions, in schools, and in places of employment," and
outsiders did not second-guess adults' methods of instilling discipline
and obedience in children who were their charge.1" Family privacy
and parental autonomy, while not yet constitutionalized, were
paramount values in American society, discouraging scrutiny of the
internal affairs of families. Children were viewed as parental
property at common law.' 9 In addition, children were politically and
legally powerless in American society. Without advocates or legal
representatives, it was nearly impossible to imagine a diminution of
the deference to parental authority that negated extrafamilial
intrusion into childrearing.
And yet, as noted above, the nineteenth century was a period
characterized by increasing concern on the part of social reformers
about the childrearing practices of various subsets of the American
populace."' Mary Ellen's case first came to public attention as the
philosophies characterizing the Progressive Movement began to gain
a foothold in the United States. 9'
Reportedly, a charity worker whose husband was a journalist
learned of Mary Ellen's plight and managed to persuade the Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ("SPCA"), to assist her in
finding a way to remove Mary Ellen from the Connolly home.'9 The
legal counsel of the SPCA, Elbridge Gerry, filed a writ to secure
187. PLECK, supra note 154, at 34-47.
188. MASON, supra note 158, at 12. In some locales, however, such as parts of New
England, children treated too harshly could be removed from their parents and indentured
to another family. Id. And, in some areas, masters' punishment of their indentured
servants was also scrutinized. Id. The Quakers were noteworthy as a group that espoused,
and sought to put into effect, non-physical methods of child discipline. PLECK, supra note
154, at 37-39. In general, though, parents, guardians, and other adults were given
substantial leeway in using corporal methods to supervise children.
189. See generally, MASON, supra note 158. Some authors suggest that the vestiges of
this heritage continue to influence American family law. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?" Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 995 (1992). In her analysis of the constitutionalization of the doctrine of
family privacy in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), Professor Woodhouse asserts that: "Alongside notions of children as
individuals and national assets, Americans cherished deeply etched images of children as
their God-given, inalienable property; treasures, to be sure, but private treasures under
the control and custody of their parents." Id. at 1067.
190. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
191. POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 180, at 52,57-67.
192. Id. at 51-67; PLECK, supra note 154, at 69-79. Commentators have been intrigued
by the irony that, at this point in our country's history, a philanthropic establishment
existed to protect animals, but one did not exist to protect children. POLITICS OF CHILD
ABUSE, supra note 180, at 60-61 (discussing press reports and other evidence of public




Mary Ellen's freedom from the Connollys' custody.1" He filed
criminal charges against Mrs. Connolly, ultimately leading to Mary
Ellen's courtroom and in camera testimony of her abuse, which was
covered by the newspapers."
Gerry used this case as the springboard with which to form the
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
("NYSPCC").195  In this relatively hospitable social climate, a
movement was born, and "[f]orty years later, there were 494 such
anticruelty societies in the United States."1 96 These private societies,
hailed as the precursors of today's public child protective services,
increased public awareness of and concern about the dangers some
children experienced at the hands of their caregivers; they promoted
the passage of criminal child abuse statutes; they filed actions in court
against suspected perpetrators; and, most significantly, they
challenged the autonomy of parents in the interest of child protection
to a greater extent than had other organized social agencies.
The juvenile court movement, which transferred formal
jurisdiction for the broad range of dependent youth to the state,
including those neglected and abused, expanded the social weapons
available to combat cruelty to children.1 9 Yet, the social reforms of
the Progressive Era were so highly influenced by socioeconomic,
cultural, and class struggles, that the anticruelty efforts ultimately
succumbed to the influence of these broader crusades. The practical
effects of this phenomenon included a focus on the welfare of limited
subgroups of children perceived to be endangered, many of whom
were not those at greatest risk for physical harm. Reformers typically
focused more on child "neglect" than "abuse," often sweeping
193. Id. at 52-55. The writ filed was a writ de homine replegiando, a precursor of the
modern action for habeas corpus. BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 382 (7th ed. 1999).
194. BREMNER ET AL., supra note 185, at 185-93.
195. PLECK, supra note 154, at 72-73; POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE; supra note 180, at
62-67.
196. PLECK, supra note 154, at 69, 72-73.
197. Schene, supra note 169, at 26-27. Yet, despite these gains, some analysts suggest
that the anticruelty societies did not have a significant impact on the day-to-day lives of
abused children. See, e.g., PLECK, supra note 154, at 70. Elizabeth Pleck concludes that:
The law enforcement rhetoric of the SPCC was considerably stronger than their
actions. There is thus considerable confusion between the stated goal of the
societies-the prevention of cruelty to children-and their actual work...
Measured against all previous attempts at family violence reform, the work of the
anticruelty societies was distinctive in placing protection of children ahead of the
goal of preserving the family. Still, in hoping to maintain proper parental
authority in the family, the agents of these societies often sided with cruel parents
at the expense of the child's safety.
Id. at 70. In addition, without reporting laws of the type on state statutes today, most
cases of child abuse remained hidden from public view.
198. MASON, supra note 158, at 102.
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broadly within immigrant and lower-class populations, failing to
distinguish between "willful mistreatment of children and poverty or
cultural difference."'1
C. Child Labor as Child Maltreatment
Although the United States Supreme Court first railed against
"the crippling effects of child employment" in its 1944 opinion in
Prince v. Massachusetts,2' ° the movement to protect children from
hazardous employment conditions had commenced over a century
earlier. Yet, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that regulation
of child labor became a fixture of American life, after many decades
of bitter struggle.
Children had engaged in productive labor since the early days of
the American colonies, typically within the context of the family farm
or business, or as an indentured servant to a master who promised to
train and support the minor in exchange for the child's labor.
20 1
During the colonial period, child employment was viewed quite
positively, as instilling a sense of responsibility, duty, and discipline in
children, while preparing them for adult obligations.2 The often-
idealized American traditions of work in the context of family and
apprenticeship did not always shield children from abuse and injuries,
nor were all of these experiences necessarily accompanied by some
form of enriching education.203 Children were, however, "protected"
to some extent in family and apprenticeship contexts, in that the
supervising adults acknowledged legal, financial, and moral
responsibility for the welfare of their working minor charges.0 4
Gradually, throughout the nineteenth century, the locus of
employment shifted from the more sheltered settings of home, farm,
and small business to the impersonal context of large and often-
199. Id. at 100-08.
200. 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). Ironically, the vehicle for the Supreme Court's formal
rebuke of the "evils" of certain types of child labor, Prince v. Massachusetts, was not,
technically-speaking, a case addressing regulation of children in the work force. The case
concerned the constitutionality of the state's child labor laws, as enforced against a nine-
year-old child's legal custodian, who allowed the child to distribute religious literature on
street comers. Id. at 161-64.
201. GROSSBERG, supra note 158, at 259.
202. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL
VALUE OF CHILDREN 66-68 (1985); Trinkley, supra note 163, at 69-71 (1993). Arguably,
these attitudes were, in part, a rationalization for the practice by England of "shipping"
poor children to the American colonies to avoid financial and social responsibility for
these children while addressing the need in the colonies for additional laborers. Id. at 63-
67.
203. GROSSBERG, supra note 158, at 259-68.
204. Id.
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exploitative corporations2 5 and to the city streets.2"6 The widespread
industrialization of the nineteenth century brought new concerns
about the welfare of children in the workplace." Long hours, paltry
wages, and highly dangerous conditions typically characterized the
work in factories, mills, mines, and other corporate settings.
Industrial accidents, exposure to harmful substances, and physical
abuse by employers were common incidents to children's
employment."' In the late 1800s and early 1900s, as the conditions in
the workplace became increasingly hazardous, the proportion of
children between the ages of ten and fifteen entering the labor force
rose sharply.2"
Muckraking reporters exposed some of the conditions in
factories, mills, and mines, revealing circumstances dangerous for full-
grown adults, and thus all the more perilous for the young."'
Furthermore, full-time child labor had no place in the society that
Progressive reformers sought to craft, nor did any type of labor that
interfered substantially in children's educational or socioemotional
development.21' Yet, critics of child labor laws assailed reforms as
intrusions upon parental autonomy.2"2 The battle to use the legal
system to protect children from dangerous and exploitative working
conditions confronted strong opposition.213  By the 1940s, however,
205. Trinkley, supra note 163, at 67-72.
206. In urban areas, some children became involved in selling various items on the
streets, such as food, clothing, newspapers, and so on. Clement, supra note 173, at 249.
The streets brought their own dangers, as alluded to by the Supreme Court in Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 165, 168 (1944): "Among the evils most appropriate for [state
action for the protection of children] are... the possible harms arising from... the
diverse influences of the street."
207. STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA:
CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW 3 (1968).
208. Trinkley, supra note 163 at 59, 69-71. "No matter how exhausted they were from
the drudgery of the previous day, factory children were obliged to keep pace with
machinery that never tired." Id. at 67-68. Trinkley reports accidents such as children
losing or injuring fingers, falling down elevator shafts, and tumbling into vats of hot
chemicals. Id. at 70.
209. For example, census figures and Department of Labor data reveal a sharp increase
between 1870 and 1910. WOOD, supra note 207, at 3-4. See also David Stern et al., How
Children Used to Work, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 93, 98-99 (1975).
210. Cohen, supra note 177, at 288.
211. As the Supreme Court ultimately opined in Prince, in upholding Massachusetts'
child labor statute in 1944: "It is the interest of the youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for
growth into free and independent, well-developed men and citizens," necessitating
children's participation in developmentally-appropriate educational tasks, and their
protection from "evils" such as "the crippling effects of child employment." 321 U.S. at
165,168.
212. ZELIZER, supra note 202, at 69-70.
213. Those opposing child labor reforms included employers, legislators, ZELIZER,
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
the reformers prevailed: courts stopped invalidating child labor
legislation and, after World War II, children's employment in the
United States ultimately was restricted to part-time work under
suitable conditions, as long as this work does not interfere with the
children's education.14 Whether the triumph of child labor legislation
resulted from general humanitarian concerns, changing social notions
about children, the changing demands of the workplace, 215 or other
political factors,2 16 child labor no longer presents a threat to the health
and well-being of the overwhelming majority of American children.217
D. Development of the Child Protection System in the Twentieth Century
Several developments in twentieth century converged to create
the modern child protection system. Among the most significant are
the increasing involvement of federal and state government in the
regulation of children's lives in a variety of spheres; the growth of
government "welfare" programs to provide support to impoverished
families; new "scientific" understandings of child abuse via the
dissemination of methods to diagnose "the battered child syndrome"
through radiological and other medical techniques; the subsequent
supra note 202, at 64-66, and parents of employed youth, asserting their "desperate
need.., for additional income" in order to make ends meet. See Selma Berrol, Ethnicity
and American Children, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND
HISTORICAL HANDBOOK 343,349-50 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985). See
also ZELIZER, supra note 202, at 69-70.
214. Not until 1941, in United States v. Darby Lumber, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), did the U.S.
Supreme Court uphold a comprehensive federal labor law, the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, as a constitutional exercise of congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce. And even in the face of this victory for reformers, child employment rates rose
again, during World War II, as the nation sought the labors of those who were not serving
in the military (i.e., women and children). MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 158, at 166.
215. Leroy Ashby, Partial Promises and Semi-Visible Youths: The Depression and
World War II, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL
HANDBOOK 489, 493 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985). See also ZELIZER,
supra note 202, at 62-63.
216. Some assert that the success of child labor reform relates can be partially
attributed to the convergence of the interests of children's advocates and organized labor.
Ashby, supra note 215, at 493; Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist
Approach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 1, 6 (1986). The latter group
joined forces in the movement to restrict child labor because doing so was expected to
improve the bargaining position of adult employees by constricting the pool of available
workers. Id.
217. Some writers argue that, even in the United States today, there is continuing
exploitation and endangerment of children in certain employment contexts. For
exceptions to restrictions on child labor, see, for example, Davin C. Curtiss, The Fair
Labor Standards Act and Child Labor in Agriculture, 20 J. CORP. L. 303 (1995); Rachelle
Propson, A Call for Statutory Regulation of Elite Child Athletes, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1773
(1995); Marc R. Staenberg & Daniel K. Stuart, Children as Chattels: The Disturbing Plight
of Child Performers, 32 BEVERLY HILLS BAR AsS'N J. 21 (1997).
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passage of child abuse reporting laws in the fifty states; and in the last
three decades of the twentieth century, the enactment of a series of
federal statutes providing policy leadership and funding to the states
in the effort to protect maltreated children. And, as is often the case
when the major policy changes "sweep" the nation, these
transformations have been followed by criticism and reassessment of
the philosophies, methods, and goals that constitute modem
responses to concerns about endangered children.
During the twentieth century, federal and state governments
became increasingly involved in supporting and regulating families.
The proliferation and enforcement of compulsory schooling laws and
policies restricting child labor, and the creation and growth of the
juvenile court system provide salient examples of expanding state
involvement in the regulation of childhood.218 In the twentieth
century, the government also became involved in providing financial
support to families, and offering various human services. The passage
of the Social Security Act of 1935, which established the Aid to
Dependent Children program,219 signaled the federal government's
entry, by means of substantial financial commitment, into the bastion
of child welfare. In that this program, like its successors, funded state
child welfare programs, providing incentives to the states to
implement federally-endorsed welfare policies, the program marked
the birth of federal and state bureaucracies charged with addressing
the well-being of children in America. "  This program was also
noteworthy in that it marked the federal government's adoption of
the then-emerging philosophy that it was better for children from
destitute families to be raised by their own families than placed in
institutions. 1 The 1935 Act and its successors provided for financial
assistance to the impoverished families, obviating the "need" to
remove otherwise "dependent" children from the home. Throughout
218. See supra notes 181-84,205-14 and accompanying text.
219. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (repealed 1996). In 1962, this program was renamed Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, to reflect a broadened focus on providing support to
the parents or other relatives caring for the child. Public Welfare Amendment of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(1), (3), 76 Stat. 185 (1962).
220. Although the Children's Bureau had been established in 1912, following the first
White House Conference on Children, the Bureau was not empowered to do much more
than gather and disseminate information relevant to children's well-being. See Hamilton
Cravens, Child-Saving in the Age of Professionalism, 1915-1930, in AMERICAN
CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL HANDBOOK 415, 416-17, 462
(Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985). In addition, although the 1920s saw the
beginnings of federal involvement in child welfare through grants to community groups
addressing health issues such as improved prenatal care, the 1935 Act created the
blueprint that still prevails today, albeit with substantially less funding than in prior
decades.
221. See Ashby, supra note 215, at 495-496.
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the 1930s and 1940s, as the Depression and World War II tested our
country's resilience, the federal government provided aid to its
citizens, including families with children, through a wide variety of
public assistance measures.'m Many of these programs, particularly
those targeting mothers and children, continued in one form or
another until the 1990s, when the federal government sought to "end
welfare as we know it.'z
Second, during the mid-twentieth century, state child welfare
agencies increasingly took over the functions that had been handled
previously by groups such as the Societies for Prevention of Cruelty
to Children. In the 1950s, thirty-five states and the District of
Columbia enacted statutesplacing the responsibility for child welfare
services in public agencies. 4 Reportedly, between 1956 and 1977, the
number of child welfare workers employed by state agencies rose
from 5,628 nationwide to 30,000.' In the 1960s, when the "battered
child syndrome" was identified, and child abuse reporting statutes
passed,' 6 these administrative agencies began their transformation
into modern-day child protective services.
National attention became riveted on the issue of child abuse
with the 1962 publication of a now-famous article entitled "The
Battered Child Syndrome" in the Journal of the American Medical
222. See generally id.
223. In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-603, which repealed the AFDC provisions that had become a fixture in
welfare policy throughout the latter two-thirds of the twentieth century. For a comparison
of the provisions of the prior and present welfare policy as it relates to children and
families, see generally Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare As We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REV.
471 (1997); Stephen D. Sugarman, Financial Support of Children and the End of Welfare
As We Know It, 81 VA. L. REV. 2523 (1995). The phrase "ending welfare as we know it,"
which has been adopted in the scholarly and lay press to highlight the end of an era,
derives from statements made by President Bill Clinton, when campaigning, in speeches
once in office (including the State of the Union address), and when signing the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. See, e.g., President Bill
Clinton, Remarks to Officials at Missouri (June 14, 1994), available at 1994 WL 258369;
Laura W. Morgan, A Shift in the Ruling Paradigm: Child Support As Outside the Contours
Of "Family Law," 12(5) DIVORCE LITIG. 77, at n.60; Noelle M. Reese, Workfare
Participants Deserve Employment Protections Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
Workers' Compensation Laws, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 873 ,911 (2000) (citing Francis X. Clines,
Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; State in New Role, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996). Some
observers predict that the reduction of financial support to impoverished families with
children may result in increases in serious child neglect and abuse. See, e.g., Mary Jo Bane
& Richard Weissbourd, Welfare Reform and Children, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 131, 134
(1998).
224. DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 19-20 (1994).
225. Id.
226. See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
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Association.m Using X-ray technology and other medical assessment
techniques, physician C. Henry Kempe and his colleagues reported
hundreds of cases in which children had been brought to hospitals
repeatedly for various injuries, and in which parental explanations for
injuries diverge from the diagnostic picture. Other medical writers
had speculated about the possible relationship between parental
abuse and children's injuries previously, but their writings received
little attention.'
Kempe's research literally changed the entire landscape of child
protection. Several factors may account for this impact. First, his
article reported a national research study, which imbued the concept
of the battered child syndrome with the stamp of scientific veracity.
Second, Kempe and his colleagues provided very clear guidance to
physicians regarding how to diagnose the syndrome. This meant that
it was possible for physicians throughout the country to put his
recommendations into practice. Third, Kempe's narrative was
haunting and powerful, features not typically the hallmarks of
research reports. For example, in the section on the clinical
manifestations of the syndrome, Kempe and colleagues speak to the
import of certain radiological findings: "To the informed physician,
the bones tell a story the child is too young or too frightened to
tell." 9 In addition, Kempe and his colleagues spoke directly to their
physician audience, tapping into the physicians' own emotional
reactions to children whose clinical picture suggests the syndrome:
"[T]here is a reluctance on the part of many physicians to accept the
radiologic signs as indications of repetitive trauma and possible abuse.
This reluctance stems from the emotional unwillingness of the
physician to consider abuse as the cause of the child's difficulty...
Finally, Kempe's report implored physicians to overcome their
hesitance to intervene, implying that it was a physician's duty to act to
protect children from the "expected repetition of trauma. '  The
article leaves no doubt that the protective action involved would be
legal in nature, such as reporting the cases to police or child
227. Kempe et al., supra note 155.
228. For a discussion of prior medical writings, see DORNE, supra note 69, at 33-37;
FONTANA & BESHAROV, supra note 154, at 5.
229. Kempe et al., supra note 155, at 106.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 112.
Physicians, because of their own feelings and their difficulty in playing a role that
they find hard to assume, may have great reluctance in believing that parents are
guilty of abuse. They may also find it difficult to initiate proper investigations so
as to assure adequate management of the case. Above all, the physician's duty
and responsibility to the child requires a full evaluation of the problem and a
guarantee that the expected repetition of trauma will not be permitted to occur.
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protective services, and that such action is necessary in order to
prevent "further tragic injury or death" to the child. 2
The response to Kempe's article was dramatic. Model reporting
statutes were drafted by several groups within the next few years.
By 1967, all states had enacted statutes that mandated physicians to
report suspected child maltreatment.' In the years that followed, the
statutes were broadened, mandating reporting by a range of other
professionals who work with children or their parents, and expanding
the definitions of what constitutes reportable maltreatment. In 1974,
the federal government took a leadership position with the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPTA"),2 5 the first
in a series of legislative efforts to encourage states to adopt various
statutory provisions in order to qualify for federal child protection
funds. The model promoted by CAPTA was that of a coordinated
national response to the problem of child maltreatment, implemented
through state protective services agencies and criminal justice
authorities. In addition, CAPTA provided mechanisms for the
collection of child maltreatment data nationwide.
Yet, as is often the case, government intervention proved not to
be the panacea policymakers had hoped for. CAPTA was amended
over the years, and Congress passed other legislation relating to abuse
and neglect. 6 Each decade brought with it new emphases, each
attempting to respond to updated understandings of the phenomena
of child maltreatment, 7 or to promulgate shifting philosophies of
child protective services intervention, or to respond to criticisms of
the ways in which child protection policy was implemented. 9
232. Id. at 111-12.
233. Kalichman, supra note 9, at 15.
234. Donald J. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow
the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 542 (1985)
[hereinafter "Doing Something"].
235. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-
5120 (2000).
236. For a summary of such legislation, see DORNE, supra note 69, at 66-70; Schene,
supra note 169, at 28.
237. For example, increasing concern about sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of
children led to federal and state legislation in the 1970s and 1980s. See DORNE, supra note
69, at 66-67; D. Kelly Weisberg, supra note 152, at 31-50.
238. For a discussion of the shifting philosophical movements reflected in federal child
abuse legislation, see DORNE, supra note 69, at 67-71; POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra
note 180, at 117-32; Robert M. Gordon, Drifting through Byzantium: The Promise and
Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 641-57 (1999);
Lamer et al., supra note 113, at 8-9.
239. For a discussion of the criticisms leveled at the child protection system for failures
in implementing its mandates, see POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 180, at 135-65;
Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care,
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Federal and state law succeeded in bringing more cases of child
maltreatment to the attention of government authorities. Reports of
suspected child maltreatment virtually skyrocketed over the following
years and decades."' Whether these figures reflect actual increases in
the prevalence of child maltreatment or merely increases in reporting
of cases,241 growing numbers of children and families came within the
jurisdiction of those authorities empowered to respond. During the
1960s and 1970s, the child welfare agencies focused increasingly on
investigating and intervening in cases of reported child maltreatment,
leading to their transformation into the child protective services
agencies we are familiar with today.2 Sadly, modem child protection
agencies are, to some extent, "driven" by their mandate to investigate
reported cases, with the result that "investigation often seems to
occur for its own sake, without any realistic hope of meaningful
treatment to prevent the recurrence of maltreatment or to ameliorate
its effects, even if the report of suspected maltreatment is
validated." '243 In addition, the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse
and Neglect observed that child protection policy in the United States
is "largely unplanned; it has consisted primarily of ad hoc responses
to crises. In 1990, the Board asserted that "the system the nationhas devised to respond to child abuse and neglect is failing.""24
and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 625, 636-37 (1976) [hereinafter
Wald (1976)].
240. Various estimates have been published. For example, according to one source,
reports of child abuse had increased from 10,000 annually in 1962 to almost three million
in 1992. LINDSEY, supra note 224, at 8. According to another, the number of children
reported nationally rose by over 347% between 1976 and 1993. Schene, supra note 169, at
29.
241. Although we can speculate as to whether these figures reflect actual increases in
the prevalence of child maltreatment rather than merely increases in reporting, it is not
possible to determine which factor accounts for what proportion of the increase.
242. LINDSEY, supra note 224, at 97.
243. See U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., NEIGHBORS HELPING NEIGHBORS: A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN 9-10 (1993), available from Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office.
244. U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CREATING CARING COMMUNITIES: BLUEPRINT FOR AN EFFECTIVE
FEDERAL POLICY ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT xi (1991), available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office.
245. U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO
A NATIONAL EMERGENCY vii (1990) (emphasis in original), available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. Among the Advisory
Board's conclusions were that "child abuse and neglect in the United States now
represents a national emergency," in part because "in spite of the nation's avowed aim of
protecting its children, each year hundreds of thousands of them are still being starved and
abandoned, burned and severely beaten, raped and sodomized, berated and belittled." Id.
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One source points out that approximately thirty to fifty percent
of the children who die from maltreatment by parents each year had
been "previously reported to child protection agencies,"246 reminding
us that reports of child maltreatment are meaningless if not followed
by an effective response. Despite all of the effort that has been
expended to bring maltreated children to the attention of authorities,
very little emphasis has been placed on how to intervene effectively
with affected families. 47  Interpretation of the limited empirical
research conducted on the efficacy of traditional child welfare
responses to reported cases of child maltreatment has been mixed, at
best, leaving scientific observers with uncertainty as to whether
formal intervention by child protective services makes a difference in
the lives of children and families, or whether one approach used by
child protection agencies is superior to another.2 41 The mammoth
bureaucracy that has become the nation's web of child protective
services agencies has been the target of criticisms for its overly-
zealous intervention in families as well as its failure to intervene in
other instances, for casting its net too broadly as well as for focusing
on too limited a segment of children at risk, for its ignorance of and
bias against the cultural traditions of non-white segments of our
nation's population and its prejudice against racial and ethnic
minorities, for the inefficacy of its interventions, and for a host of
other problems.249
And yet, despite these criticisms, it is difficult to find
commentators who suggest dismantling the system.2 0 Now that our
at vii. The Board underscored the absence of effective preventive and intervention
strategies. Id. at xii-xv (emphasis in original).
246. POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 180, at 116-17 (quoting Douglas Besharov,
Contending With Overblown Expectations, PUBLIC WELFARE, Winter 1987, at 7-8).
247. LINDSEY, supra note 224 at 96-126; POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 180, at
117-132. See also infra notes 619-53 and accompanying text.
248. For arguments that there are insufficient data to conclude that formal child
protection intervention makes a difference in the lives of maltreated children, see
LINDSEY, supra note 224, at 96-126; POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 180, at 116-32;
Gary B. Melton et al., Empirical Research on Child Maltreatment and the Law, 24 J.
CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 47 (1995); Ross A. Thompson & Brian L. Wilcox, Child
Maltreatment Research: Federal Support and Policy Issues, 50 AM. PSYCHOL. 789 (1995).
For the position that reporting laws and the subsequent state intervention lead to a decline
in child abuse, particularly child-abuse related deaths, see DONALD J. BESHAROV,
RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE 10-11 (1990).
249. One set of commentators unsympathetically dubbed child protective services with
the "dubious distinction of being among the most maligned public agencies." Lamer et al.,
supra note 113, at 5.
250. Critics of the current system lean instead to proposing changes in the system's
structure and functioning. See, e.g., POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 180, at 171-89
(proposing "restructuring" of the system); Lamer et al., supra note 113, at 9-19 (proposing
"focusing and strengthening" of the system).
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nation has assumed responsibility to protect children from the harm
that might befall them while in the care of adults, it is almost
unthinkable that we would abandon that mission. That said, however,
substantial disagreement remains as to how, and in what instances,
child protective services should intervene in families to protect
children's safety and well-being. Over the years, the child protection
movement has experienced various shifts in philosophy, focusing on
family reunification, then family preservation, and presently on
striving to balance these approaches with timely termination of
parental rights and adoption. Within the last decade, spearheaded
by the efforts of the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and
Neglect in the Department of Health and Human Services, new
community-based philosophies have emerged in a valiant attempt to
assist children and families at risk, and to overhaul the agencies
designated to assist them. 2
Yet, as we consider newer philosophies, and evaluate the efficacy
of various approaches, children remain at risk. "[B]ecause children's
lives are at stake, [the child protection system] cannot stop its work
while the public debates its mission, or while researchers discover
which interventions might help which families. This plane must be
fixed while it flies through the air." 3 In the sections that follow, I
describe the network of policies and agencies that constitute that
plane, as it flies today, with particular reference to the handling of
cases involving domestic violence. And then, this Article discusses
whether it is possible, and if so how, to navigate and repair the plane
in its journey to transport children exposed to domestic violence to a
position of safety from domestic violence's harmful impact on their
lives.
M. Children's Exposure to Domestic Violence as a Form of
Child Maltreatment
In this Part, I focus on our legal system's current responses to
child maltreatment, emphasizing the role of the juvenile court and
child protective services. I consider whether inclusion of childhood
exposure to domestic violence within statutory definitions of child
251. See, e.g., Howard Davidson, Child Protection Policy and Practice at Century's End,
33 FAM. L.Q. 765 (1999).
252. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text; TOWARD A CHILD-CENTERED,
NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM (Gary B. Melton et al. eds.)
(forthcoming); PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT: FOUNDATIONS
FOR A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY (Gary B. Melton & Frank D. Barry eds., 1994). For a
thoughtful analysis of the problems confronting present-day child protective service
systems, and a proposed ten-point agenda for reform, see Davidson, supra note 251, at
772-81.
253. Lamer et al., supra note 113, at 5.
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maltreatment is consistent, philosophically, with traditional juvenile
court dependency jurisdiction. In addition, I discuss recent trends in
New York and California, where courts have interpreted existing
child maltreatment statutes as providing the authority to reach cases
of childhood exposure to domestic violence.
A. Current Legal Responses to Child Maltreatment Cases
As noted above, two systems with overlapping jurisdiction have
authority to intervene in child abuse and neglect cases: the criminal
justice system and juvenile court system.' Child abuse statutes exist
in state penal codes, empowering law enforcement and court
personnel to investigate cases, prosecute alleged offenders, and
sentence those found guilty. Offenders are provided with the full
panoply of due process protections as they move through the criminal
justice system. The state must prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. Those offenders found guilty can be sentenced to prison,25'
which may satisfy the criminal justice system's goals of deterrence,
incapacitation, and retribution."
By contrast, the state's parens patriae authority to act in
children's best interests authorizes the juvenile court's jurisdiction in
child maltreatment cases, leading to a different philosophy of
intervention. Here, the state intervenes with the dual goals of
protecting children from harm and remediating parental deficits. In
the hope of preserving the family unit, the juvenile court system seeks
to offer education, treatment, and rehabilitation to parents.5 7 Given
this posture in approaching the family, and consistent with the civil
traditions that characterize juvenile court proceedings, evidentiary
standards and due process requirements are "relaxed" in dependency
254. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. See generally, DORNE, supra note
69, at 1-4; Josephine A. Bulkley et al., Child Abuse and Neglect Laws and Legal
Proceedings, THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 271 (J. Briere et al.
eds., 1996); Child Abuse, supra note 69, at 315-324 (1986).
255. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(a) (West 2000) (authorizing sentences of up to
six years for certain child abuse offenses).
256. There are, however, alternative dispositions for offenders who fall into some
categories, providing for mandated participation in "treatment" and "rehabilitative"
programs directed at changing the objectionable behavior that led to the conviction. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(c) (2000) (authorizing as an alternative to imprisonment,
probation during which participation in certain treatment programs is required). For an
excellent review of the issues relevant to the choice of punitive versus rehabilitative
responses to domestic violence, see Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and
Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505 (1998) [hereinafter
Hanna, The Paradox of Hope].
257. Jacquelyn McCroskey & William Meezan, Family-Centered Services: Approaches
and Effectiveness, 8 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE
AND NEGLECT 54, 62-64 (1998), available at http://wwwv.futureofchildren.org/pcn/.
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court, as contrasted with proceedings in the criminal justice system.
2s
Most determinations made by the juvenile court in maltreatment
cases require proof by the preponderance of evidence standard.,9
Termination of parental rights, which permanently severs a parent
and child's legal relationship, and which is arguably the most severe
disposition available to the juvenile court in maltreatment cases, must
be based on clear and convincing evidence.2 6
In general, the juvenile court relies on parents' desires to retain
or regain custody of their children to motivate parental compliance
with the court's or child protective services' directives. For example,
if the court allows a child to remain in the parents' custody, such a
disposition may be conditional upon parental participation in one or
another treatment program and with full cooperation with child
protection personnel. Thus, if parents are unmotivated to retain or
regain custody of their children, the system's ability to effectuate
changes in the family is minimal. In addition, if the offender in
question is not a legal parent, but a cohabitant or companion of a
parent, the system may be less able to motivate compliance and a
change in the conditions that brought the child to the state's
attention. The juvenile court does have at its disposal certain more
"coercive" remedies, such as the issuance of civil protective orders 6'
and "contempt" sanctions, 62 in order to restrain or compel certain
conduct.2 63
There are some cases of abuse and neglect that are so severe, the
system will abandon hope of reunification, determining that there are
no circumstances in which returning the child to the parents could be
in the child's best interests."' But, in most instances, the system tries
258. See Bulkley et al., supra note 254, at 275, 284.
259. Id. at 275.
260. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
261. Civil protective orders permit the court to restrain the offender from contact with
certain persons, such as a maltreated child or an adult domestic violence victim, including
evicting him from the residence and restricting his access to the victim. ROBERT D.
GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CASES AND MATERIALS 488-492 (1999)
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE]. One author suggests that this remedy is
underutilized in child abuse and neglect cases. Id.
262. See, e.g., Hon. Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., What of the Future? Envisioning an Effective
Juvenile Court, 15 CRIM. JUST. 6, 12 (Spring 2000) (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2320
(c)(3) (1997)).
263. These latter remedies may be particularly useful, for example, in cases where an
unrelated adult member of a household is perpetrating abuse against the child or that
child's parent, and the court seeks to preserve the family unit consisting of the nonabusive
parent and child(ren). In these cases, the court may issue these orders so as to protect that
parent-child unit from the abusive individual. See Findlater & Kelly, supra note 98, at 90.
264. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(1)(2) (Michie 1996) (authorizing termination of
parental rights upon several findings, including:
The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious and substantial
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to make "reasonable efforts" to help the parents rectify the problems
that brought their child to the state's attention.2 65 Only if those efforts
are unsuccessful, or the parents show little interest in improving the
situation, will the state seek to terminate the parents' rights to the
child permanently.266
B. The Juvenile Court's Dependency Jurisdiction
The juvenile court is authorized, by state statute, to intervene in
the family in certain specified situations. In defining the grounds or
bases for the court's jurisdiction, state statutes identify what types of
parental conduct, what living situations, or what types of observed
harm experienced by a child constitute child maltreatment. The
determination that certain parental behaviors, certain circumstances,
or certain child outcomes constitute child maltreatment is a policy
decision infused with social values and goals.
Because maltreatment statutes authorize state intervention into
the family, they must delicately balance parental rights to discretion
in childrearing 67 with state parens patriae and police power interests
in protecting children from harm,26 and giving children the best
chance for a future as constructive members of society.
2 9
Constitutional precedent is unequivocal in its recognition that any
analysis of potential state intervention in the family must start with
recognition of the primacy of parents' rights to control the upbringing
threat to his life, health or development; and [i]t is not reasonably likely that the
conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected
or eliminated so as to allow the child's safe return to his parent or parents within
a reasonable period of time.
265. See, e.g., David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in
Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State
Child Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 139, 171-75 (1992) (reviewing statutes with
"reasonable efforts" requirements).
266. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE, supra, note 261, at 820 (identifying general
standards for termination of parental rights including: "Despite the social service agency's
'reasonable efforts,' the parent has failed to rectify the cause of the child's being removed
from the home .... ).
267. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
268. See, e.g., Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 ("[W]e have recognized that a state is not
without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their
physical or mental health is jeopardized"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) ("the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest .... Acting to
guard the general interest in the youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict
the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's
labor, and in many other ways").
269. "A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies." Prince, 321
U.S. at 168.
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of their children." Whereas the contours of the term "upbringing"
have never been fully explicated, there is no question that it
encompasses most aspects of childrearing, and is limited only in
specific, identified situations.
State intervention into the family is typically characterized as a
conflict between parents and the state. Yet, some jurists have also
articulated children's interests: interests in safety, health, and well-
being; interests in the preservation of their family without
unnecessary separation from their caregivers; and interests in
stability, continuity, and permanence in their lives.27 Whereas the
constitutional status and parameters of children's independent
interests are not clear, children's interests clearly have not acquired
the same level of constitutional protection as have those of their
272parents.
270. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their
child to the State."); Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 ("Our jurisprudence historically has
reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental
authority over minor children."); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 ("The primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition."); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and freedom of the child reside with the parents..."'); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35
(referring to "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control" as "fundamental").
271. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 ("[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the
child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their
natural relationship."); id. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("A stable, loving homelife
is essential to a child's physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being"); In re Juvenile
Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1319 (Conn. 1983) ("The child, however, has two distinct and
often contradictory interests. The first is a basic interest in safety; the second is the
important interest... in having a stable family environment." (emphasis in original)).
272. This conclusion is aptly demonstrated by the opinion for the Court in Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), in which the Court dismissed the claim that an eight-year-
old girl had a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with
her biological father. In doing so, the Court stated that it has "never had occasion to
decide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in
maintaining her filial relationship," and that it did not intend to decide the matter that
day. 491 U.S. at 130. In addition, children's interests are often presumed to be
coextensive with those of their parents. Cf Parham, 442 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the parent-child conflict that manifests itself as parents
surrendering custody of their child to a state mental institution undercuts the presumption
that the parents' and child's interests are the same); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 243-44 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Amish adolescents have an interest in continuing their public
education, independent of their parents' rights to withdraw them from public school).
Many scholars have argued that children's voices are typically absent in determinations of
what is in children's best interests. See, e.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity,
Difference, And Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11
(1994); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights": The
Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321 (1994).
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The grounds enumerated in those statutes authorizing juvenile
court jurisdiction reflect our society's judgments as to what is harmful
to children. 3 Whereas some of these judgments seem fairly objective
(e.g., inflicting physical harm nonaccidentally, resulting in serious
injury), even fairly objective categories may be "qualified" by social
judgments. Thus, for example, in an attempt to balance state and
parental interests, a statute may exempt the infliction of
nonaccidental physical harm from liability if that infliction constitutes
"reasonable" discipline2 4  Or, a statute may exempt from its
definition of medical neglect certain decisions by parents to reject
medically-recommended treatments if the parents' decisions were
motivated by religious beliefs.2 5 In addition, the ways in which
statutes are interpreted and applied also reflects social judgments.
Abuse and neglect statutes have been used, over the years, as
273. Professor Michael Wald noted the limitations in our "knowledge regarding
childrearing and the ways to effect long-term change in a given child's development."
Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 992 (1975) [hereinafter WALD (1975)]. He observed
further that:
No national consensus exists concerning what constitutes a 'healthy' adult Even
more importantly, we really know very little about how to raise a child to make
him "healthy'-however 'healthy' may be defined. The few longitudinal studies
of child development conclude that the prediction of future behavior from
observation of childrearing practices is extremely difficult.
Id. These observations still hold true, twenty-five years later. Wald emphasized, however,
that state intervention in families for the purpose of child protection should not seek "to
regulate all aspects of childrearing," but should instead focus on "basic harms from which
we wish to protect all children." Id. a, 993.
274. For example, the pertinent California statute exempts from its reach "reasonable
and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks where there is no evidence of serious
physical injury." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) (West 2001).
275. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300(b) (West 2001):
Whenever it is alleged that a minor comes within the jurisdiction of the court on
the basis of the parent's or guardian's willful failure to provide adequate medical
treatment or specific decision to provide spiritual treatment through prayer, the
court shall give deference to the parent's or guardian's medical treatment,
nontreatment, or spiritual treatment through prayer alone in accordance with the
tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination, by an
accredited practitioner thereof, and shall not assume jurisdiction unless necessary
to protect the minor from suffering serious physical harm or illness. In making
its determination, the court shall consider (1) the nature of the treatment
proposed by the parent or guardian, (2) the risks to the minor posed by the
course of treatment or nontreatment proposed by the parent or guardian, (3) the
risk, if any, of the course of treatment being proposed by the petitioning agency,
and (4) the likely success of the courses of treatment or nontreatment proposed
by the parent or guardian and agency. The minor shall continue to be a
dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is necessary to
protect the minor from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.
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instruments to express social disapproval of certain lifestyles,276 or of
the way in which particular cultures raise their children.2"
Ideally, policy decisions as to what constitutes child maltreatment
consider the likelihood that the protective and rehabilitative
interventions available to the juvenile court will advance the minors'
best interests. The circumstances of children who spend their
minority "drifting" back and forth between their parents and a series
of foster care placements have become all too familiar in the past
several decades.' Although recent federal initiatives seek to provide
greater permanency and stability for children who enter the
protective services system, 79 it is not at all clear whether these
276. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (holding Alabama's child
maltreatment statute unconstitutionally vague in a case where a child was removed from
the custody of his Caucasian mother because she was living with an African-American
man in a neighborhood that was populated primarily by African Americans).
277. During hearings in the 1970s, Congress considered data indicating "that 25 to 35%
of all Indian children had been separated from their families and placed in adoptive
families, foster care, or institutions," as a result of the intervention of state child welfare
authorities. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989)
(citing Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearing Before Subcomm. of the S Comm. on
Interior Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 3d Sess. (1974) (statement of William Byler)).
Furthermore, the evidence revealed that the "adoption rate of Indian children was eight
times that of non-Indian children. Approximately 90% of the Indian placements were in
non-Indian homes." Id. at 33. Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978,25
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000), in an attempt to shield Indian parents from the intervention of
child protection workers who are unfamiliar with Indian culture and childrearing
traditions. Id. at 34-35. The statute's goal was to promote tribal sovereignty in
decisionmaking over the welfare of Indian children.
278. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816,
835-36 (1977) (noting that "children often stay in 'temporary' foster care for much longer
than contemplated by the theory of the system," and that "many children apparently
remain in this 'limbo' indefinitely"). See David L. Chambers & Michael S. Wald, Smith v.
OFFER, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW, REFORM, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 67, 71-74 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985); Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In
Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARv. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973); Wald (1976), supra note 239, at
644-646. Howard Davidson, director of the American Bar Association's Center on
Children and the Law, observes that despite reforms in the 1980s and 1990s to reduce the
phenomenon of "foster care limbo," there remains "justifiable congressional concern that
too many children [still languish] in foster care" at the end of the twentieth century.
Davidson, supra note 251, at 771.
279. In 1997, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act, in an attempt to
minimize children's extended placements in foster care. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997). The Act contains several provisions creating financial incentives for states to act
more quickly in child maltreatment cases to establish permanency for children. For
example, in order to continue to receive federal funding for child welfare services, states
must hold termination of parental rights hearings in cases of children who have been in
foster care for fifteen of the preceding twenty-two months. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2001).
For a thoughtful discussion of AFSA, see Gordon, supra note 238. For an empirically-
based policy analysis of child welfare policies and the extended stays of children in foster
care, see IRA M. SCHWARTZ & GIDEON FISHMAN, KIDS RAISED BY THE GOVERNMENT
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approaches will, ultimately, improve the lives of the children in
question. ° 2 Before making the threshold decision that the state is
entitled to disturb family integrity for the purpose of securing the
well-being of a minor, policymakers should have reasonable
expectations that the interventions available to the juvenile court will
achieve its goals.
This requirement is of particular concern when the families in
question are affected by domestic violence. The child protective
system has come under fire repeatedly for its handling of these
cases."1 Only in recent years, and in some model and pilot programs,
have professionals in these two systems established some highly
successful collaborative strategies for handling these difficult cases.
Thus, the legislature should consider carefully what tools it has
available to assist these families, and how likely its strategies will be
to lead to a measurable improvement in children's lives.
In determining the appropriateness of expanding juvenile court
jurisdiction to include domestic violence exposure, it is also useful to
compare this phenomenon with the more "traditional" grounds for
juvenile court dependency jurisdiction. Most state abuse and neglect
statutes contain language identifying several primary bases for
juvenile court jurisdiction: physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, and
emotional or psychological harm.' Albeit with variations, these
categories reflect our modern communities' conclusions as to what
types of parental conduct or omissions, or what types of indicia of
"harm" justify state action. Statutes vary, however, in how they
define these categories, whether they provide specific examples
within categories, and what factors must be shown in order to trigger
the court's intervention.
(1999).
280. See Gordon, supra note 238, at 673-699. See also Martin Guggenheim, The Foster
Care Dilemma and What to Do About It: Is the Problem That Too Many Children Are Not
Being Adopted Out of Foster Care Or That Too Many Children Are Entering Foster Care?,
2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141 (1999); Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to
Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical
Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995). For a discussion of the challenges in
assessing the efficacy of child protection interventions, see MICHAEL S. WALD ET AL.,
PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 181-200 (1988).
281. The interagency tensions and mistrust between child protective workers and
domestic violence workers is well-known in the field, and has created many barriers to
productive cooperation between these two groups. The differences in philosophies,
approaches, and available interventions of these two service system are quite significant.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
282. See infra notes 523-44 and accompanying text.
283. See DORNE, supra note 69, at 4-10; KALICHMAN, supra note 9, at 20-26.
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(1) Grounds for Juvenile Court Intervention: Required Elements
Grounds for intervention often require some form of
disapproved parental conduct or failure to act and resultant indicia of
"harm" suffered by the child. As such, statutes may require proof of
certain parental actions or omissions, observed harm to a child, and a
nexus between parental conduct and the child's state, indicating that
the "harm" was caused by the challenged parental conduct or
omission.' Yet, all of these requirements are not present in all
statutes. For example, most state statutes are broad enough to
encompass circumstances in which the challenged parental behavior
creates a "likelihood" of harm, even if no harm has already
occurred.' Thus, certain types of parental conduct are deemed by
society to be sufficiently dangerous to children that they serve as a
basis for intervention, even in the absence of actual harm. If a parent
leaves a child locked in a car while shopping on a hot day, and that
child is discovered before any harm has occurred, the parental action
alone is likely to be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, given the
likelihood that harm could have occurred from such conduct.
Some types of parental conduct or omission create a
jurisdictional basis without requiring a showing of harm or even of a
likelihood of harm. Jurisdiction in sexual abuse cases, for example,
typically does not require such showings." Proof that a parent
engaged in certain acts is sufficient. Why is parental conduct alone
sufficient in this instance? Is it that we presume that there is such a
strong likelihood of harm, that we need not make a showing?'
284. See, e.g., In re Rocco M., 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 429, 433 (1991) (requiring "three
elements" in making out a prima facie case of neglect: "(1) neglectful conduct by the
parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) 'serious physical harm or
illness' to the minor, or a 'substantial risk' of such harm or illness").
285. See, e.g., pertinent California statutes defining abuse and neglect. "The minor has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will suffer, serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally.... " CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) (West 2000); "The
minor has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will suffer, serious physical
harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to
adequately supervise or protect the minor...." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(b)
(West 2000).
286. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300 (d):
The minor has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the minor
will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or
her parent or guardian or a member of his or her household, or the parent or
guardian has failed to adequately protect the minor from sexual abuse when the
parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the minor was in
danger of sexual abuse.
287. Interestingly, even though short- and long-term negative effects of sexual abuse on
children is generally assumed among the public and in the legal community, there is a
dearth of good empirical data delineating the effects. See Penelope K. Trickett & Frank
W. Putnam, Developmental Consequences of Child Sexual Abuse, in VIOLENCE AGAINST
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Perhaps. More likely, however, the absence of such a requirement
stems from our society's moral and cultural prohibitions of sexual
contact between parents and their minor children." These statutes
seek to send a strong message to parents that sexual contact with their
children is impermissible under any circumstances.
Policymakers have struggled, as well, with what resultant indicia
of harm constitute sufficient grounds for intervention without
evidence that the specific parental behaviors or failures to act caused
the observed conditions. A version of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
may be applied in some instances, whereby the mere existence of
certain outcomes creates a rebuttable presumption of some deficit in
parental functioning.' Use of this doctrine might be appropriate
when a child is found to have cigarette burns all over his body. In
such a case, the court's jurisdiction need not hinge on proof that the
parents engaged in the specific acts causing the injuries, or on facts
supporting the allegation that the parents were negligent or reckless
in allowing someone else access to the child. One might argue that
the fact that such injuries occurred while the child was in parental
custody speaks for itself. In our society, parents are expected to
protect their children from such assaults-period-and only in
exceptional situations are parents relieved from liability from such
occurrences.
290
CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY, supra note 3, at 39, 50-51. There are indications, however,
from the limited empirical work, that children who are sexually abused do evidence
certain physiological and psychological abnormalities in development and functioning,
such as high levels of the stress hormone coritsol, acting-out and behavioral problems, and
poorer educational and occupational attainment as adults. Id. See also Lucy Berliner &
Diana M. Elliot, Sexual Abuse of Children, in THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD
MALTREATMENT 51 (J. Briere et al. eds., 1996); Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al.,
Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies,
113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 164 (1993) (concluding from a review of 45 studies that children who
are sexually abused demonstrate more psychological symptomatology than nonabused
children, and finding variability in the types of symptoms displayed).
288. Although definitions of what type constitutes incest varies from one culture to the
next, bans against sexual contact between parent and child exist in some form in virtually
all societies. See, e.g., Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 NW. U. L. REv. 1501, 1502
(1998); Michelle Murray, Problems with California's Definition of Incest, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 104,104-05 (2000).
289. The tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence or creates
a rebuttable presumption of negligence, depending upon the jurisdiction, in the absence of
specific evidence of the negligent conduct asserted to have caused the harm. See, e.g.,
JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 236-242 (5th ed. 1999). In cases of
child maltreatment, the factfinder may infer or presume that a parent is liable for harm to
a child, even absent proof of causality, because the child is in the parent's custody and
control. See William Wesley Patton, Evolution in Child Abuse Litigation: The Theoretical
Void Where Evidentiary and Procedural Worlds Collide, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1009, 1017
n.37 (1992).
290. For example, if parents take reasonable actions to protect their children from
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Relaxation of requirements regarding proof of actual harm or the
allegedly causative parental behavior may be more troubling when we
are dealing with child outcomes alleged to result from the parents'
emotional or psychological interactions with their children. For
example, if a child is diagnosed as having a condition referred to as
nonorganic "failure to thrive," which presents as delayed physical
development for which there is no medical explanation, together with
various emotional abnormalities, a court may presume that the
condition resulted from emotional neglect, which is frequently
correlated with the disorder's occurrence." Given the subtlety of the
parental conduct in question, the permissibility of an inference as to
the cause of the child's problems may be the only way to obtain
jurisdiction in such cases. Perhaps because of these proof problems,
many statutes require that in cases of psychological maltreatment, the
court must find that the minor has already suffered actual harm, and
that the harm be directly attributable to particular deficits in parentalconduct."
As noted above, most of the harms posited to follow from
children's exposure to domestic violence are psychological in nature.
Thus, the traditions of protecting children from psychological or
emotional harm through the juvenile court's dependency jurisdiction
are particularly relevant to our analyses of statutory approaches to
protecting children who are exposed to domestic violence.
(2) Juvenile Court Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Alleged Psychological
Maltreatment or Harm
Abuse and neglect cases in which the sole ground justifying state
intervention is psychological maltreatment are relatively
uncommon.293 The reasons are several. First, these cases tend to raise
more problematic proof issues than do cases of purely physical
maltreatment.2 Whereas there are few "innocent" explanations for
cigarette burn marks on a child's body, there may be many alternative
danger, but despite this a third party is able to harm the child, the parents would not be
held responsible for the injuries.
291. For a description of the "failure to thrive" syndrome as it relates to abuse and
neglect determinations, see Ruth S. Kempe & Richard B. Goldbloom, Malnutrition and
Growth Retardation ("Failure to Thrive") in the Context of Child Abuse and Neglect, in
THE BATTERED CHILD (Ray E. Heifer & Ruth S. Kempe eds., 4th ed. 1987).
292. Janet Corson & Howard Davidson, Emotional Abuse and the Law, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH 185, 186-92 (Marla R.
Brassard et al. eds., 1987).
293. GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE, supra note 261, at 207; Corson & Davidson, supra
note 292, at 185; Gary B. Melton & Howard A. Davidson, Child Protection and Society:
When Should the State Intervene? 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 172, 173 (1987).
294. GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE, supra note 261, at 217-24.
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explanations for observed psychological symptoms. 5 Demonstrating
that particular types of parental conduct caused certain psychological
problems in a child may be more complicated than demonstrating
causality in cases of physical harm.
Second, statutes articulating what are acceptable versus
unacceptable psychological interactions between parent and child
may open a "Pandora's box" with respect to state intervention in the
family. Our constitutional traditions celebrate diversity in
childrearing; "standardizing" children is antithetical to our
democratic tradition. 6 If we begin to regulate how parents interact
psychologically with their children, how tempting might it be for
overzealous child protective services personnel to begin "micro-
managing" family relationships?2' The brief, but controversial,
history of child protective services has demonstrated all too often that
the system has serious difficulty refraining from intervention in
families whose ethnic, cultural, or religious traditions differ from
those of society-at-large.2 9 Perhaps more specifically, is there any
295. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEST INTERESTS, supra note 133, at 75-76.
What appears to be a similar behavior, whether as a symptom of illness or a sign
of health, may for different persons be a response to a wide range of different
and even opposite psychic factors. And the same deep-seated emotional
disturbance may lead to the most diverse manifestations in a child's behavior.
IL We know now, for example, that many psychological conditions, such as certain types
of psychosis and depression, previously thought to be the product of one's life experiences,
have genetic bases. Life experiences interact with genetics, and there is significant
individual variability in how, when, and why psychological disorders or symptoms
manifest. For an illuminating examination of the "nature-nurture" debate in psychology,
see Gregory A. Kimble, Evolution of the Nature-Nurture Issue in the History of
Psychology, in NATURE-NURTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 3 (Robert Plomin & Gerald E.
McClearn eds., 1993). In addition, there is a growing body of empirical research in child
development examining a phenomenon referred to as "resilience." See, e.g., Ann S.
Masten, Ordinary Magic: Resilience Processes in Development, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 227
(2001). Data reveal that various life challenges encountered by children, such as poverty
or physical abuse, are experienced differently by different children. See generally, STRESS,
RISK, AND RESILIENCE IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: PROCESSES, MECHANISMS,
AND INTERVENTIONS (Robert J. Haggerty et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter STRESS, RISK,
AND RESILIENCE]. Despite exposure to similar "harmful" or even "traumatic" influences,
some children emerge relatively unscathed whereas others have very poor psychological
outcomes. Id.; Masten, supra. Research is beginning to identify some of the variables that
help explain the discrepancies in outcomes. Suffice to say, the variability in children's
responses to the same "challenging" life experiences makes it harder to generalize about
the consequences of certain types of parental conduct.
296. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the state to standardize its children .... ).
297. See, e.g., Professor Wald's caution regarding the limitations of our knowledge
about what childrearing practices promote "healthy" psychological development, supra
note 273. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 177-84, 266-67 and accompanying text.
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way in which legal criteria defining psychological maltreatment can be
developed so as to avoid the problems of unconstitutional vagueness
and overbreadth, and discriminatory application?
If the lines between unacceptable and acceptable parental
practices are difficult to draw when speaking of physical harms to
children, how will we consistently and predictably draw the lines
between unacceptable and acceptable practices relating to the
psychological interactions of parents and children? Some forms of
spanking are permissible as a methods of childrearing, despite
disagreement among reasonable people as to whether corporal
punishment is morally proper or effective, and perhaps even harmful
to children.' How can we reliably discriminate between
unacceptable psychological conduct by parents toward children, and
those types of conduct which, although they appear cruel and hurtful
to some observers, might be judged as appropriate disciplinary
responses by others?
There are not, as yet, any answers to these questions. CAPTA, °
passed in 1974, included "mental injury" as one of the forms of child
maltreatment falling within the scope of the Act,' yet failed to define
the term. Several states attempted to flesh out the concept in their
statutes, but no consistent understanding of the terms has developed
across jurisdictions? ° Since 1980, when a pamphlet on the subject
was first published by the National Committee for Prevention of
Child Abuse, several theorists and behavioral scientists have sought
to bring rigor and clarity to the somewhat nebulous endeavor of
defining and describing what constitutes psychological maltreatment,
and identifying what categories of parental conduct and family
299. For an example of one state's treatment of corporal punishment in its juvenile
court jurisdictional statute, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) (West 2000)
(qualifying what is meant by "serious physical harm" to exempt "reasonable and age-
appropriate spanking to the buttocks where there is no evidence of serious injury"). For a
review of legal issues relating to corporal punishment in the United States, see, for
example, David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment of Children by
Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children, 35 HoUs. L. REV. 147 (1998). Murray
Straus and other experts in the field of family violence indicate that empirical data
strongly supports a relationship between corporal punishment in childhood, and the
perpetration of adult violence. See, e.g., Murray A. Straus & Carrie L. Yodanis, Corporal
Punishment by Parents: Implications for Primary Prevention of Assaults on Spouses and
Children, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35 (1995).
300. Pub. L. 93-247, 88 Stat. No. 5 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-
5120 (2000)). See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
301. The CAPTA amendments of 1984 defined the forms of "child abuse or neglect" as
"the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, negligent treatment, or maltreatment."
Nicholson v. Williams, 2001 WL 951716 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§
5101-5106(a)).
302. For an excellent summary of state law provisions on "mental injury" or
"psychological abuse" through 1987, see Corson & Davidson, supra note 292.
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interaction create a substantial risk of harm to children's
psychological well-being.'
The pamphlet proposed the following classification of types of
parental conduct that might be classified as emotional maltreatment:
rejecting, ignoring, terrorizing, isolating, and corrupting.' In
addition, it discussed some of the effects on children and some of the
psychological mechanisms by which such parental conduct promotes
those effects. °5 In 1983, the term psychological maltreatment was
further defined:
Psychological maltreatment of children and youth consists of acts of
omission and commission which are judged by community
standards and professional expertise to be psychologically
damaging. Such acts are committed by individuals, single or
collectively, who by their characteristics (e.g., age, status,
knowledge, organizational form) are in a position of differential
power that renders a child vulnerable. Such acts damage
immediately or ultimately the behavioral, cognitive, or physical
functioning of the child. Examples of psychological maltreatment
include acts of rejecting, terrorizing, isolating, exploiting and mis-
socializing!" s
In 1986, James Garbarino, one of the leaders in the study of child
maltreatment, published The Psychologically Battered Child, which
substantially elaborated upon the earlier work and significantly
influenced the direction of theoretical formulations in the area of
psychological maltreatment. 307
More recent writings have focused on generating greater
definitional clarity,3' reporting the findings of a growing empirical
data base examining the relationships between various categories of
303. See, e.g., JAMES GARBARINO & ANNE C. GARBARINO, NAT'L COMM. FOR
PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE, EMOTIONAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN (rev.
1986) (1980); JAMES GARBARINO ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICALLY BATTERED CHILD:
STRATEGIES FOR IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION (1986);
PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 292; Dante
Cicchetti & Barry Nurcombe, eds., 3(1) DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY (1991)
(special journal issue devoted to "Defining Psychological Maltreatment"); Stuart N. Hart
et al., Psychological Maltreatment, in THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD
MALTREATMENT 72 (John Briere et al., eds., 1996) [hereinafter Hart et al., APSAC
HANDBOOK].
304. GARBARINO & GARBARINO, supra note 303, at 12-13.
305. Id.
306. B.B. Robbie Rossman & Mindy S. Rosenberg, Psychological Maltreatment: A
Needs Analysis and Application for Children in Violent Families, in VIOLENCE AND
SEXUAL ABUSE AT HOME: CURRENT ISSUES IN SPOUSAL BATTERING AND CHILD
MALTREATMENT 245, 246-47 (Robert Geffner et al. eds., 1997) (citing Office for the
Study of the Psychological Rights of the Child, Proceedings of the International
Conference on Psychological Abuse of Children and Youth, 1983).
307. GARBARINO ET AL., supra note 303.
308. See, e.g., Cicchetti & Nurcombe, supra note 303.
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parental conduct and psychological outcomes in children,3 0 and
identifying important areas for future research.310 For example,
Rossman and Rosenberg suggest the following general formulation:
"[P]sychological maltreatment can be understood as parental and
socialization practices in which a child's fundamental psychological
needs are unmet or met in a deviant fashion, and which require the
child to develop unhealthy adaptive strategies to meet those needs. 31
Synthesizing prior theoretical and empirical work in the field by
Garbarino and others, Stuart Hart and his colleagues described the
following typologies of psychological maltreatment, which are defined
in Table 1: spurning, terrorizing, isolating, exploiting/corrupting,
denying emotional responsiveness; and mental health, medical, and
educational neglect. 2 As noted in Table 1, in each case, a "repeated
pattern or extreme incident(s)" of the interaction types described is
necessary for the conditions to rise to the level of psychological
maltreatment.' 3 Empirical data reviewed by Hart and colleagues
reveals consistent findings that children who are exposed to repeated
patterns of the conditions described in Table 1 may develop a range
of disturbances of thoughts and feelings (such as anxiety, depression,
low self-esteem, suicidal feelings or behavior); of emotional
functioning (e.g., emotional instability, anger, poor impulse control,
non-compliance, lack of emotional responsiveness, physical self-
abuse); and/or of social functioning (e.g., aggressive conduct, low
social competency, attachment problems).3' Children may also
develop learning problems, physical health difficulties, and may abuse
alcohol or drugs, or may ultimately engage in delinquent or criminal
conduct.31'5  Data also suggest that, in some cases, psychological
309. See, e.g., Stuart N. Hart et al., Evidence for the Effects of Psychological
Maltreatment, 1 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 27 (1998) [hereinafter Hart et al., Evidence].
310. PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 292;
Mindy S. Rosenberg, New Directions for Research on the Psychological Maltreatment of
Children, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 166 (1987). There is now a tradition of increasingly-
sophisticated empirical research and theory on this subject of psychological maltreatment.
In 1998, a new journal, the Journal of EmotionalAbuse was launched.
311. Rossman & Rosenberg, supra note 306, at 247-48. Another set of authors offers
the following "generic" definition of psychological maltreatment: "[T]he repeated pattern
of behavior that conveys to children that they are worthless, unloved, unwanted, only of
value in meeting another's needs, or seriously threatened with physical or psychological
violence." Hart et al., APSAC HANDBOOK, supra note 303, at 73.
312. Hart et al., APSAC HANDBOOK, supra note 303, at 73-74, Table 4.1. Table 1 is at
pages 154-56 of this Article. Table 1 can also be found in Hart et al., Evidence, supra note
309, at 32-33. For a discussion of the conceptual difficulties with the categories that
appear in Table 1, see Robin A. McGee & David A. Wolfe, Psychological Maltreatment:
Toward an Operational Definition, 3 DEv. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 3,8-10 (1991).
313. Hart et al., APSAC HANDBOOK, supra note 303, at 73-74.
314. Hart et al., Evidence, supra note 309, at 30-47.
315. Id.
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maltreatment can have more deleterious effects on children than
physical maltreatment.316
Several authors have asserted that the "core comgonent" of all
forms of child abuse or neglect is psychological. Hart and
colleagues have suggested that "[p]sychological maltreatment is
embedded in all other forms of child maltreatment" as well as existing
on its own. ' Yet, there is some conceptual cloudiness in these
discussions. At times, it appears that the authors suggest that
psychological maltreatment typically accompanies other forms of
maltreatment (i.e., verbal abuse often goes hand in hand with physical
abuse; physically-neglected children generally are also neglected
psychologically). At other times, it appears they suggest that other
forms of maltreatment typically have psychological effects (i.e., that a
child who is physically abused becomes fearful and anxious, and
develops feelings of worthlessness and rejection). There is support
for both propositions in the research literature.
319
316. Byron Egeland & Martha Farrell Erickson, Psychologically Unavailable
Caregiving, in PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra
note 292, at 110, 113-15. Egeland and Erickson found that children whose parents were
"emotionally unavailable" evidenced more serious impairments in functioning than
children who were physically abused. In summarizing their empirical comparison of the
functioning of children whose mothers were either physically abusive, hostile/verbally
abusive, neglectful, or psychologically unavailable, Egeland and Erickson report that
whereas:
children in all maltreatment groups functioned poorly from infancy through the
preschool years .... [t]he psychologically unavailable pattern was particularly
devastating to the child's development. The sharp decline in the intellectual
functioning of these children, their attachment disturbances and subsequent lack
of social/emotional competence in a variety of situations is cause for great
concern.
Id.
317. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Navarre, Psychological Maltreatment: The Core Component
of Child Abuse, in PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra
note 292, at 45; Hart et al., APSAC HANDBOOK, supra note 303, at 72; Hart et al.,
Evidence, supra note 309, at 31, 48-50.
318. Hart et al., APSAC HANDBOOK, supra note 303, at 72.
319. See, e.g., Angelika H. Claussen & Patricia M. Crittenden, Physical and
Psychological Maltreatment: Relations Among Types of Maltreatment, 15 CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT 5 (1991). In a well-designed study using multiple measures to assess the
presence of physical and psychological maltreatment in a sample consisting of a
community control group and cases reported to protective services, Claussen and
Crittenden examined the association and relationships of these two general categories of
maltreatment in the two groups. The investigators found that physical maltreatment
rarely occurred in the absence of psychological maltreatment , and that both were usually
present in the cases reported to protective services. Id. at 13-14. By contrast,
psychological maltreatment was often found alone in the community sample. Id. at 14.
Whereas the investigators do not recommend child protective services involvement in
these latter cases, they do recommend increased availability of voluntary psychological
services to assist community families. Id. at 14-15.
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McGee and Wolfe distinguish between physical versus
psychological parental conduct on the one hand, and physical versus
psychological effects on the child, on the other hand.31 With a two-by-
two grid, one can isolate these variables into four cells: physical
maltreatment causing physical effects (e.g., a beating causing a
broken bone); physical maltreatment causing psychological effects
(e.g., a beating leading to fearfulness or aggressive conduct with
peers); psychological maltreatment causing physical effects (e.g.,
consistent failure to respond emotionally to a child leading to
nonorganic "failure to thrive" syndrome;32 angry tirades at a child
causing psychogenic gastrointestinal upset); and psychological
maltreatment causing psychological effects (repeated belittling of a
child leading to poor self-esteem).' 2 Addressing the effects of child
maltreatment, Hart and his colleagues assert that: "Presently
available analysis of child maltreatment impact data for physical
abuse, sexual abuse, and physical neglect suggest that the vast
majority of the negative consequences of maltreatment are
psychological in nature." 323 This position seems logical, when one
considers that, even after broken bones have healed, children who
have been abused physically suffer with the emotional ramifications
of their experiences.324
The original formulations of psychological maltreatment were
directed to clinicians3 and researchers.3 Using this body of
knowledge to help troubled families who seek services in a voluntary
clinical context, or to focus and stimulate empirical research, differs
substantially from using the definitional categories to determine
grounds for state intervention in the family. Initially, consistent with
this distinction, most writers were cautious about importing the
theoretical and empirical work into the legal setting.32' Furthermore,
320. Robin A. McGee & David A. Wolfe, Psychological Maltreatment: Toward an
Operational Definition, 3 DEv. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 3,4-5 (1991).
321. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
322. See Hart et al., Evidence, supra note 309, at 43-44.
323. Id. at 48.
324. Research reveals that children who are abused physically experience a range of
cognitive, social, and behavioral problems. See, e.g., PANEL ON RESEARCH ON CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 208-23 (1993).
325. GARBARINO ET AL., supra note 303, at x-xi (indicating that the book was written
for "practitioners in child mental health, family therapy, parent counseling, child
development, and parent-child relations" primarily to assist them in their work in
promoting healthy family functioning).
326. PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 292,
at xi (indicating that it is the "intention of the editors and authors of this book to" guide
and stimulate scientific research on psychological maltreatment, which to date, had been
given "very little consideration").
327. Most authors writing in this area do not explicitly address the question of legal
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some writers have provided thoughtful examinations of complex
policy and practical issues relating to the use of concepts of
psychological maltreatment in the legal child protection context?2
Yet, with the 1995 publication of Practice Guidelines:
Psychosocial Evaluation of Suspected Psychological Maltreatment in
Children and Adolescents by the American Professional Society on
the Abuse of Children ("APSAC"),3 29 the theoretical formulations
and empirical findings of these scholars was moved one step closer to
use in courtrooms or by legislators. The APSAC Guidelines, which
adopt the classification system and definitions presented in Table 1,
were developed to assist "professionals evaluating children to
determine whether they are or have been victims of psychological
intervention, although the use of legal terms of art, such as "maltreatment," "battering,"
and "abuse" implies that the writers believe these phenomena to be at least related to, if
not synonymous with, circumstances formally triggering civil or criminal legal intervention.
In one recent publication, three of the leading writers in the area of psychological
maltreatment, Stuart Hart and his colleagues, Maria Brassard and Henry Karlson, address
directly the question of child protection system intervention. Recognizing the poor track
record that has characterized such interventions in physical abuse, neglect, and sexual
abuse cases, the authors question the advisability of adding all cases of psychological
maltreatment to child protective services caseloads. Hart et al., APSAC HANDBOOK,
supra note 303, at 81-82. Hart and his colleagues indicate that the typical coercive
interventions offered by child protective services are unlikely to alter the types of
psychological interaction patterns falling into the major categories of psychological
maltreatment. Therefore, they suggest that, for most families who engage in
psychologically abusive or neglectful conduct towards their children:
[P]reventive, educational, and mental health approaches are preferable to
coercive CPS intervention. However, when psychological maltreatment of high
frequency, intensity, and duration or developmental salience occurs and is
predicted to produce serious harm to the child, mandatory societal intervention
may be justified. This is particularly true when perpetrators resist offered help.
Id. at 82. See also Claussen & Crittenden, supra note 319, at 15. But see, Egeland &
Erickson, supra note 316, at 115. Reporting the poor outcomes of children with
emotionally-unavailable mothers as compared with physically-abused and other
maltreated groups, Egeland and Erickson suggest that we may need to broaden legal
definitions of child maltreatment to incorporate such problematic parent-child relations.
Id. ("These findings must lead us to a careful reexamination of our society's definition of
child abuse and a consideration of means for early identification and intervention to help
prevent the cumulative, malignant effects of this form of maltreatment.").
328. See, e.g., Corson & Davidson, supra note 292, at 185; James Garbarino, Not All
Bad Developmental Outcomes are the Result of Child Abuse, 3 DEv. &
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 45 (1991); Jeanne Giovannoni, Social Policy Considerations in
Defining Psychological Maltreatment, 3 DEv. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 51 (1991); Melton &
Davidson, supra note 293, at 172-75 (1987); Gary B. Melton & Ross A. Thompson,
Legislative Approaches to Psychological Maltreatment. A Social Policy Analysis, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 292, at 203.
329. AM. PROF'L SOC. ON THE ABUSE OF CHILDREN (APSAC), PRACTICE
GUIDELINES: PSYCHOSOCIAL EVALUATION OF SUSPECTED PSYCHOLOGICAL
MALTREATMENT IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (1995) [hereinafter APSAC
GUIDELINES].
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maltreatment [for the purposes of] case planning, legal
decisionmaking, and treatment planning." 30 The document states
further that: "The guidelines apply primarily to forensic assessments
of psychological maltreatment., 3' The Guideline material even
provides advice about testifying in court.32 Thus, the intended
application of the APSAC Guidelines to the child protection context
is clear. What is less clear, however, are the ramifications of
importing the clinical and research definitions into the legal context.
Many experts in the field of child maltreatment point out that there
exist differential "premises, objectives, and ... foci" of medical-
diagnostic, sociological, legal, and research definitions of child
abuse.333 In particular, Lawrence Aber and Edward Zigler observe
that "different sets of definitions" are necessary to pursue the
different "social aims" of legal, clinical, and research definitions.33'
Whereas legal definitions set forth the circumstances justifying state
intervention in the family, and clinical definitions guide professionals
in providing voluntary services, research definitions assist scientists in
discovering the relationships among variables.3 5
The APSAC Guidelines and the categories they delineate have
the potential to take on "a life of their own" in the definition of legal
criteria for psychological maltreatment. It remains the role of
policymakers to determine whether and how to import into the legal
arena any, some, or all, of the criteria these psychologists have
developed initially for clinical and research contexts. Ideally,
policymakers balance the rights and interests of the parties and of
society-at-large in determining whether the magnitude and certainty
of the harms to children relating to these categories of parental
conduct are great enough to justify state intrusion into the family
through juvenile court interventions. In importing the scientific
formulations into the legal context, policymakers must be careful to
assess each category, sub-category, and definitional criterion to insure
that the policy concerns are appropriately balanced. 336 In a powerful
330. Id. at 1.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 11.
333. J. Lawrence Aber III & Edward Zigler, Developmental Considerations in the
Definition of Child Maltreatment, 11 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEV. 1, 12 (1981).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. In addition, however, policymakers must realistically assess the capabilities of the
systems, agencies, and professionals whose tasks it will be to apply and implement these
criteria. As noted above, child protective agencies are typically understaffed,
underfunded, and overloaded with cases. Jane Waldfogel, Rethinking the Paradigm for
Child Protection, 8 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: PROTECrING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE
AND NEGLEcT 104, 107-08 (1998), available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/
dvc/index.htm. Thus, when venturing into areas such as redefinitions of psychological
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reminder to his behavioral scientist colleagues that they must not
overreach by seeking to set forth legal policy, James Garbarino
asserts:
Maltreatment is a social judgment regarding the appropriateness
and likely outcome of parental behavior, a community's assertion of
minimal standards of care. It is a social judgment that arises as a
kind of negotiated settlement between "culture" (as represented by
community standards that are articulated through a political
process) and "science" (as made incarnate in "professional
expertise").
Social scientists can offer their attempts to articulate the current
status of this negotiated settlement and can try to influence its
direction. They cannot unilaterally announce what is and what is
not child maltreatment.3 37
Garbarino goes further to suggest that the phenomenon of
psychological maltreatment is intrinsically difficult to define, and that
researchers' efforts to bring definitional clarity must "navigate a
course between the rock of the real world and the hard place of social
science research,"3" and must not usurp the role of the community in
setting standards for what constitutes legally-actionable maltreatment
of children.33
maltreatment, policymakers must insure that there is adequate support, particularly with
respect to training and caseload, to enable workers to implement the new standards as the
legislature, or other policymakers, intended.
337. Garbarino, supra note 328, at 45.
338. Id. at 50. The APSAC Guidelines state that: "Professionals should be aware of
legal definitions of psychological maltreatment that are applicable in their community....
Definitions specific to a particular state will generally be found in one or more of its civil
or criminal statutes." APSAC GUIDELINES, supra note 329, at 2. Garbarino emphasizes
the historical, social, developmental, and situational relativity that combine to lead to a
determination of what constitutes psychological maltreatment, and underscores that this
relativity prevents specification "in concrete detail ... in advance" of what is psychological
maltreatment, because psychological maltreatment "is defined by what a 'reasonable
person' would judge to be an appropriate response to a child, a response that is
appropriate to the child's age and developmental level" in the context of one's culture,
historical era, and so on. Garbarino, supra note 328, at 49. The APSAC Guidelines, in the
section on "Levels of Severity," instruct clinicians to consider a range of factors pertaining
to the alleged maltreatment, including "[s]alience of the maltreatment given the
developmental period(s) in which it occurs ...... APSAC GUIDELINES, supra note 329, at
S.
339. It is not clear whether the APSAC Guidelines adequately "navigate this course."
Professionals applying these Guidelines can avoid overreaching by focusing primarily on
describing their findings relative to the psychological functioning, conduct, and
interactions of the parties, and refraining from asserting opinions as to the "ultimate legal
issue" of whether these factors rise to the level of legally-defined psychological
maltreatment. Cf Lois A. Weithorn & Thomas Grisso, Psychological Evaluations in
Divorce Custody: Problems, Principles, and Procedures, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 157,159-161 (L.A.
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Some policymakers have already indicated a willingness to adopt
the psychological maltreatment definitions offered by social scientists.
For example, one state has adopted a version of the APSAC
Guidelines in its child maltreatment statute.' In 1998, the Alaska
legislature revised its child abuse and neglect statutes, particularly
relating to its formulations of "mental injury."34' It imported the
categories of psychological maltreatment from the psychological
literature discussed above-specifically Garbarino's writings in the
1980s.' 4 The relevant provisions of Alaska's statute read as follows:
[T]he court may find a child to be a child in need of aid if it finds by
a preponderance of evidence that the child has been subjected
to ... (8) conduct by or conditions created by the parent, guardian,
or custodian [that] have... (A) resulted in mental injury to the
child; or (B) placed the child at substantial risk of mental injury as a
result of (i) a pattern of rejecting, terrorizing, ignoring isolating, or
corrupting behavior that would, if continued, result in mental
injury ....
Alaska's new statute represents a fairly dramatic departure from
"traditional" juvenile court jurisdiction in psychological maltreatment
cases. Whereas like other states, Alaska's statute provides for
juvenile court jurisdiction in cases where there is evidence that
psychological harm has resulted from specific parental conduct." In
addition, however, the statute also provides for juvenile court
jurisdiction in cases where a parent has engaged in one or more types
of interpersonal conduct viewed as creating a "substantial risk" of
emotional harm to children. 45 As such, evidence of the objectionable
parental conduct alone is sufficient for jurisdiction, if the court finds
that the pattern of behavior, if continued, would result in mental
injury. 6 The statute does not indicate how courts should determine
whether the continuation of specific patterns of behavior will result in
Weithorn ed., 1987) (cautioning that mental health professions who provide evaluations
for the courts should refrain from invading the domain of the court by offering opinions
on what are essentially legal questions); see also John Monahan, WHO IS THE CLIENT?
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE ROLE
OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9 (1980) ("Since it is not within the
professional competence of psychologists to offer conclusions on matters of law,
psychologists should resist pressure to offer such conclusions."). The APSAC Guidelines
do not caution against evaluators' drawing conclusions as to the existence of
"psychological maltreatment" in their assessments. APSAC GUIDELINES, supra note 329,
at 10.
340. See infra notes 341-47 and accompanying text.
341. ALASKA STAT. §47.10.011(8) (Michie 2000).
342. See supra notes 303-07 and accompanying text.
343. ALASKA STAT. §47.10.011(8)(A), (B)(i) (Michie 2000).
344. ALASKA STAT. §47.10.011(8)(A) (Michie 2000).
345. ALASKA STAT. §47.10.011(8)(B)(i) (Michie 2000).
346. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
PROTECTING CHILDREN
mental injury. 7 Likewise, child protection workers, who investigate
reports of suspected child maltreatment, and decide which cases to
refer to dependency court, must also struggle with such issues. In the
next several years, as cases using these new "mental injury"
provisions make their way through the courts, it will be particularly
interesting to see how these provisions are applied, and how they
withstand constitutional attack.
C. Children's Exposure to Domestic Violence as Child Maltreatment
(1) What is Meant by "Exposure" to Domestic Violence?
The term "exposure" to domestic violence attempts to capture
the full range of experiences that confront children living in these
families.' Initially, authors writing about children exposed to
domestic violence spoke about children who witness domestic
violence, emphasizing children's contemporaneous visual, and
perhaps also auditory, observation of violent acts between their
parents or between one parent and that parent's intimate partner.349
Those state statutes that explicitly criminalize children's exposure to
domestic violence typically refer to the offense as "domestic violence
347. There are other potential problems with the Alaska statute. Rather than adopting
the more recent formulations of categories developed by Hart and colleagues, and
incorporated into the APSAC Guidelines, the Alaska legislature selected the older
formulation. The terminology in that formulation, particularly in the absence of the
detailed definitions, may sweep too broadly. For example, one could argue that there are
no circumstances that would justify parental "terrorizing" or "exploiting" of children. Yet
the terms "ignoring," and possibly also "rejecting," without clarification, could include
types of parental conduct that occur occasionally in all families. In fact, parents may be
advised by pediatricians and child care experts to "ignore" their children's tantrums so
that the children will not use this form of behavior to manipulate their parents. Although
"rejecting" is certainly not a childrearing strategy recommended by experts, it is a form of
parental interaction which also occurs in forms that are unlikely to have consequences for
children's well-being justifying state intervention. Even the terms "terrorizing" and
"exploiting" can be subject to diverse interpretations. Is a farm family's requirement that
their children perform certain chores a type of "exploitation"? Finally, the term
"corrupting," by virtue of its link with concepts of morality, is highly subjective. Although
the statute seeks to limit its reach by specifying that the conduct in question must have
caused "mental injury" or placed the child at "substantial risk" of "mental injury," the
undefined terms may lead to a wide range of interpretations by those required to report
suspicions of maltreatment. Discussions with persons working within Alaska's state
government, however, report that there has not been a net-widening effect following the
implementation of this statute. Rather, like the domestic violence provisions in Alaska's
1998 revisions of the juvenile court jurisdictional statute, the provisions simply allow for
proper categorization and more effective processing of cases that have already been
reported to child protective services. See infra notes 510-16 and accompanying text.
348. Carter et al., supra note 2, at 15 n.3.
349. See id.; INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 1; Edleson, Children's
Witnessing, supra note 3, at 840-41.
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in the presence of a child,""35 and may incorporate any type of
contemporaneous experience of the violence, even if the children are
351not in the room where the violence occurs.
Arguably, the term "witness" is too narrow to characterize the
nature of these children's lives amidst adult partner violence. 52
Whereas research reveals that children frequently do "witness"
domestic violence,353 children may be "closer" to the violence that the
term "witness" suggests. A child may be in his mother's arms or lap
at the time of an attacko 4 A child may be caught in the crossfire,
figuratively, or literally, as their mother is brutalized with and without
weapons.35 A domestic violence perpetrator may force a child to
watch the attack upon his parent, or may require a child to play a
role in an abusive incident or its aftermath.5 A child may even side
with the batterer.358
350. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
351. See also supra note 94, discussing how Florida courts have interpreted their
juvenile court jurisdictional statute's reference to domestic violence exposure as requiring
that the child has actually witnessed the violence.
352. Goodmark, supra note 29, at 243-45.
353. In a recent telephone survey of battered women, 83% reported that their children
had overheard the abuse from another room, at least occasionally, and 44% reported that
their children, at least occasionally, watched an entire abusive incident. Jeffrey L. Edleson
et al., How Children are Involved in Adult Domestic Violence: Results from a Four City
Telephone Survey, Minnesota Center Against Violence & Abuse (Feb. 15, 2001),
temporarily available at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/link/children/asp [hereinafter
Edleson et al., How Children are Involved].
354. See, e.g., N. Zoe Hilton, Battered Women's Concerns about their Children
Witnessing Wife Assault, 7 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 77, 80-81 (1992). As
described by one mother: "He's coming at me. I guess I had the kid in my arm, and he's
bucking me up against the doorframe." Id. at 81. "'A four-year-old sat weeping in her
mother's lap as the father threatened with a knife."' Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 3, at
79 (quoting M. HYDEN, WOMAN BATrERING AS MARITAL ACT 123 (1994)).
355. See, e.g., Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 3, at 79 ("'A seven-month baby girl lay in
her crib in the living room when an explosive fight broke out. It ended with the mother
getting beaten and landing on top of the little girl."').
356. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567,569 (N.Y. 1984) (A domestic violence
perpetrator violently raped his estranged wife in the presence of their three-year-old son,
and forced her "to tell their son to watch what the defendant was doing to her."), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
357. Six-year-old Lisa Steinberg, who died tragically at the hands of Joel Steinberg (a
man who "illegally" adopted Lisa) in 1987, was used as a "go-between" in the domestic
violence Joel perpetrated upon his common-law wife, Hedda Nussbaum. Primetime Live:
A Journey to Tragedy: Hedda Nussbaum Tells Her Disturbing Story (ABC television
broadcast, Apr. 2, 1997), available at 1997 WL 15362260. For more information about the
proceedings following Lisa's death, see People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845 (N.Y. 1992).
In another incident, after a father forced his wife's head under a hot water tap, broke her
nose and perforated her eardrum, he pulled their 16-year-old son from his bed and
"ordered him to clean up his battered and bleeding mother." Echlin & Osthoff, supra
note 135, at 209-210.
358. One battered mother reports that after she was severely beaten by her husband,
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Some children try to interrupt the violence. One study revealed
that children made 10% of 911 calls reporting domestic violence
incidents in the sample.59 Another study found that, during incidents
of domestic violence against their mothers, 21% of children, at least
occasionally, "called someone else for help," while 52% yelled from
another room, and 23% became physically involved in the incident.?"
There are frequent reports of children physically positioning
themselves between the batterer and victim, including accounts of
children who have stepped in front loaded guns aimed at the
mothers.' 6' Children may attack the abuser, in an effort to protect
their mother, such as a three-year-old who started hitting his father
while his father was assaulting his mother, crying "No, Daddy, No,"32
or older children who shout things like "Daddy, don't kill Mommy!"363
There are also reported cases of children who go as far as to kill the
abusive parent.'
In addition, there is a high rate of co-occurrence of domestic
violence and physical abuse of children. 63 Reports suggest that
incidents of domestic violence and child abuse are sometimes linked
temporally, with a mother's attempt to protect an abused child
leading to her own injuries, with a child's attempt to protect her
mother leading to the child's injuries, or with the abuser lashing out at
several family members simultaneously.366 In one study, 20% of
her five-year-old son told her, "mommy, if you just did what daddy told you, he would not
have to beat you." Oliver J. Williams et al., Fatherhood and Domestic Violence:
Exploring the Role of Men Who Batter in the Lives of their Children, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 157,175.
359. John W. Fantuzzo & Wanda K. Mohr, Prevalence and Effects of Child Exposure to
Domestic Violence, 9 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
CHILDREN 21, 26 (1999), available at http://www.futureofchildren.orgdvc/index.htm.
360. Edleson et al., How Children are Involved, supra note 353.
361. See, e.g., Edleson, Children's Witnessing, supra note 3, at 840; Williams et al, supra
note 358, at 175 (describing an incident in which a child was shot when she intervened in
her father's violence against her mother).
362. Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 3, at 79 (quoting L.A. HOFF, BATTERED WOMEN
AS SURVIVORS 204 (1990)).
363. Hilton, supra note 354, at 80.
364. See, e.g., Jahnke v. Wyoming, 682 P.2d 991 (Cal. 1984) (a sixteen-year-old boy
claimed that his shooting of his father was a form of self-defense because of his father's
ongoing abuse of him, his sister, and his mother).
365. Jeffrey L. Edleson, Studying the Co-occurrence of Child Maltreatment and
Domestic Violence in Families, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF CHILDREN,
supra note 3, at 91; Edleson, The Overlap, supra note 7, at 136. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
366. Researchers are just beginning to confront the complex questions relating to the
co-occurrence of spousal and child abuse. Whereas models depicting the directionality
and interactions of these two phenomena have been proposed, available data do not allow
us to draw conclusions as to how these two phenomena interrelate. See, e.g., Anne E.
Appel & George W. Holden, The Co-occurrence of Spouse and Physical Child Abuse: A
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domestic violence victims indicated that "children somehow
influenced the onset of the violent incident."367 One mother reported
how her abuser assaulted her and her two children in the same
incident: "He got down and started kicking me .... He grabbed Amy
by the neck and broke Bobby's arm."'36
The term "exposure" goes even further, however. It also implies
that even if a child is not present during violent incidents, that child
may still be detrimentally affected by the violence. Children live with
the aftermath of and context surrounding violent incidents. Even
children who do not contemporaneously observe violent incidents
169may still be affected deleteriously by these occurrences. The
domestic violence victim may have bruises and other injuries, perhaps
some severe enough to require hospitalization or create disability.
"One adult son told his mother, 'You know, Mom, I can remember
more than you think I can. I can remember the ambulance carrying
you away covered in blood."'37  The victim may be frightened,
Review and Appraisal, 12 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 578 (1998). In a study examining the
presence of domestic violence in families who were referred by Yale-Nev Haven Hospital
staff on suspicion of child abuse or neglect, the researchers draw the following conclusions:
Not only are the children of battered mothers more likely to be physically abused
than neglected, for instance, but the batterer also appears to be the typical source
of child abuse, not a mother 'overwhelmed with problems.' The data shed little
light on the dynamics of child abuse in battering homes. Again, however, the
battering clearly predates the child abuse ....
Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk- A Feminist Perspective on
Child Abuse, 18 INT'L. J. OF HEALTH SERVS. 97, 107 (1988).
367. Fantuzzo & Mohr, supra note 359, at 26.
368. Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 3, at 79 (quoting M. HYDEN, WOMAN BATTERING
AS MARITAL AcT 113-14 (1994)).
369. Specifically, in a ground-breaking study that examined the relationship between
weapon use in domestic violence incidents and children's adjustment, researchers found
that children who observed the presence of knives or guns in domestic violence incidents
evidenced more behavioral problems than children exposed to domestic violence
situations where no such weapons were present. Ernest N. Jouriles et al., Knives, Guns,
and Interparent Violence: Relations with Child Behavior Problems, 12 J. FAM. PSYCHOL.
178, 190 (1998) [hereinafter Jouriles et al., Knives, Guns]. One of the most interesting
findings, however, was that children who did not report observing a weapon, but whose
mothers indicated that a weapon was present during the incident, did not differ
significantly with respect to behavioral problems from children who had personally
observed weapons. Id. The investigators conclude that "the occurrence of interparent
weapons violence, rather than children's observation of it, marks increased risk for child
behavior problems." Id. One may conclude, cautiously, that there are some factors, such
as the presence of weapons during domestic violence incidents, that signal an escalation in
conflict sufficient to engender behavioral and adjustment difficulties in children, even if
the children are not aware of the weapon's presence. These data lend support to the
conclusion that children may be affected detrimentally by the climate of a home
characterized by domestic violence, whether or not they perceive, or are aware of, all
dimensions of the violent incidents.
370. Hilton, supra note 354, at 80.
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distraught, depressed, or emotionally unavailable to the children. 7
The child may experience absences from one parent or the other, and
may be moved about as the victim seeks to escape the violence, if the
perpetrator is apprehended by law enforcement authorities, or if the
perpetrator is barred from contact with the family by a civil protective
order. All of these factors suggest that childhood exposure to
domestic violence is multifaceted, and there are many different ways
in which it might have an impact upon children's health and well-
being.
(2) What Are the Effects of Children's Exposure to Domestic Violence?
As is demonstrated by the summary in the preceding subsection,
the literature is replete with examples, presented by mothers,
children, therapists, domestic violence workers and others, recounting
children's experiences with domestic violence. Yet, what is the
impact of those experiences on the children? Certainly, at the time of
the incident, children may be severely frightened, fearing for their
own welfare as well as that of their caregivers. They may cry, scream,
try to get help or intervene, hide, try to ignore the events, become
numb or frozen with fear, or cooperate with the abuser in an attempt
to end the incident. In addition to these immediate reactions to the
incidents, exposure to domestic violence places children at risk for
physical harm from the violence, as bystanders or from involvement
in the incident.3 2 And, as noted previously, children living in homes
where domestic violence occurs are at risk for direct physical or
sexual victimization in the family.373 Yet, even if children are not
physically harmed, living with domestic violence places them at risk
for a range of effects on their emotional, social, and cognitive
functioning.374
371. Alytia A. Levendosky & Sandra A. Graham-Bermann, Trauma and Parenting in
Battered Women: An Addition to an Ecological Model of Parenting, in CHILDREN
EXPOSED, supra note 108, at 25, 25-26; Osofsky, supra note 134, at 41. But see Cris M.
Sullivan, et al., Beyond Searching for Deficits: Evidence That Physically and Emotionally
Abused Women Are Nurturing Parents, 2 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 51 (2000).
372. Edleson, Children's Witnessing, supra note 3, at 841; Wolak & Finkelhor, supra
note 3, at 82.
373. Research reveals that in approximately 45% to 70% of the families in which
domestic violence or child abuse is discovered, the other type of abuse exists as well. See,
e.g., Margolin, supra note 3, at 60-61; see also Edleson, The Overlap, supra note 7, at 136-
44. Early research reports suggest that the co-occurrence of domestic violence and
physical child abuse presents a particularly salient risk factor for subsequent child
homicide perpetrated by the domestic violence offender. Id. at 143-44. Margolin, supra
note 3, at 60; Edleson, Children's Witnessing, supra note 3, at 861-862. For a discussion of
the issues relevant to the functioning of children who have been victimized by more than
one type of violence, see generally MULTIPLE vICrIMIZATION, supra note S.
374. INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 11-32; JAFFE ET AL., supra note 3, at
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One team of researchers, evaluating the findings of over fifty
studies, summarizes the findings as follows:
[S]tudies that examined differences across groups in [externalizing]
behaviors revealed that children exposed to domestic violence
tended to be more aggressive and to exhibit behavior problems in
their schools and communities ranging from temper tantrums to
fights. Internalizing behavior problems included depression,
suicidal behaviors, anxiety, fears, phobias, insomnia, tics, bed-
wetting, and low self-esteem. The few studies that assessed
problems related to cognitive and academic functioning found
[that] children exposed to domestic violence demonstrated
impaired ability to concentrate, difficulty in their schoolwork, and
significantly lower scores on measures of verbal, motor, and
cognitive skills.375
The precise impact that exposure to domestic violence will have
on any given child is difficult to predict. The effects of exposure to
domestic violence on children are "multifaceted and diverse";376 a
particular child's responses to these experiences may manifest as any
of a variety of childhood symptoms. Some children do not reveal any
psychological symptomatology" Others experience short-term
negative effects that improve with time and/or intervention, whereas
others experience both short-term and long-term effects.3
8
Increasingly, researchers are examining "clusters" of symptoms that
seem to occur together, creating certain subcategories of adjustment
difficulties (e.g., "acting out" or behavior problems, internal
32-73; Edleson, Children's Witnessing, supra note 3, at 846-61; Margolin, supra note 3, at
62-77.
375. Fantuzzo & Mohr, supra note 359, at 27.
376. Margolin, supra note 3, at 62.
377. Honore M. Hughes & Douglas A. Luke, Heterogeneity of Adjustment Among
Children of Battered Women, in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE, supra
note 140, at 185. Subsequent research further supports the observation that a notable
subgroup of children living in battered women's shelters (i.e., about 30%) do not evidence
maladjustment at that time. See, e.g., John H. Grych et al., Patterns of Adjustment Among
Children of Battered Women, 68 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 84,92 (2000).
Investigators caution, however, that the absence of measurable symptoms at that point
does not rule out the subsequent development of problems. Id. These children may
remain at greater risk than non-exposed peers for future difficulty, and "may be
experiencing difficulties in areas not assessed" by present research. Id. Further research
is needed to understand the longitudinal impact of domestic violence on these and other
children, and to parcel out those factors that may allow some children to emerge from
these early experiences with higher levels of psychological adjustment than others who
were also exposed to domestic violence in the home.
378. See INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 22-23, and Honore M. Hughes
& Sandra A. Graham-Bermann, Children of Battered Women: Impact of Emotional Abuse
on Adjustment and Development, 1 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 23, 36-37 (1998), for discussions
of research findings that the psychological functioning of many children improves as time
passes after the cessation of domestic violence.
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emotional distress, self-esteem problems, and two clusters with
minimal or mild problems).379
Research reveals that symptoms associated with post-traumatic
stress disorder ("PTSD"), have been diagnosed in 13 to 51% of
children exposed to domestic violence. PTSD is marked by
emotional changes such as agitation and irritability, numbing of
feelings or withdrawal from activities, problems in social or academic
functioning, and a "reexperiencing" of the traumatic event (through
nightmares, inability to stop thinking about it or, as with children,
reenacting it through play)."" For example, one author reports the
case of a four-year-old girl who reenacted her mother's murder by
making stabbing motions at a pillow, crying "Daddy pushed mommy
down., 31 Even infants and toddlers display symptoms consistent with
post-traumatic stress disorder, such as "excessive irritability,
immature behavior, sleep disturbances, emotional distress, fears of
being alone, and regression in toileting and language."'  In addition,
researchers have observed that children who reveal PTSD symptoms
undergo certain physiological changes that correlate with their
psychological symptomatology and may have long-term effects on
their behavior and functioning.'
Presently, researchers are studying those factors that may explain
the variable influence of the experiences to domestic violence on
children. Some of the factors relevant to such analyses relate to the
child's experiences with the violence (i.e., the nature and severity of
379. Hughes & Graham-Bermann, supra note 378, at 36-37. See also infra note 391 and
accompanying text.
380. INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 37.
381. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, Volume
IV (DSM-IV), Diagnostic Code 309.81(1994).
382. Edleson, Children's Witnessing, supra note 3, at 840 (citing R.S. Pynoos & S. Eth,
The Child as a Witness to Homicide, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 87, 100 (1984)).
383. Osofsky, supra note 134, at 36.
384. See, e.g., INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 35-39; Wanda K. Mohr &
John W. Fantuzzo, The Neglected Variable of Physiology in Domestic Violence, in
CHILDREN EXPOSED, supra note 108, at 69; B.B. Robbie Rossman & Joyce Ho,
Posttraumatic Response and Children Exposed to Parental Violence, in CHILDREN
EXPOSED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 29, at 85; Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note
3, at 82-83.
385. See INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 37; Mohr & Fantuzzo, supra
note 384; Rossman & Ho, supra note 384, at 86-90; Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 3, at
82-83. See, e.g., Kym L. Kilpatrick & Leanne M. Williams, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
in Child Witnesses to Domestic Violence, 67 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 639 (1997);
Robert S. Pynoos, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Children and Adolescents, in
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 48 (Barry D. Garfinkel et
al. eds., 1990). For a review of the available clinical and research data, see
INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 50-53.
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the violent incident(s),386 the nature of the child's exposure to or
involvement in those incident(s), the frequency of exposure,'3 7 and
whether the child is multiply victimized);m the impact of the violence
on the adult victim (i.e., degree to which the violence physically or
emotionally harms, incapacitates, or renders unavailable, the battered
parent); the child's relationship with the batterer; 9 the child's age
and stage of psychological development;310 the child's gender;391 the
presence of additional "risk" factors (e.g., poverty, parental substance
abuse, multiple victimization of the child);3  the presence of
386. For example: Was the violence potentially life-threatening? Were weapons
involved? Did serious or life-threatening injuries result? In one study, researchers
examined the "severity," or potential lethality, of the violent incidents, operationalizing
"severity" for the study as the presence of knives or guns during the violent incident.
Jouriles, et al., Knives, Guns, supra note 369, at 179. The investigators found that the
presence of weapons during domestic violence incidents was related to the development of
more serious behavioral problems in exposed children. Id. at 190.
387. Research studies reveal that "children in families characterized by frequent
physical marital violence display more behavior problems than do children in families
characterized by less frequent violence." Jouriles, et al., Knives, Guns, supra note 369, at
179.
388. See Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 3, at 90-93.
389. In initial examinations of this variable, Professor Cris Sullivan and colleagues have
found relatively complex differences in the impact of domestic violence exposure on
children depending upon whether their mothers' batterer is or is not their biological father
versus a stepfather or non-father figure. Cris M. Sullivan, et al., How Children's
Adjustment is Affected by Their Relationships to their Mothers' Abusers, 15 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 587, 598-99 (2000).
390. Researchers have recently underscored the importance of bringing a
developmental perspective to studies on the effects of domestic violence on children. See,
e.g., Fantuzzo & Mohr, supra note 359, at 28-29.
The developmental perspective seeks to identify changes in children's
functioning as they grow, and examines how children's life experiences influence
child outcomes. Using the developmental approach, the impact of child exposure
to domestic violence can be assessed by measuring a child's performance of age-
appropriate physiological, cognitive, and emotional tasks. The developmental-
epidemiological framework examines children's functioning as they grow while
analyzing how environmental influences affect child outcomes.
Id. at 28.
391. Some studies have revealed that, consistent with research that examines gender
differences in children's adjustment difficulties more generally, boys exposed to domestic
violence are more likely to exhibit "externalizing" symptoms (i.e., behavioral or conduct
problems such as aggression and disobedience), whereas girls are more likely to
experience "internalizing" symptoms (i.e., emotional states such as anxiety and
depression). Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 3, at 89-90. Yet, contradictory findings and
methodological limitations indicate that drawing generalized conclusions about gender
differences in this population is premature. Id. at 90. In addition, Grych, et al., supra note
377, at 91, found that a large percentage of affected children experience both internalizing
and externalizing symptoms.
392. Fantuzzo & Mohr, supra note 359, at 26-27.
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"protective" factors that promote the child's "resilience 9 3 (e.g.,
coping skills, social support and social networks,394 a strong and
capable parent or parental figure, 5 the existence of a place in the
child's world where she can escape the violence and feel safe396), and
the roles that psychological, 31 social, 398 or legal interventions"' may
play-40
393. In the past two decades, researchers in psychology have increasingly focused on
understanding what personal and contextual variables promote individuals' abilities to
achieve positive psychological adjustment and functioning, despite difficult or traumatic
life experiences. For a general discussion of the current status conceptual and empirical
understanding of resilience in behavioral research, see Anne S. Masten, Ordinary Magic:
Resilience Processes in Development, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 227 (2001); STRESS, RISK, AND
RESILIENCE, supra note 295.
394. See Sandra K. Beeman, Critical Issues in Research on Social Networks and Social
Supports of Children Exposed to Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE
LIVES OF CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 219; Osofsky, supra note 134, at 38-41.
395. Researchers emphasize how important it is to the child's well-being that their
battered parents be supported and strengthened by the services provided to the family.
See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
396. Osofsky, supra note 134, at 39.
397. Various crisis-oriented, short-term and longer-term therapeutic interventions have
been developed to assist children and adults who have been victims of domestic violence.
See, e.g., INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 107-38 (providing a summary of
therapeutic interventions); EMERGING PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 119 (describing a
collaboration between the Yale University Child Study Center and the New Haven,
Connecticut police department, whereby the child study staff provides "immediate clinical
guidance to police officers and critical intervention services to children in the aftermath of
children's traumatic experiences"); Groves, supra note 73 (describing a range of short- and
longer-term group and individual psychotherapeutic services available to children exposed
to domestic violence).
398. Community-based domestic violence organizations have been providing a range of
supportive services to domestic violence victims and children since the 1970s, providing
shelter, safety-planning, and assistance in creating a new life free from violence. For a
description of these organizations and the services they provide, see Saathoff & Stoffel,
supra note 110. Shelter programs pioneered group interventions for children exposed to
domestic violence that focus on helping children to: "break the silence" that has
surrounded the violence in their families, label that violence and learn that such violence is
neither normal or healthy in family and intimate relationships, develop strategies to plan
for their own safety, and learn alternate ways to deal with anger and other feelings. See,
e.g., EINAT PELED & DIANE DAVIS, GROUPWORK WITH CHILDREN OF BATTERED
WOMEN: A PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE (1995).
399. Law enforcement personnel, child protective workers, and juvenile and family
court judges have been severely criticized for their responses, and lack thereof, in cases of
domestic violence. Depending upon the nature of the response, legal interventions have
the potential to promote the adult victims' and children's safety, to make no difference, to
further endanger the victims, or to create additional difficulties for the adult victims and
their children. See supra notes 32, 112-22 and accompanying text; infra notes 549-63 and
accompanying text. For example, if law enforcement and court personnel intervene
aggressively to protect the nonabusing family members (through arrest and prosecution of
the abuser, through issuance and effective enforcement of civil protective order), children
may feel safer and perhaps even empowered by these interventions. By contrast, if the
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Researchers caution, however, that future research is needed to
clarify how "particular types or frequencies of domestic violence"
affect children, and "how children with specific characteristics are
affected across time.""4 ' In particular, the data base lacks prospective
studies that follow children beyond an initial assessment point. In
fact, studies that follow children and their families for six months or a
year are considered "long-term"!' Although there is evidence that
exposure to domestic violence has deleterious effects on some
children that persist into adolescence or adulthood, the retrospective
reports on which such studies are based may limit the validity of the
findings.0
Clearly, researchers have only scratched the surface in
elucidating the myriad of variables that coalesce to determine how a
particular child will fare when exposed to domestic violence. A new
generation of empirical research seeks to apply what we know about
the limitations of previous studies.4" Despite shortcomings in the
primary response of the authorities is to separate the children from the battered parent,
when doing so is not essential to protect the children, the trauma children may experience
from domestic violence exposure may be compounded by the distress that follows
separation from their primary caregivers.
400. Also relevant to the ultimate effects that domestic violence exposure may have on
children's psychological adjustment are the events surrounding and following the cessation
of violence. Were the child and mother forced to leave their home and support networks
to attain safety from the abuser? Did the departure alter their economic circumstances,
leading to dependence on public assistance or homelessness? Do the adult victim and
child(ren) remain fearful that they would be found and hurt by the batterer even after
their departure?
401. Fantuzzo & Mohr, supra note 359, at 27. See also INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE,
supra note 3, at 28-30; Hughes & Graham-Bermann, supra note 378, at 26-28.
402. INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 23-24.
403. See Edleson, Children's Witnessing, supra note 3, at 860-61; Margolin, supra note 3,
at 63-64; McNeal & Amato, Parents' Marital Violence, supra note 5, at 123. See also
Gerald T. Hotaling et al., Intrafamily Violence and Crime and Violence Outside the Family,
in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 431 (M.A. Straus & R.A. Gelles eds.,
1990). Despite the repeated observation that children exposed to violence are more likely
to engage in such acts as adolescents and adults, some investigators urge caution because
the empirical findings rely substantially on retrospective self-reports, a methodological
approach that has limitations. See, e.g., OLA W. BARNETT ET AL., FAMILY VIOLENCE
ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 14 (1997); Widom, supra note 5.
404. Adequate controls did not characterize much of the first wave of empirical
research. For example, early studies focused primarily on samples in battered women's
shelters, because of the accessibility of the affected mothers and children. Hughes &
Graham-Bermann, supra note 378, at 37. Some studies did not use comparison groups at
all. Some studies that did compare these families to control groups, did not include a
comparison group of exposed children not living in shelters. Researchers are now in
agreement that battered women and their children living in shelters are not representative
of the general population of women and children affected by domestic violence. John W.
Fantuzzo & Carol Ummel Lindquist, The Effects of Observing Conjugal Violence on
Children: A Review and Analysis of Research Methodology, 4 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 77, 89
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research literature, the findings of the deleterious impact of childhood
exposure to domestic violence are quite robust. 5 There is a clear
consensus in the field that exposure to domestic violence places
children of all ages at risk for a range of psychological concomitants
and sequelae, which run the gamut from temporary distress to longer-
term psychological dysfunction and psychopathology." 6 One team of
researchers, applying a highly critical lens to the methodological
shortcomings of many studies in the data base, still draw the following
conclusions: "To date, research on the effects of child exposure to
domestic violence indicates that this exposure has an adverse impact
across a range of child functioning, produces different effects at
different ages [and] increases the risk for child abuse. .."
(1989). According to some researchers, children in shelters demonstrate greater
psychological difficulties than exposed children living in the community, see, e.g., Fantuzzo
& Mohr, supra note 359, at 28, perhaps explained by the additional trauma of abandoning
their homes and "hiding out" in a group setting that is characterized by high emotional
intensity. Presently, there is increased awareness that the design and interpretation of
research findings must consider the shelter versus community residence of the subjects.
Other methodological challenges faced early researchers, who had difficulty
controlling for the children's own experiences as direct victims of physical or sexual abuse.
See, e.g., INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 16-17; Edleson, Children's
Witnessing, supra note 3, at 844-45; Hughes & Graham-Bermann, supra note 378, at 34-35;
Margolin, supra note 3, at 60-61. Given the high co-occurrence of exposure to domestic
violence and direct child maltreatment, it is difficult to sort out the relative effects of each
phenomenon on children's adjustment without careful attempts to isolate these variables.
In addition, definitional inconsistency plagued the research in this field, with studies
differing with respect to what was considered domestic violence and "exposure."
INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 26; Fantuzzo & Lindquist, supra at 87-88;
Hughes & Graham-Berman, supra note 378, at 38.
In general, studies have paid insufficient attention to developmental factors (i.e., how
a child's age and stage of development affects the impact of the domestic violence
exposure on their psychological functioning), see, e.g., Fantuzzo & Mohr, supra note 359,
at 28-29; Margolin, supra note 3, at 77-79, as well as to what factors seem to "mediate,"
"moderate," or interact with, the violent experiences to lead to different effects. For a
discussion of the research on factors mediating the effects of domestic violence on
children, see generally INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 36-64, and Margolin,
supra note 3, at 77-90.
There has been very little "theory-driven" research in this field. Such research posits
and tests theoretical models explaining why particular occurrences or patterns of domestic
violence have the observed effects. More recently, however, several researchers have set
forth such models. See, e.g., INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 65-83; Sandra
A. Graham-Bermann & Honore M. Hughes, The Impact of Domestic Violence and
Emotional Abuse on Children: The Intersection of Research, Theory, and Clinical
Intervention, 1 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 1 (1998); Rossman & Rosenberg, supra note 319, at
250-56.
405. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
406. See, e.g., INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 15; Fantuzzo & Mohr,
supra note 359, at 26-27; Hughes & Graham-Bermann, supra note 378, at 28-33; Margolin,
supra note 3, at 62-77.
407. Fantuzzo & Mohr, supra note 359, at 26-27.
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(3) Is Exposure to Domestic Violence a Form of Child Maltreatment?
There are several bases on which the juvenile court might find
jurisdiction in cases of children exposed to domestic violence: (1)
provisions addressing psychological maltreatment or harm; (2)
provisions addressing nonaccidental physical harm or likelihood of
harm; and (3) provisions addressing parental failure to protect their
children from deleterious influences.
(a) Psychological maltreatment
As noted above, children who are exposed to domestic violence
are significantly more likely that are non-exposed children to develop
a range of serious psychological or emotional problems.' Thus, if
psychological symptoms are already manifest in a child's functioning,
the court may be able to rely on the statutory ground defining
psychological or emotional harm, which typically requires findings of
actual harm and causative parental conduct. Some statutes may
permit jurisdiction if a caregiver was responsible for circumstances
that created a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer
psychological or emotional harm. Given the psychological research
on the effects of domestic violence exposure to children, engaging in
such violence in the children's presence might fall within the scope of
such statutes.
Many writers in the field have addressed the relationship
between childhood exposure to domestic violence and psychological
maltreatment. In its Report on Violence and the Family, the
American Psychological Association's Presidential Task Force on
Violence and the Family stated unequivocally that: "Witnessing or
other exposure to abuse of a parent is a form of psychological
maltreatment."4 9 If one uses the APSAC Guidelines as a framework
from which to evaluate potential psychological abuse, there are
several categories that appear particularly relevant to children's
exposure to domestic violence. The Guidelines define one category
of psychological maltreatment, terrorizing, as including "caregiver
behavior that threatens or is likely to physically hurt, kill, abandon, or
place the child or child's loved ones.., in recognizably dangerous
situations. '"41 Among the examples of such terrorizing, the guidelines
specify: "threatening or perpetrating violence against a child's loved
408. See supra notes 372-407 and accompanying text.
409. AM. PSYCHOL. ASs'N, VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY: REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE
AND THE FAMILY 50 (1996). The Report goes on to adopt the formulations of
psychological maltreatment set forth in the APSAC Guidelines and the theoretical and
empirical writings that led to their development. Id.
410. APSAC GUIDELINES, supra note 329, at 7 (emphasis added).
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ones. '4 ' Most acts of domestic violence would fall within this
definition. Writers suggest that children exposed to domestic
violence may be psychologically maltreated according to the APSAC
Guidelines in other ways as well.412 Spurning may occur as the abuser
engages in verbal patterns of degradation and devaluation against the
domestic violence victim and the child, or "about" the child.411 It is
well-known that perpetrators of domestic violence frequently isolate
the victim and child, limiting outside contacts.4  The environment in
a family affected by domestic violence may be characterized by
"tension and coercion," perhaps leading to a range of negative
patterns of "hostility or withdrawal" affecting the child.4 11 One writer
asserts: "Marital abuse creates a chaotic, dangerous, and frightening
family environment.,
416
Yet, as noted above, most state statutes do not permit a finding
under the psychological maltreatment jurisdictional basis without a
showing of actual harm.417  Thus, despite the strong data base
indicating that children who are exposed to domestic violence have a
substantial likelihood of experiencing psychological distress, and
developing adjustment problems, this jurisdictional ground may not
be available in domestic violence cases, prior to the manifestation of
observable psychological symptomatology in a child.
(b) Physical harm
Statutes defining the grounds for physical harm often do not
require that actual physical harm be shown. As in California's statute,
the court may obtain jurisdiction based on the "substantial risk that
the minor will suffer... serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon the minor by the minor's parent or guardian.""4 '
411. Id.
412. INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 5-7.
413. Id. at 5.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Margolin, supra note 3, at 86. Margolin suggests further: "Even if children
growing up with marital violence do not experience obvious psychopathology, they still
may be psychologically affected by this experience in terms of their self-respect and self-
esteem and the extent to which they can trust and care for others." Id.
417. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text. Legislative proposals by various
governmental groups addressing standards for juvenile court jurisdiction in cases of
psychological maltreatment emphasize "the need for proof that there has been actual
measurable damage done to the child. Mere concern for what 'might happen' as a
consequence of emotional maltreatment in the distant or foreseeable future is not
enough." Corson & Davidson, supra note 292, at 185, 196-98. But see discussion of
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(8)(A) & (B) (i) (Michie 2000), supra notes 340-47 and
accompanying text.
418. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) (West 2000).
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The research literature reveals a high level of co-occurrence of
physical child abuse and domestic violence, ranging between 45% to
70%."'9 Given these data, a court could find jurisdiction based on the
probability that a pattern of domestic violence in the child's home
creates a "substantial risk" that the minor might be a victim of direct
and nonaccidental physical abuse in the foreseeable future. Whereas
such jurisdiction is possible, it may be viewed as too speculative or
attenuated to serve as a basis for state intervention in the family.
There are no published cases in which this jurisdictional ground has
been used in a case of a child's exposure to domestic violence.
(c) Neglect
Finally, neglect provisions offer a third jurisdictional basis for
cases involving children's exposure to domestic violence. Generally,
such provisions create parental liability where the child has either
experienced actual harm, or is substantially likely to experience harm,
because of the "willful or negligent failure of the minor's parent or
guardian to adequately supervise or protect the minor from the
conduct of the custodian with whom the minor has been left...,,420
As such, this category is "flexible" enough to provide a jurisdictional
ground for intervening in cases where parents have failed to prevent
the child's exposure to circumstances, conditions, or situations that
are substantially likely to lead to harm of a child. In domestic
violence cases, the posited resultant harm could be physical (i.e., the
child could be harmed, inadvertently, by the weapons or violent
behaviors that characterize the spousal abuse) or psychological (i.e.,
the child may develop emotional or other difficulties as a result of the
exposure).
One writer has asserted that "[a]llowing a child to live in a
dangerous environment and to be exposed to acts of violence
constitutes child endangerment and neglect . .,421 Consistent with
this characterization, this jurisdictional basis is the one most
commonly used in cases where children's exposure to domestic
violence is the primary basis for court intervention. It is noteworthy,
however, that the neglect formulation has been used not only to
challenge the parenting practices of the domestic violence
perpetrator, but also those of the adult victim of the domestic
violence.4 These latter applications of neglect provisions thus hold
adult domestic violence victims responsible for their children's
419. See supra note 7.
420. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(b) (West 2000).
421. Margolin, supra note 3, at 86.




exposure if they have not successfully prevented or escaped the
violence. Not surprisingly, use of these statutes in this way is highly
controversial
4 1
New York and California are two states in which appellate courts
have published multiple cases in which children's exposure to
domestic violence is identified as a primary basis for proceeding in
child maltreatment cases. 424 In neither state do the pertinent statutes
explicitly mention exposure to domestic violence. In both states,
despite the existence of separate statutory provisions allowing for
jurisdiction in cases of psychological harm, the courts have the
applied the "neglect" provisions of the child maltreatment statutes in
domestic violence exposure cases. For example, New York courts
have relied on Section 1012(f)(i)(B) of New York's Family Court Act
in finding jurisdiction in several cases in which the children's exposure
to domestic violence was a primary concern.425 New York's statute
defines a "neglected child" as one:
whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired
or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the
failure of his parent or other person legally responsible for his care
to exercise a minimum degree of care... (B) [i]n providing the
child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably
inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk
thereof, including [excessive corporal punishment, misusing
alcoholic beverages] or by any other acts of a similarly serious
nature requiring the aid of the court....426
423. Id.
424. New York and California are not the only jurisdictions that have used "neglect" as
a jurisdictional basis in cases of children's exposure to domestic violence. See, e.g., S.S. v.
R.S., 728 N.E.2d 1165, 1172 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) ("[I]t is reasonable for a trial court to
conclude continuing physical abuse by one parent of another will cause emotional damage
to a child and thus constitutes neglect .... "); A.D.R. v. Rankin, 542 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989).
425. See, e.g., In re Lonell, 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998) ("[A] pattern of domestic
violence between respondent parents in the presence of their children [is] sufficient to
establish neglect under Family Court Act (FCA) § 1012, absent expert testimony that the
parents' strife has caused specific harm to the children."); In re Athena, 678 N.Y.S.2d 11,
12 (App. Div. 1998) ("[E]vidence of acts of severe violence between respondents in the
presence of their children is sufficient to show 'as a matter of common sense', that the
children were in imminent danger of becoming impaired within the meaning of Family
Court Act § 1012(f)(i)(B), and indeed that the oldest child had already suffered actual
emotional harm.").
426. N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr §1012(f)(i)(B) (McKinney 1998). New York courts have also
applied the state's parallel penal code section as broad enough to encompass children's
exposure to domestic violence. The pertinent code section reads: "A person is guilty of
endangering the welfare of a child when .... He knowingly acts in a manner likely to be
injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years
old .... " N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(1) (McKinney 2001). Most recently, New York's
highest state court held:
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Whereas Section 1012(f)(i)(B) requires only that the parent(s) place
the child at risk of harm by engaging in interparental violence, the
pertinent provision of New York's statute that refers to psychological
harm requires evidence of observable emotional or behavioral
problems in the child, and that the observed psychological harms "be,, . 427
clearly attributable" to inadequate parental conduct.
California courts have also interpreted the statutory section
defining "neglect" as a basis for jurisdiction in domestic violence
exposure cases4 and have typically not used the section defining
"emotional damage" for this purpose.429 This latter provision requires
The adverse effects of domestic violence on children have been well documented
over the past two decades and have been recognized by all branches of our
government in New York.... [Djomestic violence causes great psychological and
developmental damage to children even when they are not themselves physically
abused.... To the extent that some courts have determined that section
260.10(1) requires that a defendant's conduct must be directly focused upon the
child, or that evidence of a child witnessing a severe act of violence is insufficient
as a matter of law to support a conviction under this statute, those decisions are
not to be followed.
People v. Johnson, 740 N.E.2d 1075, 1077 (N.Y. 2000).
427. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §1012(h) defines an "impairment of emotional health" or
"impairment of mental or emotional condition" as a circumstance where observed
problems in the child's emotional, psychological, or behavioral functioning is "clearly
attributable to the unwillingness or inability of the respondent to exercise a minimum
degree of care toward the child."
428. See, e.g., In re Heather A., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), review denied
March 12, 1997; cf In re Alysha S. v. Edward S., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 497 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996), review denied Feb. 19, 1997 (indicating that "[a] father who repeatedly beats the
mother in the presence of the child may well expose the child to emotional trauma and
therefore, 'fail to protect' the child," but that in this particular case, the pleaded facts did
not suggest that "the violence was perceived by or affected the child").
429. The pertinent section of the statute as it relates to emotional harm requires that
the minor "is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering
serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or
untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the
parent or guardian .... ." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(c) (West 1998). A review of
California cases turned up only one published case in which this ground appears to have
been used relating to children's exposure to domestic violence. See Edgar 0. v. Superior
Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). In this case, a father who had killed his
children's mother was appealing the state's denial of reunification services under the
pertinent statute. Id. at 541. (A refusal of reunification services in such cases signals the
state's intention to seek a termination of parental rights. See supra note 264 and
accompanying text.) In the court's description of the procedural background and facts of
this case, it lists the bases for juvenile court jurisdiction in the court below. Id. at 54142.
The bases had included both the "neglect" and "emotional damage" provisions of the
juvenile court jurisdictional statute. Id The juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction had
been grounded in the "pattern of domestic violence" that had characterized Edgar O.'s
treatment of the children's mother (and which had ultimately resulted in her death). Id.
The children had been present during repeated domestic violence incidents. Id. In
addition, a therapist who evaluated the children diagnosed all three as suffering from post-
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either a showing that "serious emotional damage" has already
occurred, or a showing that certain psychological symptomatology
was already present in the children's functioning which indicated that
"serious emotional damage" was substantially likely to occur.43 By
contrast, use of the "neglect" ground allows courts to find jurisdiction
without needing to demonstrate actual harm to the minor.
In the case of Heather and Helen A., a California Court of
Appeal panel rejected the contention that the state must prove the
following "three elements" before finding parental liability under
section 300(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code: (1) that the
parent had engaged in one of the forms of parental conduct specified
in § 300(b); (2) that serious harm or illness to the minor had occurred
or that substantial risk of serious harm or illness to the minor existed;
and (3) that the parental conduct had caused the resultant harm.431
The California court dispatched with the claim as follows:
It is clear to this court that domestic violence in the same household
where children are living is neglect; it is a failure to protect Helen
and Heather from the substantial risk of encountering the violence
and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it. Such neglect
causes the risk. 32
As such, the California court, like the New York courts,
characterized children's exposure to domestic violence as per se child
maltreatment, rejecting the contention that actual harm to the child
must be proved in order for the court to have jurisdiction. And
although a psychologist testifying in the California case addressed the
possibility that the girls had suffered "secondary abuse," a concept
that relies primarily on the negative psychological effects children's
exposure to domestic violence can have, the court focused more on
the father's disregard of the girls' physical well-being in engaging in
violent conduct when they were present.433
The New York and California cases make clear that the wording
of the some states' child maltreatment statutes is sufficiently broad to
encompass children's exposure to domestic violence, even without
explicit mention of such exposure as a jurisdictional basis. State
attorneys and courts tackling these cases may therefore apply the
neglect provisions in their statutes, rather than provisions addressing
traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") as a result of the domestic violence exposure. Id. at
542. Thus, the facts of this case are sufficient to justify a finding of "emotional damage"
under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300(c), supra, since a diagnosis of PTSD clearly meets the
statutory requirements that certain symptomatology be present. For a description of
PTSD and its symptoms, see supra notes 380-85 and accompanying text.
430. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(c) (West 1998).
431. 60 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
432. Id.
433. 60 Cal. Rptr.2d at 318.
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psychological maltreatment, because neglect provisions typically do
not require proof of actual harm to the exposed children. The
presence of domestic violence in the children's family environment is
viewed as a sufficient condition to permit a finding of neglect, in that
it presents a serious risk of harm to children, whereas psychological
maltreatment provisions tend to require showings of actual emotional
harm. Yet, although it is possible for the juvenile court to find
jurisdiction in domestic violence cases, in the absence of specific
statutory language authorizing such jurisdiction, we must also
evaluate whether such explicit language would have specific benefits.
Part IV argues that there are a range of benefits that might
follow from such inclusion 4 In addition, Part IV underscores that
the use of the neglect provisions in child maltreatment statutes risks
negative repercussions affecting the welfare of the affected children
and their nonabusive adult caregivers.435 In the absence of statutory
guidance to the contrary, courts and child protective service workers
conceptualize childhood exposure to domestic violence as a product
of omissions in parental duty, rather than as a product of violent acts
committed by domestic violence perpetrators. Such a perspective
focuses excessive attention on the role that the domestic violence
victim "should have played" in protecting her children, rather than on
how child protective services and the state can intervene to protect
children and adult victims from the domestic violence perpetrators.
As the multitude of policy documents addressing effective
intervention in these cases suggests, focusing on the "failures" of
adult domestic violence victims does not typically serve the best
interests of affected children. Explicit statutory language
incorporating childhood exposure to domestic violence into the ambit
of maltreatment statutes can directly communicate a philosophy of
intervention that is more likely to serve children's needs. Thus,
although existing state statutes can accommodate cases of children's
exposure to domestic violence under existing language, there remain
policy and practical arguments for enacting statutes explicitly placing
such cases within the jurisdiction of dependency court.
(4) A Framework for Construing Certain Cases of Children's Exposure to
Domestic Violence as Child Maltreatment
Blanket expansions of dependency jurisdiction to permit findings
of psychological maltreatment without proof of actual harm open the
door to intrusions into family relationships on the basis of speculative
and unsubstantiated notions of what constitutes "good" and "bad"
parent-child interactions. Such expansions risk imposing the
434. See infra notes 564-65 and accompanying text.
435. See infra notes 545-63 and accompanying text.
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majoritarian middle- and upper-class establishment's vision of the
family upon many whose children are not in danger. Although our
understanding of the psychological factors that predict deleterious
outcomes for children is growing, particularly as behavioral scientists
focus their inquiries specifically on these questions, there remains
substantial uncertainty regarding these phenomena. This said,
however, the empirical data available regarding the effects of
particular forms of parental conduct on children's psychological well-
being may be sufficiently robust for us to conclude that certain
specified acts are substantially likely to lead to subsequent emotional
harm to a child. The empirical data demonstrating the detrimental
effects of childhood exposure to domestic violence rise to this level.
Although the findings are imperfect, and methodological limitations
in the data base exist, the scientific evidence reveals an unequivocal
relationship between such exposure and negative child outcomes,
even though not all children exposed to domestic violence have been
found to develop serious psychological symptoms. 6 The risk of harm
is clearly present.
Another factor distinguishes childhood exposure to domestic
violence from a range of other phenomena that might be
characterized as psychological abuse or neglect. Perpetration of
domestic violence is illegal. State legislatures have determined that
acts of domestic violence should be prohibited by criminal law. As
such, incorporating children's exposure to these acts into definitions
of child maltreatment places some limits on the degrees to which
caseworkers' and judges' personal biases about what constitutes
appropriate parenting will seep into the decisionmaking process. Of
course, not all acts proscribed by criminal statutes are necessarily
harmful to children or the appropriate subject matter for the juvenile
court.437 I argue here that if there is strong empirical evidence that
children's exposure to certain types of parental conduct leads to
deleterious consequences for children, and the conduct in question
also constitutes a violent criminal offense, the case for incorporating
such conduct within the dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile court
is stronger than if only one or the other factors exists alone.
The question still remains, however, as to which acts of domestic
violence should be characterized as substantially likely to lead to
436. Fantuzzo and Mohr conclude that, despite the data base's methodological flaws,
"research on the effects of child exposure to domestic violence indicates that this exposure
has an adverse impact across a range of child functioning, produces different effects at
different ages, increases the risk for child abuse, and is associated with other risk
factors.. . ." Fantuzzo & Mohr, supra note 359, at 26-27.
437. For example, it is likely that many categories of nonviolent criminal acts would not
be considered sufficiently harmful to children's well-being to justify state intrusion in the
family.
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deleterious psychological consequences for children. Definitions of
domestic violence vary in the literature, some including primarily
non-physical acts such as verbal abuse, threats of harm, and other
forms of harassment."' Should these acts be sufficient to trigger
dependency jurisdiction? Is one act of violence sufficient to trigger
jurisdiction, or must there be multiple incidents? How "severe" must
an act be to trigger jurisdiction? Where should the lines be drawn for
the purpose of child abuse and neglect statutes? These are not easy
issues to resolve. The empirical literature provides some guidance, as
does the collected experience of those professionals who have worked
closely with these cases over the years. Decisions where to draw
these lines are policy decisions, requiring that society consider the
prospective benefits and costs of adopting such reforms. The
experiences of those states that have experimented with such statutes
can begin to inform us as to what some of the benefits, costs, and
unintended consequences of particular statutory frameworks might
be.
IV. Mobilizing State Protective Services Systems to Respond
to Childhood Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Relative
Efficacy of Various Approaches
What do we know about the efficacy of various strategies for
using the child protection system to promote the best interests of
children exposed to domestic violence? In this Part, I discuss how
several different approaches appear to have succeeded. In particular,
I examine jurisdictions that have enacted statutory language explicitly
bringing children exposed to domestic violence within the reach of
the juvenile court. Thus, I contrast the nonenforcement of several
Canadian provincial statutes with the chaos created by a short-lived
statute in Minnesota, and with the "promise" offered by a packet of
Alaskan statutes. I also examine jurisdictions that have not enacted
new statutes of this type. I consider how jurisdictions such as
Massachusetts and Michigan have confronted the needs of these
children and families in the absence of formal statutory change. And
finally, I review the developments in New York, one among several
jurisdictions that has used existing child maltreatment statutes to
reach children exposed to domestic violence.
438. In recent years, legislatures have expanded their understanding of and sanctions
against domestic violence, criminalizing certain categories of conduct, such as "stalking,"
even in the absence of a physical assault, in part because of evidence that such conduct can
easily escalate into, or be accompanied by, physical violence. See, e.g., Laurie Salame, A
National Survey of Stalking Laws: A Legislative Trend Comes to the Aid of Domestic
Violence Victims and Others, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 67 (1993).
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A. The "Early Returns": The Impact of Statutes Defining Children's
Exposure to Domestic Violence as Child Maltreatment
The jurisdictions experimenting with statutes that define
childhood exposure to domestic violence as child maltreatment are
virtual laboratories. Yet, none of these experiments incorporates a
program evaluation component, leaving us to rely on information
about the statutes' impact from a variety of other sources, such as
subsequent statutory reform, case law, news accounts, and reports of
those living with these laws on a day-to-day basis.
(1) Nonenforcement: The Canadian Experience
Between 1978 and 1990, six of the ten Canadian provinces passed
statutes characterizing childhood exposure to domestic violence as
child maltreatment (and one of those provinces altered the statutory
language slightly in 1998)."39 Given that these six statutes are still on
the books, while two of the American statutes have been repealed or
439. See Child Welfare Act, R.S.A., ch. C-8.1, § (3)(a) (1984) (Alberta, Can.)("a child is
emotionally injured (i) if there is substantial and observable impairment of the child's mental or
emotional functioning that is evidenced by a mental or behavioural disorder, including anxiety,
depression, withdrawal, aggression or delayed development, and (ii) if there are reasonable and
probable grounds to believe that the emotional injury is the result of... (C) exposure to domestic
violence or severe domestic disharmony .... "); Child and Family Services and Family Relations
Act, R.S.N.B., ch. C-2.1, Part III, § 31(1)(f) (1980) (New Brunswick, Can.) ("The security or
development of a child may be in danger when the child is living in a situation where there is
severe domestic violence"); Children and Family Services Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 5, § 22(2)(i) (1990)
(Nova Scotia, Can.) ("A child is in need of protective services where the child has suffered
physical or emotional harm caused by being exposed to repeated domestic violence by or towards
a parent or guardian of the child, and the child's parent or guardian falls or refuses to obtain
services or treatment to remedy or alleviate the violence"); Family and Child Services Act,
R.S.P.E.I., ch. F-2 1, § (2)(i) (1988) (Prince Edward Island, Can.) ("'a child in need of protection'
means a child who is living in a situation where there is severe domestic violence"); Child and
Family Services Act, S.S., ch. C-7.2, § I l(a)(vi) (1989-1990) (Saskatchewan, Can.) ("A child is
in need of protection where as a result of action or omission by the child's parent the child has
been exposed to domestic violence or severe domestic disharmony that is likely to result in
physical or emotional harm to the child."). In the sixth province passing such a statute,
Newfoundland, the pertinent statutory language changed in 1998. Child, Youth, and Family
Services Act, NFLD. R.S., ch. C-12.1, § 14 (1998) (Newfoundland, Can.). Whereas the statute
passed in 1981 incorporated "a child who is living in a situation where there is severe domestic
violence" into the statutory definition of "child in need of protection," An Act to Amend the
Child Welfare Act, 1972, NFLD. R.S., ch. 54, § 2(a.1)(v) (1981), the 1998 amendments delete that
language and indicate instead that "child in need of protective intervention" includes a child who
"is living in a situation where there is violence." Child, Youth, and Family Services Act, NFLD.
R.S., ch. C-12.1, § 14(f) (1998) (Newfoundland, Can.). The change in language appears to widen
the net of children who might be identified as needing state protection, in that the violence need
not be "severe," as required by the 1981 statute. In addition, the new language does not limit its
reach to "domestic" violence. It is clear, however, that Newfoundland is still among those
provinces that explicitly recognizes children exposed to domestic violence as being "in need of
protection."
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amended less than a year after enactment," ° I was intrigued by the
prospect that the Canadians had found a way to write and implement
these statutes that really worked. It was, however, virtually
impossible to find evidence of the enforcement of these statutes.
Despite lifespans that have extended between twenty-two and
ten years, depending upon the province, these statutes have generated
almost no case law. Reviews of Canadian appellate cases uncovered
only two from among the six provinces with pertinent statutes.44' Of
course, the dearth of case law using these specific statutory provisions
is not necessarily a reliable indicator of what is happening in the
courts and child protective services investigations below. Yet, the
limited published commentary regarding these statutes, 442 and
communications with those professionals in Canada who have written
on the subject of child protective services in these cases, support the
conclusion that these statutes simply are not enforced.43
440. See supra notes 78, 84 and accompanying text.
441. In re J., Lj., and T., 1999 Sask. D.J. 168, 1999 Sask. D. J. LEXIS 262 (Saskatchewan
Q.B., 1999); Children's Aid Society of Cape Breton v. S.(B.), 1997 ACWSJ LEXIS 96388,
1997 ACWSJ 139134; 76 A.C.W.S. 3d 1120 (Nova Scotia Ct. of Appeal, 1997). Ontario
has one appellate case in which domestic violence exposure was a basis for juvenile court
intervention, despite the absence of statutory language authorizing this as a separate
jurisdictional ground. In In re Elijah B., Clinton B., and Anita B., 1997 Ont. C.J.P. LEXIS
303, at *6 (Ontario Court, Provincial Div., 1997), the court found the children to be "in
need of protection" under the statutory provision relating to "risk of physical harm,"
indicating that the father's extreme violence toward the mother placed the children at risk.
"Although none of the children were directly harmed by the father, they were present
during violent episodes between the parents and had indirectly been exposed to domestic
violence." Id. at 2.
A 1999 publication of the Family Violence Prevention Unit of Canada's Department
of Health indicated that Ontario was considering whether explicitly to incorporate
exposure to domestic violence into the relevant statutory language. MARLIES
SUDERMANN & PETER JAFFE, HEALTH CANADA, A HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH AND
SOCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS AND EDUCATORS ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO WOMAN
ABUSEIFAMILY VIOLENCE 21 (1999). Furthermore, in 1999, the Joint Committee on
Domestic Violence, formed to advise the government of Ontario following a Coroner's
inquest into a domestic violence victim's murder, issued a report to the Attorney General
of Ontario. The report recommended, among other things, that "the Government of
Ontario, in its five year review of Child and Family Service Act, proceed to enact the
[proposal] that exposure to family violence be included as a separate ground for a
protection finding." JOINT COMM. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WORKING TOWARD A
SEAMLESS COMMUNITY AND JUSTICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A FIVE
YEAR PLAN FOR ONTARIO 83 (August 1999). In summarizing the uncertainty attendant
to interpretations of current Ontario law, the Committee stated that "exposure to
domestic violence may or may not fall within the definition of child abuse or a child being
found in need of protection." Id.
442. See Echlin & Marshall, supra note 109, at 177.
443. Telephone Interview with Larry Marshall, M.S.W., Director of Intake Services,
London & Middlesex Children's Aid Society (Oct. 18, 2000); Email from Peter G. Jaffe,
Ph.D., Executive Director, Centre for Children and Families in the Justice System (Apr.
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The Canadian experience suggests that mere passage of a statute
conferring juvenile court jurisdiction in cases of childhood exposure
to domestic violence does not necessarily lead to changes in practice.
This may be particularly true when achieving the intended legislative
goals requires substantial alterations in the way in which government
agencies and their staffs process cases. One team of authors, Carole
Echlin and Larry Marshall, who work in Canada's child protection
system, attributes the statutes' lack of use to several factors, some
fairly general, and some specific to these Canadian provinces.4
First, Echlin and Marshall conclude that there is no clear
mandate for the child protective services role in these provinces, as
well as in most U.S. states.44s Clear guidelines simply do not exist in
most Canadian jurisdictions as to what circumstances justify child
protective services involvement. The statutory definitions are not
particularly helpful, in that they often require workers to speculate
about the extent to which children's experiences in the family might
lead to emotional harm. ' 6  This problem leads to a range of
inconsistent and sometimes inappropriate responses to these cases by
child protection workers. 7 Second, successful intervention in these
cases typically requires substantial knowledge about the dynamics of
domestic violence, and such expertise has not traditionally been a part
of the training of child protection workers. Third, some of the
statutory definitions require workers to prove that a child has
experienced emotional harm that was caused by the exposure to
domestic violence.449 As the experiences of New York and California
reveal, the path of least resistance in these cases is to avoid using the
jurisdictional bases relating to "emotional harm," because of the
more challenging proof requirements.45 ' Fourth, Echlin and Marshall
report that there has been a lack of judicial support for these statutes
in some of the Canadian provinces, another factor that presents
obstacles to these statutes' use.45l
2000). In addition, telephone conversations with a range of professionals in various
Canadian provinces who work in the specialties of child protection, domestic violence, or
family law supported the conclusion that these statutes were typically not used as a ground
for juvenile court jurisdiction. In fact, many front-line workers in provinces with such
statutes appeared not to be familiar with these statutes.
444. Echlin & Marshall, supra note 109.
445. Id. at 170-71.
446. Id. at 176.
447. Id. at 170-71, 173-75. See also Findlater & Kelly, supra note 98, at 84-88; Peled,
supra note 72, at 134-36; Schechter, supra note 98, at 62-63.
448. Echlin & Marshall, supra note 109, at 175, 178; Peled, supra note 72, at 134-36;
Findlater & Kelly, supra note 98, at 87-S9.
449. Echlin & Marshall, supra note 109, at 177.
450. See supra notes 424-33 and accompanying text.
451. Echlin & Marshall, supra note 109, at 177.
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Clearly, successful implementation of statutes bringing children
exposed to domestic violence within the reach of the child protection
system is an uphill battle. A jurisdiction is unlikely to mount an
effective response in the absence of: (1) a clear statutory definition of
the target population; (2) guidelines for implementation; (3) adequate
training for personnel (e.g., child protection workers, the judiciary,
and court staffs), and (4) a signal from their superiors, backed up by
funding and adequate person-power, that consistent handling of these
cases is a governmental priority.452 Child protective systems are
already overburdened. As such, they are unlikely to take on
additional cases for which the mandate is unclear and their expertise
limited. In addition, most professionals who work in child protection
are aware that there are large numbers of families affected by
domestic violence. It is not surprising that, without significant
institutional support, they would hesitate to take on a mandate that
could conceivably flood their system.453
(2) Overloading the System: The Minnesota Experience
Minnesota's short-lived experiment with statutory reform aimed
at protecting children exposed to domestic violence was, by many
accounts, an abject failure. Observers' worst nightmares came true:
the child protection system was flooded with new cases, child
protective intervention in domestic violence cases was overly
intrusive, and such intervention was not targeted at families in
greatest need of intervention.
Reportedly, Minnesota's statutory change was the result of an
allegedly "well-meaning [state] Senator from Rochester, Minnesota
[who] inserted in conference committee at one end, late at night, a
change in the definition of child neglect in the State of Minnesota."4 '
The statute's effect was to bring children exposed to domestic
violence within the scope of the state's child maltreatment reporting
law. The statutory changes passed, and went into effect on July 1,
1999.
The statute specifically provided that, for the purposes of
reporting suspected child maltreatment, the term neglect includes
circumstances in which:
452. See THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 61-63. "Child protection services should
develop screening and assessment procedures, information systems, case monitoring
protocols, and staff training to identify and respond to domestic violence and to promote
family safety." Id. at 61. "Child protection workers should develop service plans and
referrals that focus on the safety, stability, and well-being of all victims of family violence
and hold domestic violence perpetrators accountable." Id. at 62.
453. See, for example, the experience of Minnesota, supra notes 454-68 and
accompanying text.
454. Edleson, Bridging Research, supra note 61 (transcript at 241-42).
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the parent or other person responsible for the care of the child: (i)
engages in violent behavior that demonstrates a disregard for the
well-being of the child as indicated by action that could reasonably
result in serious physical, mental, or threatened injury, or emotional
damage to the child; (ii) engages in repeated domestic assault [as
defined in by specified criminal provisions]; (iii) intentionally
inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm against a family or
household member [who] is within sight or sound of the child; or
(iv) subjects the child to ongoing domestic violence by the abuser in
the home environment that is likely to have a detrimental effect on
the well-being of the child.4"'
These four provisions, taken together, are quite broad and, as a
whole, encompass almost every conceivable scenario of domestic
violence that occurs in a household in which children reside. None of
the sections requires a showing of actual harm. Excepted from the
reach of the statute would be one-time incidents that occurred when
the child wasn't around. Yet, even some of those cases fit within the
statute if the violence could "reasonably result in serious... injury, or
emotional damage to the child," '456 which arguably might be inferred
about any violence that left the child's mother injured, distraught,
depressed, and so on. Thus, the statute, in effect, defined childhood
exposure to domestic violence as "per se" neglect.
On November 30, 1999, the Minnesota Department of Human
Services published a Bulletin to guide child protective services
workers in implementing this legislation.4 7 The Bulletin directed
social services personnel to scrutinize the actions of "non-offending
adult caretaker[s]," who "also may be subject to a maltreatment
determination under this provision.""4  The term "non-offending
455. MINN. STAT. §626.556(2)(c)(8), repealed by 2000 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 401
(S.F. 3410) (West 2000).
456. MINN. STAT. §626.556(2)(c)(8)(i), repealed by 2000 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 401
(S.F. 3410) (West 2000).
457. Minnesota Dep't of Human Servs., Laws Relating to Domestic Violence Involving
Children, Including 1999 Amendments to Neglect Definition in Maltreatment of Minors
Reporting Act, BULL. #99-68-15 (Nov. 30, 1999), available at http:l/www.dhs.state.mn.us/
FMOlLegalMgtlBulletinslpdf/199999-68-15.pdf.
458. Id. at 4. The interpretation reads:
A non-offending adult caretaker who takes or sustains no reasonable steps to
stop violence that is likely to have a detrimental effect on the child also may be
subject a maltreatment determination under this provision. County social
services must carefully consider what actions a non-offending parent took, or
could have been reasonably expected, to take after the assessor considers all of
the known dynamics of domestic violence. The purpose of the Maltreatment of
Minors Reporting Act is to extend protection and services to children, not to
unnecessarily label parents who may be victims themselves. However, public
policy requires intervention when an adult caretaker does not take reasonable
action to protect a child from ongoing violence that is detrimental to the child.
November 2001]
adult caretaker" euphemistically refers to the battering victim. The
Bulletin, therefore, expressly authorized application of the statute to
hold the domestic violence victim responsible for the potential harm
to the child from exposure to the violence. As noted above, the use
of child maltreatment statutes to find that a battering victim failed to
protect her child by remaining in a violent situation is one of the most
severely-criticized dependency system responses to domestic
violence.459
Professor Jeffrey Edleson46 reports that, following the law's
enactment, there were at least two incidents in which the state sought
names of women with children residing at battered women's shelters
in order to report these families under the new statute.461 Apparently,
in Hennepin County, the most populous county in the state, computer
databases used for state reimbursement of domestic violence shelter
expenses were accessed, permitting identification of mothers at the
shelters for the purpose of reports of child maltreatment.4 6 "In
another county, the shelter was called and demanded from the child
protection system to turn over a list of women with children in their
shelter on a regular basis., 463 These events are precisely the type of
occurrences that some in the field feared would result from passage of
statutes defining children's exposure to domestic violence as child
maltreatment, and certainly might deter women from seeking any
type of voluntary domestic violence services.
Professor Edleson reports that the state experienced "a one-
hundred percent increase in child maltreatment reports."4 64 In an
"oversight" that tolled the death knell for the statute, the legislature
had not appropriated any additional funding for this statutory
change.46' An analysis conducted by the Minnesota Association of
Community Social Service Administrators estimated the cost to the
state of implementing the legislative changes to be approximately $31
million per year.46 The survey that led to this estimate predicted that
459. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
460. Jeffrey Edleson is a professor at the University of Minnesota School of Social
Work, and Director of Evaluation and Research at the Domestic Abuse Project in
Minneapolis, and has published extensively in the area of children exposed to domestic
violence. He is the co-author, with Susan Schechter, of "The Green Book." See supra
note 12.
461. Edleson, Bridging Research, supra note 61 (transcript at 266).
462. Id. (transcript at 266).
463. Id.
464. Edleson, Bridging Research, supra note 61 (transcript at 242).
465. Id. See also memorandum from Rob Sawyer, Olmstead County Community
Services, to Minn. Ass'n. of County Social Serv. Adm'rs, Domestic Violence Fiscal Note
(Feb. 23,2000).
466. Sawyer, supra note 465.
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full implementation of the statute would likely lead to a caseload
increase of approximately 500% statewide.467
The legislature repealed the statute in April 2000; the
controversial definitions were expunged, effective the day after the
governor signed the bill.4 In a very revealing step, the legislature
also passed a new statute addressing the same subject matter.469 The
new act, Section 626.5552 of the Minnesota Statutes, would go into
effect on July 1, 2001, only if funding is authorized for its
implementation.470 As of the time of this writing, no funds have been
appropriated for its implementation.
Section 626.5552 is substantially different from it predecessor. It
provides guidance to protective services workers and the court in
determining which cases of children exposed to domestic violence to
pursue by identifying certain risk factors, such as whether the child
has also been victimized directly, certain "protective factors," and
"whether steps are or have been taken to exclude the abuser from the
home of the child or [whether] the adult victim sought protective
services such as shelters, counseling, or advocacy services, legal
recourse, or other remedies."4' This revision provides domestic
467. The survey was sent to Social Service Directors in all counties in Minnesota. The
respondents were asked to provide data for the annual number of domestic violence
assaults and civil protective orders (subtracting duplications) in their county in the 12-
month period of 1-1-98 to 12-31-98 or 7-1-98 to 6-30-99. They were to perform certain
other calculations, leading to the projection of the new child maltreatment reports that
child protective services would be required to screen, as a result of the new law, in a year.
The annual estimate for the state was 9,101 cases. The estimated number of cases that
would have been screened using the categories in place prior to the new statute were
1,812. Sawyer, supra note 465.
468. 2000 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 401 (S.F. 3410) (West).
469. 2000 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 401, § 2 (S.F. 3410) (West).
470. 2000 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 401, § 5 (S.F. 3410) (West).
471. Email from Ann Ahlstrom, Minnesota Department of Human Services (July 17,
2001); Telephone Interview with Brent Gustafson, Analyst, Minnesota Department of
Finance (July 16,2001).
472. 2000 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 401, § 2 (b)(1), (b)(5) (S.F. 3410) (2000). The
entire Section 2 reads as follows:
(a) A child is considered to have been exposed to domestic violence when:
(1) a parent or other person responsible for the care of the child
engages in violent behavior that imminently or seriously endangers the
child's physical or mental health;
(2) a parent or other person responsible for the care of the child
engages in repeated domestic assault that would constitute a violation
of section 609.2242, subdivision 2 or 4;
(3) the child has witnessed repeated incidents of domestic violence as
defined in section 518B.01; or
(4) a parent or other person responsible for the care of the child
engages in chronic and severe use of alcohol or a controlled substance
that adversely affects the child's basic needs and safety.
(b) In determining the protective action to take and the services to be
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violence workers and others in the community with the discretion to
refrain from reporting cases in which adult battering victims are
taking steps to extricate themselves and their children from the
situation.
Importantly, the definitions of children exposed to domestic
violence are far narrower in the repealed statute than in its
predecessor. The new definitions require that the domestic violence
either "imminently or seriously endangers the child's physical or
mental health," that the domestic violence be repeated, or that the
child has witnessed "repeated incidents of domestic violence.
'73
Thus, the scope of the reporting law, the mandate of the Department
of Human Services, and the dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile
court are thereby limited to a subsample of the cases falling within the
scope of the original act.
In some respects, the new statute is like a postscript to this
engrossing story. Minnesota learned a lesson that can perhaps guide
future states as they try to walk a treacherous tightrope, seeking a
balanced approach to child protective services and juvenile court
involvement in domestic violence cases. One cannot solve the
problems of children who are exposed to domestic violence with a few
definitional changes in the state code. There are a lot of affected
children out there, and the resources of the state and its
overburdened human services systems are limited. States must make
considered decisions in determining in which cases to intervene. The
lessons of Minnesota's experience are that the system can probably
only handle the most severe cases, and that families that are already
receiving voluntary help are poor targets for those limited resources.
And finally, it all takes money. Without the dollars to pay for the
offered to the child and family when a child has been exposed to domestic
violence, the local welfare agency shall consider the safety and well-being of
the child and the safety of a parent who is a victim of domestic violence. In
determining whether there is a need for child protective services, the local
welfare agency shall take into account the presence of protective factors in
the child's environment. These factors include, but are not limited to:
(1) whether the child is or has been the victim of physical abuse, sexual
abuse, or neglect as defined in section 626.556, subdivision 2;
(2) the age of the child;
(3) the length of time since an incident of being exposed to domestic
violence;
(4) the child's relationship to the parent and the perpetrator of domestic
violence; and
(5) whether steps are or have been taken to exclude the abuser from the
home of the child or the adult victim sought protective services such as
shelters, counseling, or advocacy services, legal recourse, or other
remedies.
Id. (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5552 (West. 2001)).
473. Id.
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anticipated expansion in caseload, a service system already strained
close to the breaking point may be overwhelmed.
Despite the failure of Minnesota's legislature to fund the revised
statute, the state's Department of Human Services is proceeding to
implement the philosophy expressed in that legislation. Some
families are diverted to an Alternative Response program, which
provides for voluntary assessment and service provision programs
underway in the state." The Department is also developing
"Guidelines for Responding to the Co-occurrence of Child
Maltreatment and Domestic Violence," which assert that the
"preferred way to protect children in most domestic violence cases is
to join With the adult victim in safety planning and to hold the abusive
partner accountable."47 The Guidelines incorporate use of a range of
assessment tools and intervention strategies developed in other
jurisdictions or by experts in the field, thus builds on existing
expertise.476  Reportedly, federal grants flowing from Violence
Against Women Act funding will fund training and implementation
of these Guidelines in some portions of the state.
477
(3) A Promising Start: The Alaska Experience
The story of Alaska's statute is quite different from those of the
Canadian provinces and of Minnesota. In Alaska, the Department of
Health and Social Services ("the Department") had been trying to
meet the needs of children exposed to domestic violence, but had
experienced some frustration in the process.47 One of the roadblocks
was the absence of explicit statutory grounds for juvenile court
jurisdiction in these cases. For example, the Assistant Attorney
General for Human Services in Alaska reported that prior to the
legislation's passage, litigating these cases was an uphill battle at
times.4 9 Cases were squeezed into other jurisdictional categories,
specifically "neglect," or "substantial risk of physical injury," and the
474. Email from Ann Ahlstrom, Minnesota Department of Human Services (July 17,
2001). See Alternative Response Program: Reaching Out to Support Families, Fact Sheet
available at: http://wwwv.dhs.state.mn.us/newsroom/facts/ARPfact.htm.
475. Minnesota Dep't of Human Servs., Guidelines for Responding to the Co-
occurrence of Child Maltreatment and Domestic Violence 3 (June 29, 2001)(draft).
476. See id.
477. Telephone Interview with Sara Klise, Program Consultant, Family and Children's
Services Division, Minnesota Department of Human Services (July 13,2001). Specifically,
funds available under the Rural Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement
Grant Program provisions of the Violence Against Women Act will permit training and
implementation of the Guidelines in the rural sectors of Minnesota, with Professor Jeffrey
Edleson of the Minnesota Institute as principle investigator. Id.
478. Telephone Interview with Susan Wibker, Assistant Attorney General, Human
Services Section, Attorney General's Office, State of Alaska (Nov. 7,2000).
479. Id.
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state often had to expend significant resources proving harm or risk of
harm, and contesting batterers' allegations in court that "the children
haven't been injured."'
In 1997, the governor of Alaska, Tony Knowles, convened a
Domestic Violence Summit to study a range of issues relating to the
state's responses to domestic violence.4s' The state brought together
personnel from various concerned groups, including Alaska's
Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault ("Network");4s2
the Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault ("Council")
(an office within the state's Department of Public Safety);4
representatives from the Governor's and Lieutenant Governor's
offices, from the Division of Family and Youth Services in Alaska's
Department of Health and Social Services, from the Department of
Corrections, and from the state Attorney General's office; and
members of the state judiciary. The participants worked together
prior to and after the Summit, and collaborated with the legislature
and other state officials and personnel, hammering out a package of
statutes focusing on the welfare of children exposed to domestic
violence and their mothers 4'
A package of legislation resulted from these efforts and became
effective on September 14, 1998.4 One statute explicitly placed
480. Id.
481. See Press Release, Knowles Convenes Alaska's First Domestic Violence Summit:
A Hundred Delegates to Review Current Law and Policies, Focus on Reducing Domestic
Violence in Alaska, #97-351 (Dec. 9, 1999) , available at http:llwww.gov.state.ak.usl
press/pr120997a.html. See also GOVERNOR'S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SUMMIT, REPORT TO
THE PEOPLE OF ALASKA: TWENTY-SIX POINT ACTION PLAN (Dec. 9 & 10, 1997) (copy
on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
482. The Network is a community-based domestic violence organization, of the type
described in Saathoff & Stoffel, supra note 110. Alaska's Network is particularly active in
lobbying, and therefore, policymaking. For a description of Network philosophy and
activities, see the Network website at http:/lwvw.dps.state.ak.us/CdvsaL.
483. The Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, which operates within
Alaska's Department of Public Safety, is charged with providing for "planning and
coordination of services to victims of domestic violence or sexual assault and to
perpetrators of domestic violence and sexual assault and to provide for crisis intervention
and prevention programs." ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.66.010 et seq. (2000). The Network,
together with Alaska's Department of Health and Human Services, developed and
promoted the legislation creating and empowering the Council.
484. See Wibker, supra note 478; Telephone Interview with Cindy Smith, Director of
Boards and Commissions, Office of the Governor of Alaska (July 16, 2001).
485. See Protecting Child's Health and Welfare-Adoption-Foster Care, 1998 Alaska
Sess. Laws Ch. 99 (H.B. 375). The legislation addressed a wide range of issues relating to
the intersection of domestic violence and child protection. Id. Four of these statutes bear
directly on the subject of this Article. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (Michie 2000)
(incorporating children exposed to domestic violence within the statutory definition of
"children in need of aid," i.e., children falling within the jurisdiction of the dependency
court); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.035 (Michie 2000) (setting forth the manner in which child
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certain categories of children exposed to domestic violence within the
dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile court, specifically providing
that:
[T]he court may find a child to be a child in need of aid if it finds by
a preponderance of evidence that the child has been subjected
to .... (8) conduct by or conditions created by the parent,
guardian, or custodian [that] have .... (B) placed the child at
substantial risk of mental injury as a result of.... (ii) exposure to
conduct by a household member, as defined in [pertinent Alaska
domestic violence statutes] against another household member,
that is a crime under [Alaska statutes criminalizing murder, assault,
and sexual assault], an attempt to commit an offense [listing same
statutes above]; or (iii) repeated exposure to conduct by a
household member, as defined in [pertinent Alaska domestic
violence statutes], against another household member that is a
crime under [Alaska statutes criminalizing offenses that have not
necessarily already caused physical injury, such as reckless
endangerment, and stalking]."
Thus, if alleged acts of domestic violence "placed the child at
substantial risk of mental injury," and it fit into one of the
enumerated categories of offenses cross-referenced from Alaska's
criminal statutes, the court could find the child to be dependent.'
One difference between the Alaskan and Minnesota statutes is
immediately apparent. Whereas Minnesota's first statute defined
almost all instances of domestic violence as "per se" child
protective services is to handle domestic violence cases that come within its purview);
ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (Michie 2000) (providing an exemption for domestic violence
workers from the statutory duty to report child maltreatment in certain cases of children's
exposure to domestic violence); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.013 (Michie 2000) (providing
domestic violence victims with a "defense" in dependency court against claims that they
have abandoned their children if they are fleeing the home because of domestic violence).
See also GOVERNOR'S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SUMMIT, supra note 481, at 16-19, for the
analysis and goals of the Children and Youth Programs focus group of the Domestic
Violence Summit, recommending these and other statutory changes, and accompanying
training initiatives.
The 1998 legislation represented a continuation of Alaska's commitment to combat
domestic violence and its deleterious consequences for adults and children. In 1996, the
legislature passed the Domestic Violence Prevention and Victim Protection Act, which
substantially increased the legal protections for adult domestic violence victims and their
children under both civil and criminal law, adopting many of the provisions set forth in the
Model Code proposed by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges,
supra note 32. See 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 64 (H.B. 314). The legislation defined
various domestic violence crimes; set forth specific mandatory arrest duties of law
enforcement personnel; expanded the scope of, and domestic violence victim's access to,
civil protective orders; addressed child custody and visitation issues in domestic violence
cases; required child protective services to develop procedures for screening for domestic
violence; and more. Id.




maltreatment, Alaska's statute limited jurisdiction to a logical subset
of cases. In addition, the Alaskan statute did not require a finding
that actual harm had already occurred, which is typically a required
element of psychological harm in dependency cases.2"
The second statute in the group passed in September of 1998
identified the philosophy and procedures intended to guide protective
services' handling of domestic violence cases.4s9 This statute mandates
that child protective services adopt the intervention approach
promulgated by pioneers in the field of collaborative child protective
services and domestic violence strategies.4  One year later, the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges published the
Green Book,49' followed by the U.S. Department of Justice's Safe
From the Start Initiative, 4 both of which incorporate a similar
philosophy. The statute: (a) disfavors removal of a child from the
custody of the domestic violence victim; (b) makes protection of the
domestic violence victim, as well as the child, a departmental
mandate; (c) makes clear that if anyone is to be removed from the
home, it should be the domestic violence offender, not the child; and
(4) requires the state to make internal changes, providing training for
its child protective services workers, developing protocols guiding
case assessment and intervention, and building collaborative
relationships with community domestic violence agencies."
488. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
489. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.035 (Michie 2000).
490. See, e.g., SCHECHTER & GANLEY, supra note 124; Carter & Schechter, Child
Abuse and Domestic Violence: Creating Community Partnerships, supra note 124; SUSAN
SCHECHTER & JEFFREY L. EDLESON, in THE BEST INTEREST OF WOMEN AND
CHILDREN: A CALL FOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN CHILD WELFARE AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONSTITUENCIES (1994), available at http://www.mincava.umn.edu
/papers/wingsp.htm.
491. See THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12.
492. See OJJDP, supra note 16.
493. The statute sets forth that:
(a) In consultation with the Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault,
the department shall develop written procedures for screening reports of harm
for abuse and neglect of a child to assess whether there is domestic violence
occurring within the family. The procedures must include the following factors:
(1) inquiry concerning the criminal records of the parents or of the alleged
abusive or neglectful person or the alleged perpetrator if not the parent of
the child; and
(2) inquiry concerning the existence of protective orders issued or filed...
involving either parent as a petitioner or respondent.
(b) If the department determines in an investigation of abuse or neglect of a child
that
(1) the child is in danger because of domestic violence or that the child needs
protection as a result of the presence of domestic violence in the family, the
department shall take appropriate steps for the protection of the child; in
this paragraph, "appropriate steps" includes
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A third Alaskan statute revised the state's child maltreatment
reporting law so that certain mandatory reporters, specifically
domestic violence and sexual assault workers, do not have a duty to
report domestic violence exposure cases where there is "reasonable
cause to believe that the child is in safe and appropriate care and not
presently in danger of mental injury as a result of exposure to
domestic violence. ', 4' This provision thus frees shelter workers and
others from the duty to report cases of childhood exposure to
domestic violence in which the adult domestic violence victim is
making effective use of voluntary services. In addition, the statute
reserves state intervention for situations when the reporter believes
the child is in present danger. This provision, like the revisions in the
Minnesota statute, focuses state efforts on the most severe cases,
while minimizing coercive intervention in those situations where help
is already underway.
The fourth statute sets forth the criteria for a finding of
abandonment in dependency court, and specifically exempts from
(A) reasonable efforts to protect the child and prevent the removal of
the child from the parent or guardian who is not a domestic violence
offender;
(B) reasonable efforts to remove the alleged domestic violence offender
from the child's residence if it is determined that the child or another
family or household member is in danger of domestic violence; and
(C) services to help protect the child from being placed or having
unsupervised visitation with the domestic violence offender until the
department determines that the offender has met conditions considered
necessary by the department to protect the safety of the domestic
violence victim and household members.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.035 (Michie 2600). The Assistant Attorney General in the Human
Services Section of the Attorney General's Office in Alaska reports that protective
services staff have undergone training to give them the skills to implement this mandate,
and that the legislature had specifically appropriated funding for such training. Telephone
Interview with Susan Wibker, Assistant Attorney General (July 13, 2001). She reported
that the state's protective services agencies are complying with the policies enumerated in
Section 47.17.035, and that workers typically take the "least intrusive" approach to cases,
using a variety of methods to assist the domestic violence victim and her children to
become safe from the abuser. Id. In addition, child protective services coordinates their
efforts with law enforcement, so that domestic violence perpetrators are held accountable
for their actions. Id. Removal of the child from the mother's custody is a last resort, when
all else has failed, and when such removal is essential to protect the child. Id. Even then,
however, protective services typically continues to work with the nonabusive parent, to
assist her in creating safety for herself and her child. Id.
494. Persons required to report...
(h) This section does not require a persofi required to report child abuse or
neglect under (a)(6) of this section to report mental injury to a child as a result of
exposure to domestic violence so long as the person has reasonable cause to
believe that the child is in safe and appropriate care and not presently in danger
of mental injury as a result of exposure to domestic violence.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (h) (Michie 2000).
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liability domestic violence victims who flee for their own safety or
that of their children.49 In August of 2000, the Alaska legislature
took an additional step to protect children who are exposed to
domestic violence. It passed a criminal statute that treats presence of
a child during the perpetration of a domestic violence offense as an
aggravating factor in sentencing.496
Alaska did not stop with adding the statutory language to its
state codes-it has invested substantial resources in implementation
as well.4" For example, it has required all new protective services
workers in the Department to attend what is referred to informally as
"Social Work Academy," which covers a range of issues, with
handling of domestic violence cases highly emphasized.4' Those
workers already with the Department also received specialized
training in working with domestic violence cases,499 as did other
community professionals, including persons who are mandated to
report child abuse or neglect5 O Among other things, the training
stresses the importance of screening for domestic violence in all cases
brought to the attention of child protective services, and of working
closely with other community agencies, and provides guidance in
following the steps set forth in Section 47.17.035,5'1 which details the
duties of the Department in domestic violence cases."° Reportedly,
the training seeks to equip caseworkers to implement these statutory
guidelines, emphasizing the importance of providing supportive and
495. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.013 (b) (Michie 2000) reads, in pertinent part:
[A] parent or guardian who is a victim of domestic violence, or who has a
child in the parent's or guardian's care who is the victim of domestic
violence, is considered to have justifiable cause to take an auction or to fail
to take an action that would otherwise be considered to be abandonment of
a child under [this section]if the action or failure to act is necessary to
protect the parent or guardian, or a child in the care of the parent or
guardian from further acts of domestic violence ....
Id.
496. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (c) (18) (Michie 2000):
Factors in aggravation and mitigation... the offense was a felony... (C)
specified in AS 11.41 that is a crime involving domestic violence and was
committed in the physical presence or hearing of a child under sixteen years of
age who was, at the time of the offense, living within the residence of the victim,
the residence of the perpetrator, or the residence where the crime involving
domestic violence occurred ....
497. See Wibker, supra note 478; Telephone interview with Deidre O'Connor, Division
of Family and Youth Services, Department of Health and Human Services, State of
Alaska (Oct. 23,2000).
498. See Wibker, supra note 478.
499. Id.; O'Connor, supra note 497.
500. O'Connor, supra note 497.
501. See supra note 493.
502. See supra notes 489-93 and accompanying text summarizing ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.17.035 (Michie 2000).
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safety-oriented services to the nonabusing parent and child, while
reserving separation of the two as a last resort when the child's safety
cannot be protected in any other way.'
Evidence as to the efficacy of the Alaskan statutes is limited, but
positive. The statutes have not been repealed, and those in the state
government who drafted the statutes and promoted their passage in
the legislature are cautiously optimistic about the impact thus far, and
the ongoing and future implementation. " Reportedly, with the
legislature's clarification that exposure to domestic violence can
create a substantial likelihood of psychological harm, with clear
statutory language guiding child protective services' responses to
these cases, and with the additional expertise that staff members are
developing, cases involving domestic violence are now handled more
expeditiously.5' Caseworkers and state attorneys report an easier
time getting jurisdiction in cases of childhood exposure to domestic
violence because they no longer need to convince the judge that there
is a nexus between domestic violence and emotional harm in the
absence of direct physical injury to the children." Furthermore,
officials report that cases involving children's exposure to domestic
violence are often identified earlier, with child protective services
delivering services more efficiently and appropriately to battered
women and their children.'
All parties underscore, however, that the process of change is
still ongoing, that it hasn't been easy, and that challenges still remain.
They emphasize that it has been important to have statutes on the
books that clearly set forth the state's policies. That alone, however,
was not enough to lead to the changes sought. Without training,
ongoing monitoring, and continuing collaborative efforts between
protective services and the domestic violence Network, the words in
the statute books would not have led to palpable systemic change."03
503. See O'Connor, supra note 497; Smith supra note 484; Wibker, supra note 478;
Follow-up Telephone Interview with Susan Wibker, Assistant Attorney General, Human
Services Section, Attorney General's Office, State of Alaska Office (July 13,2001).
504. See O'Connor, supra note 497; Smith supra note 484;Wibker, supra notes 478,
5023.
505. O'Connor, supra note 497.
506. See Wibker, supra notes 478, 503.
507. See Smith supra note 484; Wibker, supra notes 478, 503. Ms. Smith points out that
prior to the 1998 statutory changes, there was no formal use of a domestic violence
screening protocol in child protective services assessments in child maltreatment cases.
Because of the high rate of co-occurrence of domestic violence and child maltreatment, see
supra note 7, such screening is an essential component to the provision of appropriate
social services to these families.
508. See O'Connor, supra note 497; Smith, supra note 484; Telephone Interview with
Kari Robinson, Director, Legal Advocacy Project, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence
and Sexual Assault (Aug. 10, 2001).
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And, as one official suggested, it takes time for caseworkers and
others to internalize the new policies.5°9
Officials wrote the legislation in a manner that they hoped would
not "flood" the child protection system.1° Their perceptions are that
they have been successful in avoiding substantial net-widening. That
is, they sought to circumscribe the reach of the new statutes to
address the most serious cases of childhood exposure to domestic
violence, and to permit proper classification of cases that might have
been fit more awkwardly into previously-existing jurisdictional
grounds. 11 Data on reports of child maltreatment collected by the
state supports their impressions. A comparison of total reports of
child maltreatment for the fiscal year periods preceding and following
the statute's effective date of September 1988, reveal substantial
stability over time. 12 There was, however, a dramatic shifting of the
numbers among the various categories of child maltreatment. The
mental injury category, in which domestic violence cases are now
placed, experienced a 244% rise between Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999,
which was balanced by concomitant drops in use of the other
categories, particularly neglect (which is typically where these cases
had ended up before)."1 The Fiscal Year 2000 data reveal a
509. See O'Connor, supra note 497.
510. See O'Connor, supra note 497; Smith, supra note 484; Wibker, supra note 478.
511. Id.
512. See ALASKA DEP'T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., DIVISION OF FAMILY AND
YOUTH SERVICES, CHILD REPORTS OF HARM BY HARM TYPE, FISCAL YEAR 1989
THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2001, available at http:llwww.hss.state.ak.usldfys/Statsl
Graphs/chart8.gif. [hereinafter CHILD REPORTS OF HARM] (last visited October 20,2001).
The total child maltreatment cases reported in Fiscal Year 1998 was 16,405; in Fiscal Year
1999 was 16,459, in Fiscal Year 2000 was 16,421, and in Fiscal Year 2001 was 17,347. Id.
Alaska's fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30, with the named year being the year
in which the last six months of the period occurred. Email communication from
MaryAnn VandeCastle, Research Analyst, Division of Family and Youth Services,
Department of Health and Human Services, State of Alaska (July 9, 2001). Therefore,
Fiscal Year 1998 concluded on June 30, 1998, several months before the September 1998
effective date of the legislation. The legislation was in place for nine of the twelve months
of Fiscal Year 1999, which spanned from July 1, 1998 through June 30, 1999. As the
numbers cited here reveal, there was a slight decrease in total reports of child
maltreatment between Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000. In Fiscal Year 2001 there was a slight
increase over the Fiscal Year 1998 figures. That increase, however, was quite small,
measuring only 5.7%. This figure contrasts rather dramatically to the 100% increase
observed following the passage of Minnesota's statute. See supra note 464 and
accompanying text. Note that these data tabulate only "reports" of suspected
maltreatment in Alaska. They do not tell us what proportion of the cases ultimately led to
findings by the juvenile court that the children were in need of the state's protection. Such
data by harm category are not presently available from the state.
513. In Fiscal Year 1998, there were 378 "mental injury" cases. In 1999, there were 923.
The remaining figures for 1998 and 1999 were as follows: 1998 (abandonment = 9; sexual
abuse = 2,129; physical abuse = 4,145; neglect = 9,744); 1999 (abandonment = 26; sexual
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continuation of this trend, with a 389% rise in the mental injury
category between 1998 and 2000,s' climbing to an almost 500%
increase in reports in the mental injury category over 1998 levels by
Fiscal Year 2001. These increases were still accompanied by
concomitant drops in most of the other maltreatment categories."5
Caution in interpreting these data is warranted, however, because the
mental injury category also contains other psychological
maltreatment subcategories, in addition to the new domestic violence
ground. Given that the legislature enacted changes in the mental
injury category more generally, increases in reports of maltreatment
in this category may not be attributable solely to use of the new
domestic violence ground. Unfortunately, the state's data collection
system does not distinguish subtypes of cases within each category.
Despite this, however, those working within Alaska indicate that they
believe that the shifts are due, primarily, to use of the new domestic
violence ground.16
In addition, one appellate case 17 addressing the dependency
jurisdictional statute has been published. The decision appears to
apply the statute as intended by its drafters. In A.H. v. Alaska, a
father disputed the superior court's determination that his children
should be adjudged dependent. He argued that two specified
incidents of domestic violence were insufficient to constitute
"repeated exposure" to domestic violence as required by the statute.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Alaska Supreme Court
emphasized that, because exposure to domestic violence "has a
'devastating impact' on children, domestic violence need not be
directed toward the child or signify a significant risk of physical harm
to support" a finding of dependency. The court noted that the
record revealed "'[t]he children were in extreme distress...
screaming and in a complete state of shock for hours after"' the
domestic violence incident. 19 This decision was unanimous.
It is interesting to compare this decision with the only other
published case of its type in Alaska addressing dependency court
abuse = 1,872; physical abuse = 4,110; neglect = 9,528). See CHILD REPORTS OF HARM,
supra note 512.
514. The Fiscal Year 2000 breakdowns by category are as follows: abandonment = 17;
mental injury = 1,471; sexual abuse = 1,892; physical abuse = 3,751; neglect = 9,290. See id.
The Fiscal Year 2001 numbers are as follows: abandonment = 17; mental injury = 1,880;
sexual abuse = 1,859; physical abuse = 4,034; neglect = 9,557. Id.
515. Comparing the Fiscal Year 2001 figures to the 1998 category totals, all other
categories remain lower, except for abandonment, which increased from 9 to 16 in these
three years. I&.
516. O'Connor, supra note 497; Wibker, supra note 478.
517. A.H. v. Alaska, 10 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2000).
518. Id. at 1161-62 (quoting In reJ.A., 962 P.2d 173, 178 (Alaska 1998)).
519. Id. at 1162.
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jurisdiction in a case of childhood exposure to domestic violence. In
In re J.A., which was decided by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1998
under the pre-reform dependency jurisdictional statute, two justices
dissented from the majority's holding that the exposure to domestic
violence in the case constituted a sufficient basis for state intervention
in the family. 2° A comparison of the sets of facts that characterize
each case suggests that the domestic violence in A.H. was no more
severe or threatening to the children's well-being than in In re J.A.
One might cautiously conclude that the legislature's enactment of the
1998 package of statutes accounts for the increased unanimity on the
court in A.H. The legislature has spoken loudly and clearly regarding
its intent to include these cases within the juvenile court's jurisdiction,
with a communication that cannot be misunderstood or ignored by
the state's courts.
Whereas these initial findings of the statutes' efficacy are
promising, they are woefully inadequate bases on which to draw
conclusions about the success of a legislative initiative as far-reaching
as the four-statute package passed by Alaska in 1998. It is
unfortunate that no systematic program evaluation is in place
examining the impact of these various statutory changes. 21 The
limited data described here do not tell us if these statutes are making
a difference in the lives of children who are exposed to domestic
violence."
520. In re J.A., 962 P.2d 173, 179 (Alaska 1998) (Compton, J., dissenting) ("Today's
opinion takes an unprecedented leap forward in permitting the State to unreasonably
interfere in the lives of its citizens. The court holds for the first time that, as a matter of
law, when parents have a prior record of irresponsible conduct not involving their
children, an isolated incident in which they place their child in danger satisfies the
probable cause standard necessary for the State to petition for temporary custody under
our Child in Need of Aid statute. Since I cannot agree with this approach, I dissent.").
521. See infra notes 619-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential
benefits and challenges of conducting evaluations of public policy changes.
522. It is noteworthy, however, that Alaska is a pioneer among its sister states in
applying state-of-the-art principles to reform in this area. Given this, the process by which
these changes were adopted can serve as a model for other jurisdictions. All participants
agree that, in the early stages of the reform process, the various interested agencies, had
very different perspectives on the appropriate handling of and goals for domestic violence
cases involving children's exposure. Despite this, however, all of these groups were
intimately involved in the process of developing the new policies. See O'Connor, supra
note 497; Smith, supra note 484;Wibker, supra notes 478, 503. The parties continued to
collaborate, working through their differences and finding ways to address their agendas
and the issues of mutual concern. It appears that none gave up. I was told that no one
"bullied" constituencies with different perspectives from their own. Smith, supra note 484.
The emerging set of statutes reflected hard-won compromises. Given that all of the
concerned groups worked to develop the policies, each had a greater stake in the policies'
implementation and enforcement.
In the many interviews I conducted with participants in this process, I was struck by
the respect that each accorded leaders or representatives of the other agencies,
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B. Changing the System from the Inside-Out: Achieving an Effective
Child Protective System Response to Domestic Violence in the
Absence of Explicit Statutory Authority
In some jurisdictions, pioneering transformations in child
protection system responses to childhood exposure to domestic
violence have originated within a state or county Department of
Social Services, and have not been accompanied by specific legislative
changes. The Massachusetts Department of Social Services
("MDSS") is the best-known program of such systemic reform.'
Prompted by a tragic caseP in which a small child was killed, the
MDSS screened their case records, finding that 33% of the open cases
revealed documented domestic violence." In order to better address
the needs of battered mothers and their children, the MDSS
mandated domestic violence training for all new caseworkers, and
hired a battered women's advocate to serve as a consultant within
their program."6 In addition, the state provided funding to
community-based domestic violence service programs, such as
shelters for battered women, to increase family-based services to
battered women and their children.
The state pilot-tested the program, with four case teams
consulting with the advocate. The impact of her presence was
evaluated at the six-month period. The evaluation revealed that 71%
of the cases referred to these teams involved domestic violence, and
that prior to the consultation, the presence of domestic violence had
not been recognized in 50% of those families. 7 The advocate worked
collaboratively with the case teams, "interview[ing] mothers,
constituencies, or bodies. Each person was generous in crediting others for the tone of the
collaborative process, for developing the policies set forth in the statutes, and for writing
language that reflected the group consensus. Mutual praise was given to the Governor,
the Director of Boards and Commissions in the Governor's office, various legislators, key
Network leaders, the Assistant Attorney General for the Human Services Section, the
Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault in the state's Department of Public
Safety, and the leadership in the Division of Family and Youth Services in the state's
Department of Health and Human Services. Whatever the obstacles Alaska has faced,
and continues to face, in meeting the needs of children exposed to domestic violence, its
success thus far can be attributed to the impressive abilities of these people and
organizations to work together to address challenges of mutual concern.
523. For a description of the program and its history, see Aron & Olson, supra note
114, Ch. IV; Whitney & Davis, supra note 111.
524. In this case, a child was killed by her mother's boyfriend. Whitney & Davis, supra
note 111, at 158. Post-mortem investigation by protective services revealed that the
mother had been physically abused by the boyfriend for some time prior to the child's
death. Id. Workers wondered whether they might have been able to protect the child if
they had known about the man's violence toward the mother. Id.
525. Whitney & Davis, supra note 111, at 158.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 159.
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assess[ing] risk to both children and their mothers, assist[ing] with
safety planning, and link[ing] families to community resources."52 S
The tenets that guided this program both initially, and as it
developed, include:29 (1) "The primary goal of the teams [is] to
promote the safety of mothers and children within the same
household"; (2) "The safety and well-being of children in domestic
violence cases is usually linked to the safety and well-being of the
mother"; (3) "Offenders of domestic violence must be held
accountable for their actions"; (4) "No one agency can accomplish
these goals alone";530 and (5) "Accurate identification of the problems
and appropriate service provisions can decrease risk and prevent
unnecessary out-of-home placement."53' A subsequent evaluation
revealed that cases receiving services from joint child protection and
domestic violence teams closed in about one-third less time when
compared with the state average. 32 In 1994, the program received
legislative funding to begin a statewide expansion, and in 1995, the
staff formalized guiding principles and guidelines in a Domestic
Violence Protocol, which instructs staff in how to screen reports of
child maltreatment, how to conduct investigations and family
assessments, how to engage in safety and service planning, and how to
refer cases in a manner that takes into consideration the role that
domestic violence may be playing in perpetuating the danger to the
mother and child.33 The state's program now employs fourteen
domestic violence specialists, two coordinators, a clinical supervisor, a
half-time policy analyst, a batterer intervention specialist, a shelter
program monitor, a training coordinator, and a director'3
The co-founders of the Massachusetts Domestic Violence Unit,
Pamela Whitney and Lorna Davis, point out that the "Massachusetts
child abuse and neglect statute.., does not mention domestic
violence as a condition for abuse and neglect. There is no legal
definition of the relationship between child abuse and domestic
violence." '535 Acknowledging that this may mean that there is
variability in the extent to which domestic violence cases are referred
528. Id.
529. Id. at 160.
530. This tenet refers to the need for collaboration among child protective services,
domestic violence programs, as well as other agencies such as law enforcement.
531. In the first six months of the Massachusetts program, only one child is 59 cases was
placed in foster care. Whitney & Davis, supra note 111, at 161.
532. Whitney & Davis, supra note 111, at 162.
533. Id. at 161-62. A copy of this protocol may be obtained from the Massachusetts
Department of Social Services, Domestic Violence Unit, 24 Farnsworth Street, Boston,
MA 02210. This document has served as a model for other jurisdictions. See infra notes
570 & 596 and accompanying text.
534. Id. at 162.
535. Id. at 163.
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to child protective services under mandatory reporting statutes,
Whitney and Davis argue strenuously against incorporating children's
exposure to domestic violence into state definitions of child abuse.536
Their concerns are as follows:
[B]attered women may be deterred from seeking help for fear of
losing their children, and all families do not require the level of
intervention provided by the child protection system.
The danger in opening the "front door" [i.e., including all cases in
which children are exposed to domestic violence in the child
protection system caseload] is that DSS is not equipped to handle
the volume of cases. Many of these families could be better served
at the community level, if there were a seamless system of varying
supports beyond shelter and the criminal justice system. In
addition, a legal and clinical mind-set must shift toward holding
offenders accountable. No amount of safety planning can be
successful if the offender has continued access to the family. 37
Whitney and Davis recommend including children exposed to
domestic violence in the DSS caseload only where the child meets
"current definitions of child abuse and neglect," such as: when a child
is hurt in a domestic violence incident; when the batterer's conduct
interferes with the child's basic needs for medical care, food, and so
on; or when the child meets existing statutory emotional abuse
provisions!"'
In 1993, Michigan incorporated a domestic violence component
into Families First, one of the divisions of its child protective
services.139 Families First's mandate is to prevent children's removal
from the home whenever possible by providing intensive in-home
intervention services. Approximately 40% of the cases handled by
child protective services in Michigan are referred to this program.
The domestic violence component arose out of a liaison between
Michigan's Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Board and
Child Protection Services, which had not worked together in the past,
despite being housed in the same building.' In 1993, all Families
First workers were trained with a domestic violence curriculum, and
the collaboration was implemented through a demonstration project
linking domestic violence shelters with child protection services in
fourteen counties in the state, with the state providing Families First
funding to shelters. Three years later, fourteen additional counties
were included.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 163-64.
538. Id. at 164.
539. Aron & Olson, supra note 114, at Ch. VI.
540. Id.
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Michigan staff from both the "domestic violence and child
welfare sides" have "tentatively" concluded that:
not every domestic violence incident presents a serious risk to
children. Therefore, not every domestic violence case requires
[child protection system] involvement. Instead, domestic violence
and child welfare staff prefer to look at each family's situation and
make a determination.... One administrator stated that it would
be a strategic error to expand the caseload as an initial way of
dealing with domestic violence; such expansion would create an
additional caseload for whom appropriate services are not readily
available. The Families First/ Domestic Violence Demonstration
Project has been one way of targeting resources at families more
appropriately than merely expanding the definition of child abuse.
In general, state administrators in Michigan felt strongly that
changes in service delivery can be made most effectively through
changing policy and funding priorities at the agency level rather
than through legislative changes.-41
Although Massachusetts and Michigan are the best-known
programs to incorporate domestic violence expertise into the
provision of child protection services, there are other programs that
also report success at altering the traditional child protection system
responses to families in which there is domestic violence.4 ' Federal
funding for implementation of the Green Book policies and Safe Start
Initiatives will allow for the development of collaborative approaches
to handling domestic violence and protective services cases in over
two dozen additional communities.43  In addition, in Minnesota,
despite the legislature's failure to fund the "newer" statute, policy
change has already begun "from inside out," with its new policies
guiding protective services guidelines for domestic violence cases.54
Generally, those programs that report success in reforming child
protective services policies in domestic violence cases "from inside
out" are those that: work to bridge the mistrust between child
protective services and domestic violence services; provide training in
domestic violence for child protective services workers; provide
ongoing consultation between child protection system workers and
domestic violence experts; provide protocols guiding case screening
and management; change departmental policies so as to focus on the
safety of the nonabusive parent and child as a unit; seek to hold the
batterer accountable for perpetrating the violence; provide
appropriate services to the family members; and receive funding
541. Id.
542. For a discussion of programs in San Diego County, East Hawaii, and the Oregon
Department of Human Services, see Aron & Olson, supra note 114. See generally,
EMERGING PROGRAMS, supra note 17.
543. See supra notes 12 & 16, respectively.
544. See supra notes 469-77 and accompanying text.
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adequate to carry out these endeavors. These elements appear to
constitute a necessary precondition to effective child protective
services responses to domestic violence cases. This, of course, leads
to the question of whether, on balance, there is anything to be gained
by changing a state's statute to explicitly authorize child protection
system involvement in all or some cases of childhood exposure to
domestic violence.
The founders and administrators in the Massachusetts and
Michigan programs vocalized their positions on this controversial
question by noting that not all children exposed to domestic violence
are in need of formal child protection services and that expanding the
statutory definition of child maltreatment to incorporate all children
exposed to domestic violence would overload the system.
Furthermore, these professionals argue that such expansion is not
necessary, since the needs of children exposed to domestic violence
and their nonabusive parent can be met through internal policy and
programmatic changes, together with adequate funding. Yet, states
such as Massachusetts and Michigan are exemplary; they have found
ways to transform an ineffective and often harmful child protective
services response into one that appears to be meeting the needs of
families affected by domestic violence. Although their efforts make
clear that it is possible to change the system from "inside out" without
explicit statutory mandates, there may be specific advantages to clear
legislative directives, and there may also be risks to legislative silence.
These are explored below.
C. The Risks of Interpreting Existing Child Maltreatment Statutes to
Incorporate Childhood Exposure to Domestic Violence
In Part III, I observed that the courts in some states, most
notably New York and California, have decided at least a handful of
cases using the "neglect" provisions of the dependency court
jurisdictional statute to reach children exposed to domestic
violence.m The relatively "malleable" language of neglect provisions
can stretch to accommodate cases of childhood exposure to domestic
violence when child protective services involvement appears
warranted. In the absence of direct physical harm to the children, and
with stringent requirements in the mental injury or psychological
harm category, neglect may be the only pathway that allows state
intervention in some of these cases.46
In addition, there is another reason why some courts use the
neglect construction as a jurisdictional ground in these cases.
Sometimes, the domestic violence perpetrator is not a parent or legal
545. See supra notes 424-33 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 417-33 and accompanying text.
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guardian of the child. 47 Because the juvenile court's jurisdiction in
most states "is limited to those situations in which the child's parent
or legal guardian has created, or failed to protect the child from, the
conditions deemed by the court to be harmful to the child, [the state
may not be able to] intervene in direct response to the conduct of"
domestic violence perpetrators who do not stand in a legally-
recognized caregiving relationship to the child.' Searching for a way
"into" the case, courts may ground jurisdiction on claims that adult
domestic violence victims, who are typically the children's mothers,
have failed to protect their children from exposure to the violence.
The use of the neglect provisions to reach children exposed to
domestic violence is problematic, however. Such use requires that we
contort our conceptualization of these cases in order to access the
"back door" to juvenile court jurisdiction that the neglect provisions
provide. Specifically, the neglect category is defined by parental
omissions (i.e., "failures" to perform certain parental duties).: 9 And
yet, the primary dangers to children in domestic violence cases are the
violent and terrorizing acts committed by domestic violence
perpetrators. Logically, primary liability for the effects of such acts
upon exposed children should rest with the perpetrators of those acts,
and the statutory provisions invoked should recognize the primacy of
these acts of commission.5 ° Absent appropriate statutory provisions,
however, state personnel use the "open door" provided by the neglect
grounds, deflecting attention and intervention away from the actions
of the domestic violence perpetrators, diverting it to the alleged
absence of protective action by the adult domestic violence victims.
The use of neglect provisions reconstructs legal responsibility for
the impact of the domestic violence exposure on children, shifting
liability from those who create the hazardous conditions to the
children's primary caregivers (typically, the children's mothers) who
are generally expected to protect the children from dangerous
circumstances.55 ' The practical consequences of this policy are many,
547. See, e.g., Findlater & Kelly, supra note 98, at 90.
548. Id.
549. "Neglect is the breach [of the] parental duty, at least when that breach causes or
risks injury to the child. Whereas physical abuse involves overt aggression, neglect
consists of omissions that are potentially or actually harmful." GOLDSTEIN, CHILD
ABUSE, supra note 261, at 96. Through their child maltreatment statutes, states seek to
enforce parental duties to provide their children with food, clothing, shelter, health care,
education, and protection. Id.
550. Alaska's statutory revisions are exemplary in moving away from the "neglect"
approach by explicitly authorizing dependency jurisdiction for acts of commission by
domestic violence perpetrators that place children at "substantial risk of mental injury."
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(8) (Michie 2000).
551. Scores of authors have observed and discussed our society's, and thus also our
legal system's, lopsided tendency to focus almost exclusively on the responsibility and
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and extend beyond individual cases. As one author has noted, "the
word is 'out': if you report domestic violence in your home, your
children might be removed; if you are a child and you make a report,
concomitant liability for children's well-being of mothers, as contrasted with fathers. See,
e.g., Mary Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support
Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for the Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 13, 15 (1995) (referring to "an unspoken and unconscious double standard
for mothers and fathers"); Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State:
Children on the Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 4-5 (1995) (asserting that
juvenile courts are "'mother-blaming' institutions where fathers are absent and larger
social forces are virtually invisible"); Catherine McBride-Chang et al., Mother-Blaming,
Psychology and the Law, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 69,75 (1992) (noting that,
despite psychological research findings that reveal that mothers are not to blame for a
wide range of children's behavior problems, both mothers and fathers continue to view the
mothers as responsible for these problems); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of
Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 709 (1998) (citing "juvenile courts' tendency toward 'mother-
blaming' and the lack of accountability of fathers in those courts"); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1441-42 (1991) (identifying how Black mothers are
"scapegoated" and held responsible for many of the difficulties confronted by Black
Americans); Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist
Perspective on Child Abuse, 18 INT'L. J. HEALTH SERVS. 97, 101-02 (1988) (describing
policies that hold mothers responsible for fathers' abuse of children, while identifiable
fathers remain "invisible" to lawmakers and government agencies). Our society and its
legal system imagine mothers to be virtually omnipotent in their maternal roles-capable
of protecting their children from a broad range of potential hazards and deleterious
circumstances. See Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J. L. & FEM. 177,
203-04 (2000); McBride-Chang et al., supra at 71. The logical corollary of this proposition
is that mothers are seen as responsible for whatever happens to their children, for their
children's conduct, and for their children's functioning as adults. See McBride-Chang et
al., supra at 69 (noting that for "hundreds of years, mothers have been treated as
scapegoats for children's problems which are multi-causal and over which mothers have
limited control"); Cahn, supra at 203-04 (noting that mothers are typically presumed
responsible when their children become juvenile delinquents or murderers, go on welfare,
or develop mental disorders).
Absent from traditional legal analyses is recognition of the complexities inherent in
human behavior. Professor Mary Becker asserts that here is a tendency in our culture and
legal policy:
to view people as either agents or victims, though all human beings act at various
times-and sometimes even at the same time to varying degrees-as free and
independent agents and as passive or reactive 'victims' behaving in conformity
with requirements imposed by others. This point is particularly true for battered
women, who in their own lives are often agents-coping in impressive ways
under terrifying conditions-and yet also victims.
Becker, supra at 16. For thoughtful analysis of the complex issues surrounding the
victimization-agency distinctions, see Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression?
Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE
59 (Martha Albertson et al. eds., 1994); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminism and the False
Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 387 (1993); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in
Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (1992).
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you may be placed in foster care or a group home." '552 A savvy
perpetrator of domestic violence is also aware of these practices, and
may warn his victim that seeking help from law enforcement or other
public agencies will result in her loss of custody of her children-a
result that may terrify her even more than the battering she is
experiencing. Furthermore, state policies that "blame" the victim for
her own battering are eerily consistent with the psychological
messages that domestic violence perpetrators send explicitly and
implicitly to their victims; 5 3 messages that she is inadequate,
incompetent, and blameworthy. The Family Violence Prevention
Fund describes a scenario that illustrates the problematic interactions
between battered women and protective services that have become
typical in many jurisdictions:
Sarah, a young mother in a physically abusive marriage, is
frightened and worried. Three months ago, her four-year-old son
was hit with an ashtray thrown at her by her husband during an
episode of domestic violence. Trying to protect her son from harm,
she instructed him to go outside in the future when his father
becomes violent, and hide in the tool shed until it is safe to come in.
Child Protective Services pays her a visit when a neighbor reports
seeing the child cowering shoeless in the shed one freezing winter
night. Fearing she will be charged with "failure to protect" and that
her son will be taken away from her, Sarah denies there is violence
in her home. Given no reasonable explanation for sending the boy
outside, CPS charges Sarah with child abuse.5-
At the time of this writing, the U.S. District Court of New York,
Eastern District, is hearing a case challenging the constitutionality of
certain practices by New York City agencies and officials.55 The
552. Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against Children:
Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1995).
553. Dohm, supra note 551, at 8.
554. FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(April 16,2001), available at http://www.fvpf.org/kids/.
555. Nicholson v. Williams, No. 00-CV-2229, 2001 WL 951716 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), sub
nom Nicholson ex rel. Barnett v. Giuliani, 2001 WL 218936 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28,2001). See
also Holding Child Protection Accountable: A Suit to Watch, reprinted from DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE REPORT, Oct./Nov. 2000, available at http:/lwww.mcadsv.org/productsl
nwl/cc0l_01.html. In this case, the plaintiffs allege that the children of the lead plaintiff,
Sharwline Nicholson, were removed from her custody after a domestic violence incident
on January 27, 1999. Fourth Amended Complaint at 13-16 (filed July 12, 2001). The
complaint alleges further that: Ms. Nicholson had been assaulted by the father of one of
her children in her apartment while the children slept undisturbed in another room; Ms.
Nicholson's assailant had never behaved violently to her before, and did not live with her
at the time of the assault; Ms. Nicholson contacted police and paramedics after he left,
received treatment on the scene, and was taken to the hospital by ambulance for further
treatment; prior to going to the hospital, Ms. Nicholson arranged for her children to stay
with the neighbor until she was released from the hospital; several hours later, police
allegedly entered the neighbor's home with their guns drawn, awakened the sleeping
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plaintiffs filed this suit as a class action, alleging that New York City's
protective services and police departments, and various individuals
supervising and working for those departments, have violated
plaintiffs' constitutional rights by applying "a policy of removing and
detaining children from mothers who are victims of domestic violence
without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their
mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health,
without due process of law, and based on constitutionally inadequate
investigations.,1 6 The presiding judge, Judge Weinstein of the United
States District Court, Eastern District of New York, recently certified
two subclasses consisting of battered women and their children,
characterized, in part, by the following criteria: the children have
been removed from their mother's custody by the Administration for
Children's Services ("ACS," i.e., New York City's child protective
services department) without court order, the children have not been
physically harmed, and less intrusive methods of protecting the
children have not been attempted by ACS.' In the midst of the trial,
children, and took them to the police station.; the police reportedly did not allow Ms.
Nicholson to have phone or direct contact with her children, and the children were
subsequently transported to the Administration for Children's Services (ACS), which took
custody of them. Id. The children were returned to Ms. Nicholson on February 18, 1999
(that is, three weeks later), but proceedings by ACS against Ms. Nicholson continued for
six more months. Id. at 16-17. Allegedly, Ms. Nicholson was reported to the State's
Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (the child abuse hotline) by one of the
police officers involved in the case for "mistreat[ing] her children by engaging in domestic
violence in their presence." Id. at 15.
556. Id. at 18. The plaintiffs cite Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999),
cert denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000) (holding that removing a child from a parent without a
hearing violates due process if the danger to the child is not so imminent that there is not
reasonably sufficient time to seek prior judicial authorization for the child's removal). A
line of U.S. Supreme Court cases enunciates now well-established parental rights to a
range of due process protections prior to various forms of state intervention into their
relationships with their children. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 758-
59 (1982) (concluding that "a natural parent's... right to the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children is an interest far more precious than any
property right") (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)
(quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972))); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (asserting that the right to "raise one's children [has] been deemed 'essential' ....")
(citation omitted); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.. . ."). The
analogy between the instant New York case and Stanley is particularly strong because in
Stanley, the Court excoriated the state's policy of presuming that unwed fathers were unfit
as a class without making individualized determinations of parental competence. 405 U.S.
at 649-58.
557. Nicholson v. Williams, 2001 WL 951716 at *2 (2001). Specifically, the classes are
defined as follows:
Subclass A shall consist of:
All persons subject to domestic violence or its threat who are custodians of
children, legally or de facto, if:
November 20011 PROTECTING CHILDREN
ACS has issued certain new internal policies,"" apparently in response
to the lawsuit. In a memorandum, ACS explicitly condemns its
"historical" usage of the phrase "engaging in domestic violence" to
characterize the battered women's involvement in the circumstances
that serve as the basis for the children's removal.59 Depending upon
1. the children reside or resided in a home where battering was said to have
occurred, but where the children themselves have not been physically
harmed or threatened with harm, or neglected by the non-battering
custodian, and where protection of the children and their best interests can
be accomplished by separation of the alleged batterer from the custodian
and children or by other appropriate measures without removal of the
children from the non-battering custodian; and if,
2. the children are sought to be removed or were removed by the New York
City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) or other governmental
agency without court order (even if removal is ultimately approved by a
court), in whole or in part because the children reside in a home where
battering of the custodian was said to have occurred; or
3. the custodian is named as a respondent by ACS in child protective
proceedings by ACS under Article 10 of the New York Family Court Act in
which removal may be sought (even if removal is ultimately approved by a
court), in whole or in part because the children reside in a home where
battering of the custodian was said to have occurred; or
4. the custodian is denied adequate counsel;
a) in proceedings required by law before ACS which may confirm or
lead to removal of a child or failure to promptly return a removed child;
or
b) in court proceedings which may confirm or lead to removal of a child
or failure to promptly return a removed child.
Subclass B shall consist of:
All children who are or were in the custody of a custodian in subclass A:
1. who have been or are likely to be removed by ACS or other governmental
agency since December 16,2000; or
2. who were removed prior to December 16, 2000 and continue to be in
removed status after December 16,2000; or
3. who have not been returned to the custodian as soon as possible after
December 16,2000 pursuant to a court order, where;
a) ACS has no discretion to delay the child's return; or
b) ACS has discretion to delay or condition the child's return, but delay
or conditions are not necessary for the protection of the child.
Id. at *2.
558. See, e.g., JOSEPH CARDIERI & WILLIAM BELL, MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
USE OF "ENGAGING IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE" LANGUAGE IN LEGAL PETITIONS AND
CASE RECORDS, Division of Legal Services, Administration for Children's Services, New
York City (Aug. 14,2001) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
559. Id. The Memorandum states that the phrase "engaging in domestic violence" had
"historically" been used by ACS to refer to "a battered woman... who has been a victim
of domestic violence and has not herself engaged in or initiated an act of violence.
Because this usage misstates the nature of the victim's role in the violence and relieves the
primary aggressor of his/her responsibility for the violence, the phrase 'engaging in
domestic violence' should never be utilized in reference to a client who has simply been a
victim of domestic violence." Id. The Memorandum also distinguishes self-defensive
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the result in this case, policies that hold domestic violence victims
strictly liable for failure to protect their children from exposure to the
violence may be judged unconstitutional. Yet, independent of the
holding in this case, there is growing consensus among experts in the
field that a policy focusing on the liability of the domestic violence
victim for failing to protdct her children is not an effective response to
the problem."
The Family Violence Prevention Fund presents an "alternative"
response to "Sarah's" situation, one which does not hinge its
intervention on the presumed liability of the domestic violence victim
for failure to protect her child:
A CPS worker is called to Sarah's home after a neighbor alerts the
agency to potential child abuse. The worker makes a strength-
based assessment of the situation, instead of a deficit-based one.
She asks Sarah about domestic violence, telling her CPS is "here to
help." Because Sarah has heard from her neighbors that CPS is
indeed a resource that can help her with family problems, she
confides in her about the abuse. Together, they discuss ways Sarah
can protect herself and her kids from the batterer, explore her
options, make a safety plan for her and her child, and work with
partnering domestic violence and social service agencies that can
support her. Her batterer is held accountable for the violence, and
Sarah is not charged.6'
In sum, in the absence of either legislative initiatives promoting
state-of-the-art policies in response to childhood exposure to
domestic violence, or innovative protective services approaches like
those of Massachusetts and Michigan, protective service workers and
judges are likely to fall back on ineffective modes of intervention
which do not appear to serve the best interests of the children
involved. Alaska's statutory revisions are exemplary in moving away
from this approach by explicitly authorizing dependency jurisdiction
for acts of commission by domestic violence perpetrators that place
children at "substantial risk of mental injury.""2 As such, the juvenile
court jurisdictional statute appropriately authorizes interventions that
seek to protect children and adult domestic violence victims from the
offending adults, while providing these victims with supportive
intervention.
As noted above, it is sometimes difficult for child protective
services to gain jurisdiction in cases where the domestic violence
perpetrators are not related to the children, even though they have an
ongoing relationship with the child's caregiver. A recent statutory
conduct by a domestic violence victim from the conduct of the primary aggressor, and
specifies that self-defensive actions should not be characterized as "mutual" violence. Id.
560. See supra notes 11-16, 108-09 and accompanying text.
561. See FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, supra note 554.
562. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(8) (Michie 2000).
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change in Michigan attacks this obstacle head on, by allowing juvenile
court jurisdiction and protective services intervention "in cases
involving nonparent adults, whether or not such adults reside in the
same household as the child."5"3 Yet, even in the absence of such
statutes, strict enforcement of criminal domestic violence laws, as well
as the availability and enforcement of civil protective orders, also
provide the state with alternative ways to deter or incapacitate the
domestic violence perpetrator in some situations, if they are
appropriately enforced. Creative applications of existing laws, as well
as passage of provisions such as Michigan's, should obviate the need
to hold the adult domestic violence victim liable in order to gain
dependency jurisdiction of the case.
D. Necessary and Sufficient Components of Effective Child Protective
Services Responses to Domestic Violence Cases
Explicit statutory inclusion of children exposed to domestic
violence in the definition of maltreatment is highly likely to create
problems such as those experienced in Minnesota if the statutory
language is too broad, and if there are not contingent changes in child
protective services training, expertise, protocols, philosophy, services,
and funding. In addition, the Massachusetts and Michigan scenarios
suggest that statutory changes are not essential components to
successful handling of domestic violence cases by the child protection
system. Yet, statutory reform carries with it additional benefits, if
and only if, such changes are accompanied by internal overhauling
and renovation of the child protection system approach to domestic
violence cases, along the lines suggested by groups like the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges,5" the American Bar
Association's Center for Children and the Law,5  and as implemented
in several locales around the country, such as Massachusetts and
Alaska. The legislative mandate makes processing of domestic
violence cases more expeditious, clarifying that the court has
jurisdiction in these cases. In addition, it explicitly grounds such
intervention in the acts of commission by domestic violence
perpetrators who endanger children's psychological and physical well-
being. With such statutes on the books, child protective services
workers and judges don't need to find a "back door" through which
563. Findlater & Kelly, supra note 98, at 90 n.27 (citing 1998 Mich. Pub. Act No. 530
and 1998 Mich. Pub. Act No. 531, codified at MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §§ 722.622,
712A.2 et seq. (West 2001)). The Michigan statute authorizes the juvenile court to "order
the nonparent adult to participate in a service plan and/or to stay away from the child, and
can punish violations of the court's orders with contempt sanctions that include
imprisonment." Id. at n.27.
564. THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12.
565. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 13.
(Vol. 53
to intervene with the family. They will be less likely to seek
jurisdiction under the "neglect" ground, and are thus less likely to
divert attention to the purported omissions of domestic violence
victims. The need to use such a back door is further reduced by
statutes like Michigan's which allow the juvenile court to reach
domestic violence offenders who are unrelated to the children at risk.
Finally, and importantly, explicit jurisdictional statutes offer the
potential of educating the public, professionals, and domestic violence
perpetrators, victims, and children, as to the nonacceptability of
domestic violence in our society. The experiences of the Canadian
provinces, Minnesota, and Alaska, however, reveal that statutory
reform must be carefully conceived. In the next Part, I set forth the
components of a blueprint for statutory reform.
V. Promoting Effective Protective System Intervention on
Behalf of Children Exposed to Domestic Violence: Guidelines
for Statutory Reform
A state statute bringing children exposed to domestic violence
within the dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile court offers the
promise of interrupting the violence that places these children's well-
being at risk. It clarifies the juvenile court's jurisdiction, and offers
the hope of protection and of remedial services. It sends a message to
society-at-large, including domestic violence perpetrators, that
exposing a child to domestic violence is not acceptable parental
conduct. It underscores that the battering victim is not the only
person harmed by domestic violence, and that even in the absence of
physical scars, children's psychological well-being may be seriously
compromised.
But, as the stories of the Canadian provinces and Minnesota
reveal, a statute that merely expands the state's definitions of child
maltreatment to include childhood exposure to domestic violence,
without more, is unlikely to have the anticipated benefits, and may
lead to unintended negative consequences. In order to maximize the
chances of an effective child protective services response to domestic
violence cases, such expansion must be part of a comprehensive
scheme of policy reform. Several elements appear critical to
successful reform: (1) clarifying the mandate (identifying which cases
are the target of intervention; delineating the philosophy and
principles of intervention); (2) developing an institutional capacity to
respond to these cases (adopting protocols and policies for case
screening and management; providing staff training; building
appropriate collaborative relationships with other community
agencies; developing appropriate services or relationships with
agencies capable of delivering appropriate services); (3) coordinating
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changes in maltreatment statutes with other pertinent statutes (e.g.,
criminal, child custody); (4) allocating adequate funds for capacity-
building and ongoing implementation; and (5) designing and funding
careful evaluation of the statute's effects.
A. Clarify the Mandate and Craft Statutory Language Accordingly
The legislature must identify which families are the target of
state intervention, and must articulate a guiding philosophy and
specific principles of intervention.
(1) Define the Target Families
Minnesota's experience argues against statutory language so
broad that it brings within its reach virtually every conceivable case of
domestic violence. There is tremendous variability in domestic
violence cases and the risks they present to children. Defining
exposure to domestic violence as "per se" child maltreatment is likely
to overload the system and bring into protective services' reach many
families for whom state intervention is neither needed or appropriate.
In addition, constitutional considerations require minimizing state
intervention in families where such intervention is not essential to
protecting the children's welfare."'
Legislatures must focus state efforts on those cases where the
risks to the children are most serious. If a child is already evidencing
psychological symptoms that appear related to violence in the
household, or if the nature of the violence and its context seem highly
likely to cause psychological distress or dysfunctional behavior, a
child protective services investigation may be appropriate. Alaska
requires that the domestic violence in question "place[ ] the child at
substantial risk of mental injury."567 Minnesota's revised statute limits
intervention to those situations where the violent behavior
"imminently or seriously endangers the child's physical or mental
health." '6"
One may argue that judgments as to which domestic violence
situations are serious enough to warrant state intervention are fraught
with subjectivity and uncertainty. It is true that the elusive concept of
the best interests of the child is often indeterminate, sometimes
566. See supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
567. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(8)(B) (Michie 2000) (emphasis added).
568. MINN. STAT. § 626.5552 (2000). Criteria for assessing the impact of domestic
violence on children are set forth in some of the protocols and training materials that have
been developed by various professionals and localities. See, e.g., A NATIONAL
CURRICULUM, supra note 124, at 230 (instructing interviewers to inquire about specific
aspects of the children's physical and emotional health, social functioning, and the ways in
which the domestic violence perpetrator and adult domestic violence victim are parenting
the children).
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requiring substantial speculation on the part of those empowered by
law to make decisions about a child's welfare.569 We can, however,
strive to guide those decisions, by setting forth standards and
procedures for caseworkers and judges. Several jurisdictions have
developed regulations, internal departmental policies, or screening
and intervention protocols in order to provide such guidance to
protective services workers."' These protocols assist workers in
assessing factors such as the potential impact of a particular domestic
violence situation on a child, or the possible lethality of that situation.
Professor Jeffrey Edleson lists certain criteria that may be pertinent,
such as: "the presence of weapons; the proximity or actions of the
child in violent situations; the presence of an alcohol or drug abusing
caregiver; the history of the abusive partner including repeated or
severe violence in the home."7' He notes further, however, that:
569. See Mnookin, supra note 38, at 255-56,261-64.
570. Such departmental policies, developed in Massachusetts, Michigan, and other
jurisdictions have served as the guideposts to the field in outlining what considerations
protective services personnel should evaluate in deciding whether and how to intervene.
See supra notes 523-44 and accompanying text. For examples of such protocols, see, e.g.,
AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, LINKING A RESPONSE: PROTOCOLS FOR A
COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CHILD ABUSE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1997),
available from American Humane Association, 303-792-9900; ARTEMIS CENTER FOR
ALTERNATIVES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTOCOL: A GUIDE
FOR CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICE WORKERS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVOCATES
(1996), available from National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, University
of Nevada-Reno, P.O. Box 8970, Reno NV 89057) [hereinafter ARTEMIS CENTER
GUIDE]; MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTOCOL
FOR CPS (Feb. 13, 1995), available from Domestic Violence Unit, Massachusetts
Department of Social Services, 24 Farnsworth Street, Boston, MA 02210; MINNESOTA
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDELINES FOR RESPONDING TO THE CO-
OCCURRENCE OF CHILD MALTREATMENT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (draft) (June 29,
2001).
571. Edleson, Is Exposure Maltreatment?, supra note 98, manuscript at 24. See also A
NATIONAL CURRICULUM, supra note 124, at 236, listing the following "Criteria to
Consider in Determining High Risk to Children in CPS Domestic Violence Cases":
In determining high risk and the need for immediate response, workers should
consider the following as additional risk factors where domestic violence is
present:
1. Domestic violence related injuries to an adult or child.
2. Severe or frequent domestic violence assaults or escalation of severity and
frequency.
3. Display or use of weapons during domestic violence assault.
4. Perpetrator's threats to kill or seriously harm himself or others.
5. Perpetrator stalking of adult victim and/or children.
6. Menacing conduct of domestic violence perpetrator and risk to child of being
assaulted or snatched.
7. Substance abuse problem in the family.
8. Non-abusive parent forced to flee and leave children with perpetrator or non-
abusing parent and children have fled, without a place to go.
9. Adult victim unable to care for child due to the trauma of a recent assault or to
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"What are badly needed in this field are empirical and practice-based
criteria for deciding whether or not a child is at... heightened risk of
harm [in domestic violence situations]. These criteria, once
established, must be developed into effective and psychometrically
tested screening and assessment instruments for use in the field."'
Increasingly, researchers are conducting such research,573  but
substantially more work is needed.
When drafting a statute that incorporates children's exposure
into definitions of maltreatment, it is also important to clarify what is
meant by "domestic violence." A focus on the most serious cases
might best be accomplished by limiting the statute's reach to incidents
which also constitute conduct proscribed by the state's criminal
statutes.74 A statute might specify that a single exposure to more
serious domestic violence offenses, such as murder, attempted
murder, aggravated assault, or sexual assault, is sufficient to trigger
child protective services involvement, whereas repeated exposure is
necessary in order to trigger such involvement in lesser assault crimes,
or for conduct that has not resulted in physical injury.5
Finally, cases that are already receiving voluntary services from
child protective services,576 domestic violence agencies, or other
providers, can be excluded from the statute's reach, unless there are
circumstances that cause workers to believe that the child remains in
danger."7 Exempting these families also addresses the complicated
problem raised by the reach of mandatory reporting laws that would
otherwise require domestic violence workers to report their clients
who have children. Whereas domestic violence workers may still be
obligated to report some of these families, workers will be permitted
the trauma from a series of multiple incidents.
10. Risk increases when the perpetrator has ongoing access to adult victim and/or
children.
572. Edleson, Is Exposure Maltreatment?, supra note 98, manuscript at 25-26.
573. See, e.g., Jouriles et al., Knives, Guns, supra note 369 and accompanying text.
574. See supra notes 436-38 and accompanying text.
575. See, e.g., Alaska's juvenile court jurisdictional statute, in permitting jurisdiction in
cases involving a single exposure to domestic violence crimes such as murder, sexual
assault, and certain other assaults, but requiring "repeated" exposure for offenses that
have not necessarily caused physical injury as yet, such as reckless endangerment, and
stalking. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (Michie 2000).
576. It is not uncommon for child protective services to provide "voluntary" services to
families who come to its attention through reports of suspected child abuse or neglect. In
these cases, the family's cooperation obviates the need to proceed through the more
coercive route of a dependency adjudication. As child protective services interventions in
domestic violence cases become more "victim-friendly," serving the domestic violence
victim's needs as well as the child's, it may be increasingly common for victims to seek or
acquiesce to such services.
577. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(h).
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to exercise their professional judgment in determining which
situations warrant such action.
(2) Delineate the Philosophy and Principles of Intervention
There is little empirical work systematically comparing the
effects of different types of child protective services intervention with
domestic violence cases.7s In recent years, initial empirical studies
have demonstrated that interventions targeting the adult domestic
violence victim's safety and functioning can achieve positive results
for that victim. 9 Some studies have also examined the children's
functioning, and have shown that improvements in the children's
well-being are also observed following these interventions.: The
literature is replete with anecdotal reports about the relative success
of child protective services' interventions that promote the domestic
violence victim's safety and well-being. Although these newer
approaches have not been subjected to rigorous scientific scrutiny,
there is enough evidence for their efficacy to justify their
implementation in concert with careful and ongoing evaluation of
their impact. 8' In addition, the community-based emphasis of these
approaches complements the neighborhood-based approach
proposed by the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect."'
Key national agencies have taken the position that the well-being
of children who have been exposed to domestic violence is
inextricably linked with the well-being of the parent who is the
domestic violence victim." Some in the field assert that the absence
of the domestic violence victim's safety and stability, it is unlikely that
children can begin to recover from their traumatic experiences.5 The
child protective system must adopt, as its mandate, the goal of
-578. In fact, there is little empirical work addressing the efficacy of protective services
interventions more generally. See infra notes 619-51 and accompanying text.
579. See, e.g., Cris M. Sullivan & Deborah I. Bybee, Reducing Violence Using
Community-Based Advocacy for Women with Abusive Partners, 67 J. CONSULTING &
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 43 (1999) [hereinafter Sullivan & Bybee, Reducing Violence].
580. See, e.g., Ernest N. Jouriles et al., Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Helping Families
Departing from Battered Women's Shelters [hereinafter Jouriles et al., Breaking the Cycle],
in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE, supra note 140, at 337.
581. Based on the informed experiences of a broad range of experts who have worked
with children exposed to domestic violence, virtually every national organization and
agency addressing these issues promotes these new approaches. See supra notes 11-16 and
accompanying text.
582. See supra notes 243-45, 252 and accompanying text
583. See, e.g., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, OFFICE
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SAFE FROM THE START: TAKING
ACTION ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE (2000), available at http://ncjrs.org/html/
ojjdp/summary-safefromstart/chap3.html#d.
584. See, e.g., Groves, supra note 73, at 126.
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assisting the adult domestic violence victim to protect herself and her
children, and it must take an active role in preventing the domestic
violence perpetrator from continuing his abuse. In some instances,
the child protective system alone will be unable to provide adequate
protection for the adult domestic violence victim and her children, in
which case the appropriate community agencies, such as law
enforcement, must intervene as well, in order to stop the violence.s
At the same time, the adult victim and child must receive a range of
services that promote their immediate and long-term safety, and that
help the adult victim function independently from her batterer.
Research has also revealed that the child's relationship with the
nonabusive parent plays a critical role in that child's psychological
well-being." A strong, positive relationship between the child and
the nonabusive parent can promote and mediate the child's ability to
cope with and recover from the exposures to violence. For these
reasons, removal of a child from the custody of the domestic violence
victim should be reserved for the small segment of cases in which such
a response is the only way to protect the child from imminent harm."
If it is necessary to remove anyone from the home to protect the child
from harm, the domestic violence perpetrator should be removed, not
the child.""
When the domestic violence victim's emotional functioning is
impaired by her own fear, depression, anxiety, and other reactions to
the violence, her parenting capacity may be impaired as well."s At
worst, the psychological toll of the abuse may interfere with her
emotional or physical ability to meet her children's day-to-day needs.
She may resort to substance abuse, and her own interactions with her
children may rise to the level that would justify child protective
services intervention. And, even the most highly-functioning victims
may not be able to provide their children with certainty that they, and
she, will be safe from the batterer. Whereas there clearly may be
situations in which a protective services agency must use the neglect
ground to proceed against a domestic violence victim for failures to
585. These approaches call for a community-wide collaboration among the various
agencies and professions involved, including, child protection, domestic violence agencies,
law enforcement and probation, health and mental health professionals, and courts
addressing criminal, dependency, and custody issues, as well as civil protection orders.
See, e.g., THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 28-31,76-79,103.
586. See, e.g., Osofsky, supra note 134.
587. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
588. In order to accomplish this goal, the juvenile court can issue civil protective orders
to restrain the abuser from approaching the house, the domestic violence victim, or the
child. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text. In addition, an effective criminal
justice system response can also incapacitate the offender.
589. Id. at 41; Levendosky & Graham-Bermann, supra note 371, at 27-28.
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protect the child, S' these situations are far less frequent than agency
practices suggest. More frequently, state intervention to protect and
support adult victims and children together, and to promote their
positive functioning, will create the most promising short- and long-
term prospects for both. The information available regarding the
efficacy of various state approaches to protecting children from
domestic violence through the use of child maltreatment statutes
reviewed above 9 ' albeit limited, supports the philosophy and
principles summarized here. Alaska's package of statutes, which
embodies that philosophy and those principles, has proven the most
"successful" among those reforms passed in the last several years."
B. Develop An Institutional Capacity to Respond to Domestic Violence
Cases
In addition to drafting an appropriately-narrow statute and
articulating a guiding philosophy and principles of intervention, states
must build the capacity to respond appropriately in order to
implement the legislature's vision."' Four primary steps are essential
to building an institutional capacity within departments of social
services to respond to cases involving domestic violence. Jurisdictions
must: (1) adopt protocols and policies for case screening and
management; (2) insure that child protection system staff have
adequate expertise; (3) build collaborative relationships with other
community agencies; and (4) develop appropriate services and
referral sources.
The fiasco which resulted from the attempted implementation of
Minnesota's 1999 statute594 cautions us not to expand statutory
definitions of child maltreatment without first building an adequate
capacity to respond appropriately to these cases. The development of
an institutional capacity within the child protection system should
precede the effective date of new statutory definitions of child
maltreatment. Ideally, states should stagger the phases of
implementation, providing for adequate time and resources to
prepare the child protection system for its new mandate.
590. For a discussion of such instances, see Lyon, supra note 140, at 258.
591. See supra notes 504-44 and accompanying text.
592. Although, as noted below, formal evaluation has not been conducted to
substantiate initial impressions that the Alaska statutes are achieving their goals. See
supra notes 504-22 and accompanying text.
593. THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 38-41.
594. See supra notes 460-67 and accompanying text.
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(1) Adopt Protocols and Policies for Case Screening and Management
Pioneering professionals, policymakers, and scholars have paved
the way for jurisdictions that seek to improve their child protection
system response to domestic violence. Numerous documents,
providing step-by-step guidance, are available,595 including protocols
developed for child protection system use in assessing and managing
domestic violence cases."
(2) Acquire Adequate Expertise
Mandatory training for all child protection system workers in the
assessment, handling, and understanding of domestic violence cases
can create the foundation for more effective intervention. In addition
to intra-agency training, such as the "Social Work Academy"
implemented by Alaska's social service de partment, "cross-training"
models offer complementary approaches! Cross-training programs
bring together professionals from the various disciplines and agencies
that come into contact with exposed children (such as child protection
workers, domestic violence workers, law enforcement personnel,
health and mental health care providers, educators, and others).
These professionals share expertise, perspectives, and information,
while learning about each other's agencies. "Cross-training results in
the personnel in each agency understanding the other agencies'
mandates, roles, and strengths. .. ." and allows agency staff to begin
to overcome the mistrust and misunderstandings that may have
plagued interagency relationships and communications in the past.59
As such, it can help participants bridge philosophical differences and
disparate intervention models.
595. See, e.g., Carter & Schechter, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Creating
Community Partnerships, supra note 124; JEFFREY L. EDLESON & SANDRA K. BEEMAN,
RESPONDING TO THE CO-OCCURRENCE OF CHILD MALTREATMENT AND ADULT
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN HENNEPIN COUNTY, THE LINK RESEARCH PROJECT, available
at http:/lwww.mincava.umn.edu/link/finrport.asp.
596. See, e.g., ARTEMIS CENTER GUIDE, supra note 570; MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF
SOC. SERVS., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTOCOL FOR CPS (Feb. 13, 1995), available from
Domestic Violence Unit, Massachusetts Department of Social Services, 24 Farnsworth
Street, Boston, MA 02210).
597. Recommendation 11 of the Green Book states: "Every community must cross-
train its child welfare, domestic violence and juvenile court system personnel ...." THE
GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 39.
598. Id. In 1998, one program, co-sponsored by Boston Medical Center and the
Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, brought together over 2,200 professionals, from
a variety of professions and agencies, in 11 regional conferences throughout
Massachusetts. See Saathoff & Stoffel, supra note 110, at 109 n.60 (citing CHILD WITNESS
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROJECT, WORKING TOGETHER FOR CHILDREN WHO
WITNESS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: 1998 REPORT (unpublished report available from Office
of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 617-727-2200)).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
As Massachusetts, Michigan, and other jurisdictions have
demonstrated, the opportunity to consult regularly with experienced
domestic violence workers can also foster a more effective child
protection system response in domestic violence cases. Thus,
"acquiring adequate expertise" may require that an agency go beyond
training its own staff, and hire or build consulting relationships with
professionals whose expertise complements and balances the
agencies' practices and approaches.
(3) Build Interagency Collaboration
In the handling of domestic violence cases involving children, the
left and right hands are frequently unaware of what the other is doing,
and may even be working at cross purposes. Interagency
collaboration is critical if agencies are to respond and manage
domestic violence cases involving children effectively:
Families affected by domestic violence touch all service systems
and live in every community. Children exposed to domestic
violence are in our schools, day-care centers, health care
institutions, child welfare systems, and other agency settings. Law
enforcement personnel have contact with children exposed to
domestic violence through on-site police responses to domestic
violence calls. Virtually every branch of our court system handles
cases involving domestic violence.5 '
Interagency collaboration can be promoted by the development
of effective communication and information-sharing policies
regarding cases that other agencies should know about."'
Furthermore, each agency must develop procedures for cross-
referring clients to other agencies as needed.
(4) Expand and Support Appropriate Services and/or Referral Networks
The traditional range of services available to a child protection
system does not include many of the resources necessary to respond
effectively to domestic violence. Domestic violence victims and their
children need a place of safety where they can reside until the threat
of further violence subsides or is neutralized by legal system or other
intervention. Domestic violence shelters have served this function for
battering victims and their children.6' And yet, the availability of
shelter beds is woefully inadequate to meet the needs of those
families who seek them.Y Shelter stays are crisis-oriented and brief,
599. Carter et al., supra note 2, at 4.
600. See, e.g., EMERGING PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 89-91 (describing the San
Diego Family Violence Project).
601. Saathoff and Stoffel, supra note 110, at 99-100.
602. See, e.g., Stacey B. Plichta, Identifying Characteristics of Programs for Battered
Women, Presentation at the Commonwealth Fund Commission on Women's Health
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often limited to thirty to sixty days. Victims require a range of
services to help them survive in the community such as "safety
planning," vocational counseling and training, transitional housing,
medical and mental health care, assistance in promoting their
children's adjustment to school and the community, and legal services
to assist them, for example, in obtaining civil protective orders and
public financial assistance,6 in addressing divorce and child custody
issues, and so on. Child protection workers must have access to
referral networks in which these families' needs can be met.
Legislatures must recognize that child protection system involvement
will be futile if the types of services needed to assist these families are
not adequately funded.6
C. Create a Comprehensive State-Wide Response to Domestic Violence by
Coordinating Changes in Child Maltreatment Statutes with Other
Policies
In any given state, statutes that address domestic violence can
work together powerfully to address children's exposure. As I noted
in Part I of this Article, state legislatures have enacted several types
of statutes aimed at protecting children from domestic violence.S1
Some statutes address children's best interests in private custody
disputes between parents,6°6 whereas others require the criminal
justice system to focus on the presence of children during the
commission of domestic violence offenses.6 States must also
aggressively enforce pre-existing criminal statutes prohibiting
Symposium: Domestic Violence and Women's Health: Broadening the Conversation,
New York, N.Y., Sept. 20,1995, summarized in ADDRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES: POLICY REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH FUND COMMISSION ON
WOMEN'S HEALTH, Feb. 1998, at 45-47.
603. Research data reveals that women who are victims of domestic violence are
substantially more likely than non-victims to need public assistance. Raphael & Tolman,
supra note 135; Jody Raphael, Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Toward a New
Feminist Theory of Welfare Dependency, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 201 (1996).
Recognizing that women who are domestic violence victims are typically less able to
obtain employment within the time constraints set forth by recent welfare reform policies,
many jurisdictions have adopted a form of the Wellstone/Murray Amendment, which
exempts domestic violence victims from some of these constraints. 42 U.S.C. §602 (1997).
For a discussion of the issues relating to availability of welfare assistance for victims of
domestic violence, see Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt, 4 WELFARE REFORM
NETWORK NEWS (rev. Apr. 11, 1997) (Mar. 31, 1997), available at http://www.iwvpr.org/
wrnn4.htm. Prospective recipients must apply for public benefits and exemptions
available to domestic violence victims, however, and are likely to require legal assistance
to learn about and benefit from policies specific to domestic violence victims.
604. See infra note 618 and accompanying text.
605. See supra notes 29-97 and accompanying text.
606. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
607. See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
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domestic violence.6 There are circumstances in which the only way
to protect the child and domestic violence victim is to incarcerate the
offender. In many situations, the interventions of the child protective
system may not provide as effective deterrence as would a swift,
certain, and strong response from the criminal justice system. And
finally, coordinated, consistent responses from the criminal justice
system and child protective system strengthen the educative value of
these policies.6 Sending a clear message as to society's unwillingness
to tolerate this conduct requires that one system not undercut the
policy positions of the other by failing to take action against violent
conduct within families.
Not surprisingly, effective responses to children's needs in the
family court and criminal justice systems, like effective responses by
the child protection system, require more than just appropriate
statutory language. Staff must receive training that helps them
understand the dangers to children posed by domestic violence and to
assess and intervene in these situations to appropriately. As noted
above, when a domestic violence victim leaves her abuser, she
increases her risk of serious, and perhaps also lethal, assault, and
domestic violence perpetrators may threaten to take the children
through legal or illegal means.60 Family court judges and mediators
must recognize that it is often not in the interests of the children and
their nonabusive caregivers to order or allow a domestic violence
perpetrator to have unsupervised visitation with his child, since doing
so presents him with frequent access to the adult victim and her
children. In response, some agencies have developed "visitation
centers," secure locations in which supervised visitation can occur
between children and noncustodial parents, without requiring that
victims and perpetrators have contact.6" In addition, police officers
can play critical roles in promoting the well-being of children exposed
608. Some of the criminal justice system responses comprising such enforcement
include: mandatory arrest of domestic violence perpetrators, see e.g., Machaela M.
Hoctor, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory Arrest in
California, 85 CAL. L. REv. 643 (1997); mandatory prosecution of perpetrators and
sometimes also mandatory victim participation in prosecutions, see, e.g., Hanna, No Right
to Choose, supra note 135, at 1849; use of traditional criminal penalties rather than
"treatment" approaches in sentencing offenders, see, e.g., Hanna, The Paradox of Hope,
supra note 256, at 1505; and use of newer criminal statutes that permit early intervention
in domestic violence cases, see, e.g., Laurie Salame, A National Survey of Stalking Laws: A
Legislative Trend Comes to the Aid of Domestic Violence Victims and Others, 27 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 67 (1993). See generally EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (2d ed. 1996).
609. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
610. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
611. See, e.g., EMERGING PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 159-63 (discussing the Parents
and Children Together Visitation Center).
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to domestic violence. As the first ones to the scene of a violent
incident, these professionals have a unique opportunity to assist
affected children with their emotional needs. In one innovative
program, the New Haven Department of Police Service and the Yale
University Child Study Center collaborate in responding to domestic
violence calls involving children."2 Police receive training from child
development and mental health specialists to assist them in meeting
the immediate needs of children on the scene. University personnel
are on-call around the clock to consult with police, or to travel to the
scene or the police station, to provide crisis intervention services to
the children, as well as referrals for ongoing mental health services.
A statewide response to childhood exposure to domestic violence
must address the problems of coordination among the various legal
institutions encountering affected families. It is not uncommon for
these families to have contact with all of the following: the criminal
justice system, the child protection system, a different civil court
issuing a civil protective order, and a family court adjudicating the
private custody dispute."3 Often, there is no formal mechanism
promoting communication and coordination among these systems.
Professionals in each system often operate in a vacuum, unaware of
other legal proceedings, duplicating investigative work, and
sometimes issuing inconsistent or conflicting orders.614
In response, several types of programs have been developed .
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges has
recommended that cases be assigned a domestic violence coordinator,
who is specifically assigned to monitor the various legal proceedings
relating to a particular family, "bridg[ing] these various systems ....
streamlining procedures[,] insuring adequate victim assistance[,]
consolidating and/or coordinating court processes and case
information[,] and serving as a liaison with law enforcement,
treatment services, [protective services], victims assistance, advocates,
612. Id. at 119-23.
613. NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE:
IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE 39 (1990) [hereinafter IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE];
Carter, et al., supra note 2, at 10.
614. Thus, for example, a family court judge might require a parent who is a domestic
violence victim to comply with permitting her ex-spouse visitation, with exchanges to
occur at her home, while another court has already issued a civil protection order
preventing the domestic violence perpetrator from approaching her residence.
615. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.035 (Michie 2000) (requiring protective services to
search for criminal records and protective orders that pertain to adult domestic violence
victims and perpetrators). In one innovative program, the San Diego Family Violence
Project pools the resources of the San Diego Children's Services Bureau (the child
protective services agency) and the San Diego County Probation Department. EMERGING
PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 89-92.
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probation departments, and other relevant agencies."6 6  Other
jurisdictions are experimenting with specialized domestic violence
courts, in which the various legal claims and disputes are
consolidated."7 There are many different models that can promote
such coordination. What is critical, however, is that state legislatures
recognize the problems, and devote attention to developing a
response that best meets the needs of its legal system and its
populace.
D. Allocate Adequate Funds to Pay for Capacity-Building and Ongoing
Implementation
Although it might seem obvious that programs such as those
described above require funding, it was not so clear to certain
legislatures.61S Costs will be the expenses incurred in training
professionals, and adding staff with particular types of expertise. In
addition, if the statutes in question expand the juvenile court's
jurisdiction by including cases that might not have been processed
previously, the department's budget must accommodate those
increases. Clearly, the financial costs of these programs must be
evaluated, together with the effects that these policy changes have for
the children involved, the larger community, and the functioning of
the legal system.
E. Incorporate and Fund an Evaluation Component
Program evaluation is something that everyone endorses. No
one disagrees that program evaluation is important and that we need
more of it. Unfortunately, however, often "lip service" is all that
policymakers, administrators, practitioners, and others are willing to
commit to carefully-designed and conducted evaluation research.
Evaluation components are omitted from most policy reform
616. IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE, supra note 613, at 39 (recommendation C.7:
"Every court system should employ a family violence coordinator").
617. See, e.g., CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT
TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION (2000) (describing the use of innovative technologies in the
Brooklyn Felony Domestic Violence Court and the Bronx Misdemeanor Domestic
Violence Court, in New York City); Eve Buzawa et al., The Response to Domestic
Violence in a Model Court: Some Initial Findings and Implications, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
185 (1998) (evaluating the efficacy of a domestic violence court in Quincy, Massachusetts);
The Honorable Randal B. Fritzler & Lenore M.J. Simon, The Development of a
Specialized Domestic Violence Court in Vancouver, Washington Utilizing Innovative
Judicial Paradigms, 69 UMKC L. REV. 139 (2000). See also SANFORD N. KATZ &
JEFFREY A. KUHN, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MODEL FAMILY COURT: A REPORT
FROM THE NATIONAL FAMILY COURT SYMPOSIUM (1991) (discussing the concept of
unified family courts more generally, and providing recommendations under the auspices
of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges).
618. See supra notes 464-68 and accompanying text.
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packages. Presently, there is very little systematic evaluation of the
statutory changes described in this Article, and the various innovative
programs and approaches described here."'
Knowledge that a statute hasn't been repealed and that the
department of social services hasn't been flooded with cases to the
point of paralysis constitute inadequate bases on which to make
policy decisions. It is important to know that implementation of the
statute hasn't or won't bankrupt the state's budget, and that officials
in the state administration or personnel on the front lines feel the law
is having its intended effects. Yet, this type of information is still not
enough on which to evaluate the success of the reform. Case law may
tell us if a statute is being applied as intended, but it doesn't tell us
very much about how the people whose lives were supposed to be
bettered by the law's enactment are faring; nor does it tell us precisely
how the law is being applied by the front-line workers. All of these
indicators are important sources of information. But, they are not
enough. We need to know whether children and their nonabusive
parents are better off because the state intervened in a different way
than it would have prior to the policy reform. Obviously, making
such a determination not only entails specifying precisely what
variables are appropriate indices of "being better off," as well as how
and when to measure these variables, how to construct a sample,
whom to use as a comparison grou P, how to monitor for unintended
negative consequences, and so on.I
619. For example, none of the jurisdictions in which the statutory changes have
occurred has incorporated a formal program evaluation component. In addition, although
there is an exciting evaluation component in the new federally-funded Green Book
implementation project, see supra note 12, these projects are not focused on examining the
impact of changes in a jurisdiction's statutory policies. Finally, the many wonderfully-
innovative programs, such as those in Massachusetts and Michigan, and others
summarized in EMERGING PROGRAMS, supra note 17, typically rely on minimal data as
well as anecdotal information to determine efficacy.
620. For a range of perspectives on the challenges and strategies of conducting
evaluation research on policy issues relating to child maltreatment and domestic violence,
see COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE INTERVENTIONS, BD. OF
CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED.,
VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES: ASSESSING PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS 14-17
(Rosemary Chalk & Patricia A. King eds., 1998) [hereinafter ASSESSING PROGRAMS]
(emphasizing that many interventions in widespread use have never been evaluated) ;
POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 180, at 125 ("virtually all of the data on which
child welfare policy was constructed are the products of rudimentary descriptive statistics;
more discriminating experimental and survey research methods, though available, were
not employed"); Sandra A. Graham-Bermann, Designing Intervention Evaluations for
Children Exposed to Domestic Violence: Applications of Research and Theory, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 237; Cris M. Sullivan
& Nicole E. Allen, Evaluating Coordinated Community Responses for Abused Women and
Their Children, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF CHILDREN, supra note 3, at
269; Patrick H. Tolan & C. Hendricks Brown, Evaluation Research on Violence
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First, let's consider why systematic program evaluation research
is so important in the policy context. Without it, we cannot determine
whether policy reforms are having their intended effects. Anecdotal,
retrospective, and subjective judgment, in the absence of carefully-
planned empirical evaluation, is notoriously unreliable in determining
whether policy outcomes are consistent with program goals and
expectations." And, even careful descriptive information regarding a
program's use is not particularly helpful in the absence of a
comparison with alternatives. Without systematic empirical
evaluation, "it is unlikely that improvements in violence prevention
programs will flourish and that a sound public health strategy can be
implemented."6
Second, the answer to the question of whether a program is
"successful" rarely is a monolithic "yes" or "no."" It is most likely
that some interventions will be more or less successful in specific
situations and/or with specific types of individuals or families.624
Absent systematic evaluation, observers may conclude that a
particular intervention "doesn't work," or that there is "no
difference" in the effects of two types of interventions. The reality
may be, however, that sophisticated quantitative analysis is necessary
in order to determine the interventions' relative effects for different
subsets of clients.
Third, without formal evaluation, it may be difficult to monitor,
detect, and understand unintended negative consequences that
Interventions: Issues and Strategies for Design, in VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE
FAMILY, supra note 3, at 439, 439-40 (addressing the "substantial gaps in knowledge" and
limited body of evaluation data on the efficacy of violence prevention and intervention
programs).
621. For example, Costin et al. review the discrepancies in prevailing assumptions
(absent empirical data) about the efficacy of child protection policy when compared with
subsequent empirical research in the 1980s and 1990s. POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra
note 180, at 124-126. Specifically, they examine the overwhelming support for family
reunification and family preservation ideologies and programs, in the absence of
meaningful empirical data. Subsequent data collection challenged many prevailing
assumptions, and began to provide a clearer picture as to which families are most
successfully assisted by what types of programs under what types of circumstances. Id.
622. Tolan & Brown, supra note 620, at 442.
623. For example, in their comparison of foster care versus home placements, Wald and
colleagues concluded that "the question 'Is home or foster care better?' must be refined by
asking further, 'In terms of which aspects of development?' and 'For which children, under
what conditions?"' For a discussion of the challenges in assessing the efficacy of child
protection interventions, see WALD et al., supra note 280, at 181.
624. For example, Costin and colleagues report that certain family preservation services
appear to be most successful when applied in families with "younger children who attend
school and are not substance abusers." POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 180, at
125.
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accompany policy changes.6" In considering whether states should
define child maltreatment to include children exposed to domestic
violence, one team of commentators cautioned that such policy
initiatives require careful study before wide-scale dissemination.
Fourth, from a practical standpoint, in an era of tight funding, it
may become increasingly important to justify the benefits of
particular programs and policies in order to insure their
continuation. 627 Professor Lela Costin and her colleagues point out
that "virtually every federal agency that is responsible for the health
of Americans uses experimental research methods before clearing
new medical and pharmaceutical products for public use."62s They
and others note that appropriate empirical research strategies from
clinical research have been adapted and imported successfully into
the field of child welfare by certain investigators, despite the
challenges. 9 Given this, Costin and her colleagues charge that the
failure of the field of child welfare to evaluate prevailing policies is
tantamount to "intellectual negligence," resulting in a "haphazard,
hodge-podge nonsXstem of services for kids and their families [which]
drift[s] aimlessly."
Given the strong reasons for incorporating program evaluation
into policy reform initiatives, why isn't there more systematic
research ongoing?
First, as many have observed, policymakers and scientists see
legal change very differently. Professor Michael Saks comments:
When legislation is enacted, it is regarded by its authors as the
solution to whatever problem needs to be solved. Little remains to
do but celebrate. To an empirical researcher, however, the
effective date of a new law marks the induction of the independent
variable and the mid-point of the work of designing and conducting
a study to gather the data to find out the extent to which the new
law made the situation better or worse or stimulated new problems
that need solving.6
625. THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 47; Carter et al., supra note 2, at 14.
626. "In designing new laws to address the effects of childhood exposure to domestic
violence, policymakers should assess the potential unintended negative consequences and
weigh them against the benefits." Carter et al., supra note 2, at 14.
627. Tolan & Brown, supra note 620, at 441.
628. POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 180, at 125.
629. Id.; ASSESSING PROGRAMS, supra note 620, at 59-92, 271-73; THE GREEN BOOK,
supra note 12, at 47; Tolan & Brown, supra note 620, at 459-60.
630. Id. at 125, 126. Consistent with this criticism, one researcher analyzed grant-
funding patterns of the major federal agency funding child abuse and neglect programs,
the National Center for Child Abuse and Neglect ("NCCAN"). Raymond H. Starr, Jr.,
The Need for Child Maltreatment Research and Program Evaluation, 5 J. FAM. VIOLENCE
311 (1990). His analysis of four years of funding revealed that most of the projects funded
had no evaluation component. Id. at 314.
631. Michael J. Saks, Legal Policy Analysis and Evaluation, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1110,
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Second, and at a more practical level, many note that it is
difficult to conduct methodologically-sound empirical research in
real-world policy contexts, particularly when the focus of the research
involves a population as challenging as violent families.63 Some claim
that it is not possible to overcome "methodological and logistical
problems" such as: "constructing and gaining access to appropriate
sample[s]" that include control or comparison groups; finding or
developing adequate assessment measures; maintaining subject
participation for sufficient follow-up periods in spite of high attrition
rates that typically characterize participation in family violence
services.6" Although there is no question that research with violent
families is difficult, "messy," and often hard to control, empirical
investigation must be attempted if we are to move forward to assist
affected children.6 4  In addition, there are a range of creative
methodological and statistical approaches that allow investigators to
adapt strategies and techniques to such real-world settings. N In one
1115 (1989).
632. See, e.g., ASSESSING PROGRAMS, supra note 620, at 14-17; Tolan & Brown, supra
note 620, at 440-45. For an insightful discussion of the methodological and practical
challenges of conducting and interpreting findings from an empirical comparison of foster
versus home placements for a sample of maltreated children, see WALD ET AL., supra note
280.
633. ASSESSING PROGRAMS, supra note 620, at 14-15.
634. In his foreword to Michael Wald and Wald's colleagues' ambitious empirical
comparison of foster care and home placements, James Garbarino presents a metaphorical
story of a man who searches for his lost car keys on a dark street at night. He searches for
them under a street light, despite the fact that he had dropped them "halfway across the
darkened street." His justification: "The light is better over here." Garbarino analogizes
this search to policy research because "the most important issues of policy that need
researching are so very difficult to study in the times and places and with the people most
relevant to those policy issues," and are therefore like doing research "'over there' in the
dark." James Garbarino, Foreword, in WALD ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND
NEGLECTED CHILDREN, at xv (1988).
635. See DONALD T. CAMPBELL & J.C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963); P.H. RosSI & H. E. FREEMAN,
EVALUATION: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH (1985); Tolan & Brown, supra note 620, at
449-460; Allan W. Wicker, Getting Out of Our Conceptual Ruts: Strategies for Expanding
Conceptual Frameworks, in METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN CLINICAL RESEARCH 41
(Alan E. Kazdin ed., 1992) See also ASSESSING PROGRAMS, supra note 620, at 304-05;
POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 180, at 123-26. The recent body of research
conducted by John Monahan, Henry Steadman, and their colleagues in the MacArthur
Research Network on Mental Health and the Law, provides superb examples of how
researcher ingenuity can overcome the challenges of conducting systematic research with
violent individuals. See generally JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK
ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE
(2001); John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Toward a Rejuvenation of Risk Assessment
Research, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL HEALTH DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK
ASSESSMENT 1 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994); Henry J. Steadman et
al., Designing a New Generation of Risk Assessment Research, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL
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such example, state policymakers, university researchers, and state
mental health service providers collaborated to permit a program
evaluation that was nothing short of a policy researcher's dream come
true. In the early 1980s, the Virginia state legislature mandated the
introduction and evaluation of a proposed statutory change in order
to assess whether the new policy should be effected statewide.'1
6
Using a "quasi-experimental design," '37  University of Virginia
researchers identified several Virginia locales as the sites for the
introduction of a new policy relating to procedures for pretrial
forensic evaluations of criminal defendants. These locales were
designated "experimental" jurisdictions, while in matched
"comparison" locales, state forensic evaluation policies remained
unchanged. Data were collected from both sets of jurisdictions
throughout the experimental period. Compliance of personnel in the
various jurisdictions with the project's requirements was legally-
mandated by the legislature. The results of the study were reported
to the legislature, which proceeded to pass a statute that implemented
the experimental change throughout the rest of the state.!" Although
opportunities for research with so much support within the state
government may not occur very frequently, this project does provide
a model of the types of strategies that may be used in evaluating the
effects of statutory changes.
Third, service providers may be concerned that employing
research methods will necessarily subvert the target populations'
DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 297 (John Monahan & Henry J.
Steadman eds., 1994). In the area of domestic violence, psychology professors Ernest
Jouriles and Cris Sullivan, together with their research teams, have pioneered carefully-
designed intervention studies, evaluating programs that provide services to battered
women and their children. See, e.g., Jouriles et al., Breaking the Cycle, supra note 580;
Sullivan & Bybee, Reducing Violence, supra note 579, at 43; Cris M. Sullivan et al.,
Retaining Participants in Longitudinal Community Research: A Comprehensive Protocol,
32 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 262 (1996); Cris M. Sullivan et al., An Advocacy Intervention
Program for Women with Abusive Partners: Six-Month Follow-Up, 22 AM. J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 101 (1994).
636. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL, COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS AND
THE COURTS (1984). The state gave a grant to University of Virginia researchers, and
authorized the researchers to design a study comparing the efficacy and cost-effectiveness
of community-based versus hospital-based pretrial forensic evaluations. Va. State Leg.
House Joint Res. No. 22 (requesting the Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation to establish a Forensic Evaluation Training and Research Center); id. at 130-
131. Ultimately, the study permitted an analysis of the effects of the proposed policy
change. The resultant data were used by the legislature in passing a statute that mandated
that this pioneering new policy be adopted throughout the state. Id. at 130-31.
637. DONALD T. CAMPBELL & J.C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963).
638. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 636, at 139-45. The statutory sections passed
following the study remain in the Virginia Code, essentially unchanged in the last twenty
years. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-169.1.B & 192.169.5.B (2000).
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clinical needs to the goals of the research endeavor, undermining the
agency's ability to meet the needs of its clientele.3 There is no
question that the use of a research design requiring random or other
predetermined assignment of particular cases to particular groups
will, for the duration of the study, limit the flexibility of practitioners
in working with the families, as will requirements to follow particular
intervention protocols and procedures. Yet, in the absence of
information as to whether current practice versus proposed reforms
are superior in achieving policy goals, it is difficult to sustain
challenges based on these factors. Sadly, there is little evidence that
reliance solely on the subjective judgment of caseworkers and child
welfare administrators is effective in meeting the needs of the
agencies' clientele.
Fourth, one may wonder whether using controlled research
designs in child protection contexts will be ethically-problematic,
constraining practitioners' abilities to respond as dictated by safety
needs of their clients. Again, this is an important concern, and must
be addressed directly and explicitly in the planning of the research.
Service providers must have a "safety valve" to use if there is, indeed,
a serious threat to a participants' well-being while participating in the
project. Obviously, in a family violence context, a design would
compare current or standard practice with the proposed reform, and
would not assign any of those who need service to a "no treatment"
or "waiting" group, as might be done in other types of studies. And,
if as a study progresses, it appears that one form of intervention is
superior to the other in advance of the predetermined date of
completing, provisions may be made to terminate the ineffective
intervention sooner than planned, and to offer the more effective
intervention to all of the study participants. 6
Another difficulty that may be encountered in conducting
evaluation research is the need for the specialized expertise. It may
be necessary that state and community agencies forge a partnership
with, for example, university-based researchers." Child protective
services agencies and researchers have not yet developed a tradition
of collaboration, although newer models and programs are breaking
639. Tolan & Brown, supra note 620, at 443-44.
640. For a discussion of the ethical considerations in determining whether to terminate
a randomized clinical trial in medical research prior to completion, see TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 325-36 (5th
ed. 2001).
641. ASSESSING PROGRAMS, supra note 620, at 305; Jeffrey L. Edleson & A.L. Bible,
Forced Bonding or Community Collaboration? Partnerships Between Science And Practice
in Research on Woman Battering, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE JOURNAL
(forthcoming).
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new ground. 42 Interagency and cross-specialty cooperation is one of
the primary themes of the emerging policy reform movement focusing
on the needs of children exposed to domestic violence. The
contributions that can be made by researchers based in universities,
government agencies, in private "think tanks" or foundations must be
a part of this inclusive strategy.
Ultimately, there may be disputes about who "owns" the data,
for purposes of dissemination of results. Ethical questions may arise
as to when empirical findings are sufficiently robust to be used to
formulate public policy, such as: How many confirming studies are
necessary, with what magnitude of findings, and with what levels of
statistical significance?6 There are no hard and fast answers to these
dilemmas. Most important is that the collaborative team seeks to
address these questions prospectively65
Some may be concerned that, in an era of tight finances, funding
evaluation research is too costly. Yet, engaging in trial and error
experimentation without accumulating evidence of efficacy is
certainly less cost-effective than is obtaining a useful body of
knowledge about the impact of legal changes. Meaningful findings
will pay their own way in the long run.
There are a variety of ways to seek funding for policy research of
the type proposed here. Most states have mechanisms through which
a legislature can request and fund empirical research. Often the
administrative agencies charged with implementing certain laws have
the capacity to conduct internal research, or have grant-making
divisions that can seek proposals from, select, and monitor the
researchers outside of the organization. 6  In addition, federal
agencies have recently committed substantial dollars to funding work
of the type described here,67 and some private foundations have made
family violence research a priority.64'
642. See supra notes 107-09, 122-24 and accompanying text.
643. THE GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 28-31.
644. Lois A. Weithorn, Professional Responsibility in the Dissemination of
Psychological Research in Legal Contexts, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 253,259 (1987).
645. Id. at 258-63.
646. For example, in California, the Center for Families, Children and the Courts of the
Judicial Council's Administrative Office of the Courts funds selected projects in areas
related to family violence. See http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programslcfcc/aboutus/
aboutus.html; http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcclprograms/research.html; http:ll
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/programs/FamViol.htm.
647. See supra notes 12 and 16.
648. See, e.g., THE DAVID AND LUCILE PACKARD FOUNDATION, PROGRAM
OVERVIEW 15 (2001) (discussing the Foundation's support for programs "that improve
outcomes for children in the child protection system" with a goal of protecting "children
from the harm of violence in their homes").
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Finally, some may argue that policymakers will not pay attention
to research findings once the studies are completed. As Professor
James White points out, the time frames required to complete
empirical research studies are often out-of-sync with legislative
agendas. 9 Whereas legislators strive to act quickly in response to the
demands of their constituencies, good research takes years to
complete.6s And, as we all know, often a single headline-grabbing
tragedy motivates a legislator or executive to take action against a
newly-identified social problem.651 Whether the child affected by the
tragedy is Mary Ellen Wilson or Kayla McKeon, if the social climate
is conducive, there may be political and public efforts to respond.
Yet, there is no question, as Lisbeth Schorr has underscored in
her two recent books, that successful programs exist, and that despite
empirical research demonstrating efficacy, the programs are not
expanded beyond the initial model or pilot phases.6 2 Whereas it is
beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the challenges facing
reformers seeking to apply empirical research findings in a policy
context653 there are some approaches that may be helpful. The most
effective strategy in surmounting such obstacles is likely to be one
that recognizes the challenges up front-be they political, financial,
related to institutional inertia, bureaucratic obstacles, or other
factors-and which works prospectively to avoid as many pitfalls as
possible. To the extent that researchers and administrators can
develop a good data base on the effectiveness of various policy
approaches, perhaps when that opportune moment arrives, the forces
of politics and science can join together to improve the lives of
children affected by family violence.
649. James J. White, Phoebe's Lament, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2773,2776 (2000).
650. Id.
651. Id. at 2778 (discussing the power of anecdotal information about a "single vivid
example" when contrasted with "abstract data from multiple respondents"). For a
sociological analysis of how individual cases picked up by the media influence child
maltreatment policy, see John M. Johnson, Horror Stories and the Construction of Child
Abuse, in IMAGES OF ISSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 17 (Joel
Best ed., 2d ed. 1995).
652. See LISBETH B. SCHORR, COMMON PURPOSE: STRENGTHENING FAMILIES AND
NEIGHBORHOODS TO REBUILD AMERICA 1-21 (1997) [hereinafter COMMON PURPOSE];
LISBETH B. SCHORR, WITHIN OUR REACH: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DISADVANTAGE
(1988). See also Judith C. Meyers & Brian L. Wilcox, Public Policy Applications of
Research on Violence and Children, in VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY,
supra note 3, at 465, 468-70.
653. See generally COMMON PURPOSE, supra note 652. See also White, supra note 649,
at 2774-79 (suggesting a range of explanations for the tendencies of legislatures to ignore
empirical findings).
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Conclusion
Domestic violence, like child maltreatment, has been around
since the first settlers approached the shores of this nation, and well
before that around the world. Yet, only in very recent years have we
begun to recognize and direct attention to the relationship between
these two phenomena. It is nothing short of startling that, until very
recently, the co-occurrence of domestic violence and child
maltreatment was not recognized by either the child protection
workers whose charge it is to try to protect children from
maltreatment, or in the scholarly literature.
Now that the relationship between domestic violence and child
abuse and neglect is acknowledged, however, we are presented with a
rare opportunity. To the extent that we have models for the effective
handling of domestic violence cases involving children, which is
between half and three-quarters of all cases of child abuse or neglect,
the door may be open to greater success with a substantial portion of
the traditional child protection system caseload. Against the
backdrop of almost a half-century of child protection system
interventions of questionable efficacy, a novel and viable philosophy
and strategy of intervention may be within reach.6" This innovative
way of looking at child protection cases has not yet been adequately
tested, but it provides a glimmer of hope within a disappointing story
of child protective services in the United States. The following case
scenario, reported by Whitney and Davis as it relates to the impact of
the Massachusetts domestic violence-child protection system
collaboration, gives us a peek at that glimmer of hope:
A married pregnant mother of 12 children had been involved with
DSS for over 9 years. Each child protection report alleged neglect
of the children by their mother. During the life of the case, several
children had been adopted, the majority had been in foster are, and
three were left in her custody. Numerous services had been tried
with marginal success. Many social workers came and went. No
worker knew this woman was the victim of severe domestic
violence. No worker knew she was raped after every beating by her
husband. No one knew this woman's children were physically
beaten with planks of wood for trying to protect her. No one knew
she was beaten with planks of wood for trying to protect them. Ten
years into the case, the mother was interviewed by a battered
women's advocate for the first time. When she was asked if she was
654. I do not suggest that adoption of this strategy will cure all, or even most, of the
problems confronted in the provision of child protection services. Many have noted that
the system confronts numerous challenges, see e.g., supra notes 243-45 & 252, which
extend far beyond the reach of the interventions proposed in Part V of this Article. I do
suggest, however, that adoption of this strategy may open the doors to effective
intervention with those seemingly intractable cases in which the perpetration of domestic
violence has been a primary component.
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safe in her relationship, she replied "Why do you care about me
now?" Once the domestic violence was uncovered, the advocate
was able to engage the mother in safety planning and work with the
criminal justice system to decrease the father's access to the family.
The mother left her husband and was able to regain custody of
some of her children.'55
In short, the new paradigm begins with an understanding that the
safety and well-being of a child and her nonabusive parent are linked.
Whether in response to a statutory mandate, internal changes in
policy and procedures in the child protection system, new
collaborative relationships between child protection and domestic
violence agencies, or the enlightenment of individual professionals
who come into contact with domestic violence victims and their
children, this paradigm presents us with a chance to transcend past
failures and work toward policies that are likely to promote the best
interests of children exposed to domestic violence.
655. This scenario is reprinted verbatim from Whitney & Davis, supra note 111, at 159-
60.
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Table 1: Psychological Maltreatment
Forms**
Six Major Types of Psychological Maltreatment Are Described
Below and Further Clarified by Identification of Subcategories
A repeated pattern or extreme incident(s) of the conditions described in this table
constitute psychological maltreatment. Such conditions convey the message that
the child is worthless, flawed, unloved, endangered, or only valuable in meeting
someone else's needs.
SPURNING (Hostile Rejecting/Degrading) includes verbal and non-verbal
caretaker acts that reject and degrade a child. SPURNING includes the following:
* Belittling, degrading and other nonphysical forms of overtly hostile or
rejecting treatment
" Shaming and/or ridiculing the child for showing normal emotions such as
affection, grief or sorrow
" Consistently singling out one child to criticize and punish, to perform most of
the household chores, or to receive fewer rewards
* Public humiliation
TERRORIZING includes caretaker behavior that threatens or is likely to
physically hurt, kill, abandon, or place the child or child's loved ones or objects in
recognizably dangerous situations. TERRORIZING includes the following:
* Placing a child in unpredictable or chaotic circumstances
" Placing a child in recognizably dangerous situations
* Setting rigid or unrealistic expectations with threat of loss, harm, or danger if
they are not met
" Threatening or perpetrating violence against the child
" Threatening or perpetrating violence against a child's loved ones or objects
* Exploiting a child's fears and vulnerabilities by threatening to isolate, spurn,
become emotionally unavailable, or exploit and corrupt
** SOURCE : Office for the Study of the Psychological Rights of the Child, Indiana
University, Purdue University at Indianapolis, 902 West New York Street, Indianapolis,
IN 46202-5155.
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ISOLATING includes caretaker acts that consistently deny the child opportunities
to meet needs for interacting or communicating with peers or adults inside or
outside the home. ISOLATING includes the following:
* Confining the child or placing unreasonable limitations on the child's freedom
of movement within his/her environment
" Placing unreasonable limitations or restrictions on the child's social
interactions with the home
* Placing unreasonable limitations or restrictions on social interactions with
peers or adults in the community
EXPLOITING/CORRUPTING includes caretaker acts that encourage the child
to develop inappropriate behaviors (self-destructive, anti-social, criminal, deviant
or other maladaptive behaviors). EXPLOITING/CORRUPTING includes the
following:
" Modeling, permitting or encouraging antisocial behavior (e.g. prostitution,
performance in pornographic media, initiation of criminal activities, substance
abuse, violence to or corruption of others)
" Modeling, permitting, or encouraging developmentally inappropriate
behavior (e.g., parentification, infantalization, living the parent's unfulfilled
dreams)
* Encouraging or coercing abandonment of developmentally appropriate
autonomy through extreme overinvolvement, intrusiveness, and/or
dominance (e.g., allowing little or no opportunity or support for child's views,
feelings, and -wishes; micromanaging child's life)
* Restricting or interfering with cognitive development
DENYING EMOTIONAL RESPONSIVENESS (Ignoring) includes caretaker
acts that ignore that child's attempts and needs to interact (failing to express
affection, caring, and love for the child) and show no emotion in interactions with
the child. DENYING EMOTIONAL RESPONSIVENESS includes the
following:
* Being detached and uninvolved through either incapacity or lack of
motivation
* Interacting only when absolutely necessary
" Failing to express affection, caring, and love for the child
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MENTAL HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT includes
unwarranted caretaker acts that ignore, refuse to allow, or fail to provide the
necessary treatment for the mental health, medical, and educational problems or
needs of the child. MENTAL HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND EDUCATIONAL
NEGLECT includes the following:
" Ignoring the need for, failing or refusing to allow or provide, treatment for
serious emotional/behavioral problems or needs of the child
* Ignoring the need for, failing or refusing to allow or provide, treatment for
serious physical health problems or needs of the child
" Ignoring the need for, or refusing to allow or provide, treatment for serious
educational problems or needs of the child
